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Towards the end of 2011, Pusey, Barrett andRudolph derived a theorem that aimed to showthat the quantum state must be ontic (a state
of reality) in a broad class of realist approaches to
quantum theory. This result attracted a lot of atten-
tion and controversy. The aim of this review article
is to review the background to the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem, to provide a clear presentation of
the theorem itself, and to review related work that has
appeared since the publication of the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph paper. In particular, this review: Explains
what it means for the quantum state to be ontic or
epistemic (a state of knowledge); Reviews arguments
for and against an ontic interpretation of the quan-
tum state as they existed prior to the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem; Explains why proving the reality
of the quantum state is a very strong constraint on
realist theories in that it would imply many of the
known no-go theorems, such as Bell’s Theorem and
the need for an exponentially large ontic state space;
Provides a comprehensive presentation of the Pusey–
Barrett–Rudolph Theorem itself, along with subse-
quent improvements and criticisms of its assump-
tions; Reviews two other arguments for the reality of
the quantum state: the first due to Hardy and the
second due to Colbeck and Renner, and explains why
their assumptions are less compelling than those of
the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem; Reviews sub-
sequent work aimed at ruling out stronger notions of
what it means for the quantum state to be epistemic
and points out open questions in this area. The over-
all aim is not only to provide the background needed
for the novice in this area to understand the current
status, but also to discuss often overlooked subtleties
that should be of interest to the experts.
Quanta 2014; 3: 67–155.
1. Introduction
In 1964, John Bell fundamentally changed the way that
we think about quantum theory [1]. Abner Shimony fa-
mously referred to tests of Bell’s Theorem as “experi-
mental metaphysics” [2], but I disagree with this charac-
terization. What Bell’s Theorem really shows us is that
the foundations of quantum theory is a bona fide field of
physics, in which questions are to be resolved by rigor-
ous argument and experiment, rather than remaining the
subject of open-ended debate. In other words, it is a mis-
take to crudely divide quantum theory into its practical
part and its interpretation, and to think of the latter as
metaphysics, experimental or otherwise.
In the wake of Bell’s Theorem, the study of entangle-
ment and nonlocality has become a mainstream field of
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physics, particularly in light of its practical applications in
quantum information science, but Bell’s broader lesson—
that the interpretation of quantum theory should be ap-
proached as a rigorous science—has rather been missed.
This is nowhere more evident than in debates about the
status of the quantum state. The question of just what
type of thing the quantum state, or wavefunction, repre-
sents, has been with us since the beginnings of quantum
theory. The likes of de Broglie and Schro¨dinger initially
wanted to view the wavefunction as a real physical wave,
just like the waves of classical field theory, with perhaps
some additional structure to account for particle-like or
“quantum” properties [3]. In contrast, following Born’s
introduction of the probability rule [4], the Copenhagen
interpretation advocated by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli et. al.
came to view the wavefunction as a “probability wave”
and denied the need for a more fundamental reality to
underlie it [5]. In modern terms, most realist interpre-
tations of quantum theory; such as many-worlds [6–8],
de Broglie–Bohm theory [9–12], spontaneous collapse
theories [13,14], and modal interpretations [15]; view the
wavefunction as part of reality, whereas those that follow
more Copenhagenish lines [16–26] tend to view it as a
representation of knowledge, information, or belief. The
big advantage of the latter view is that the notorious col-
lapse of the wavefunction can be explained as the effect
of acquiring new information, no more serious than the
updating of classical probabilities in the light of new data,
rather than as an anomalous physical process that needs
to be eliminated or explained away.
The question then is whether this is a necessary di-
chotomy. Is the only way to avoid having this weird
multidimensional object as part of reality to give up on
reality altogether, or can we reach a compromise in which
there is a well-founded reality, but one in which the wave-
function only represents knowledge? This seems like a
question that is ripe for attacking with the kind of con-
ceptual rigor that Bell brought to nonlocality, and indeed
Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph have recently proven a the-
orem to the effect that the wavefunction must be ontic
(i.e. a state of reality), as opposed to epistemic (i.e. a state
of knowledge) in a broad class of realist approaches to
quantum theory [27].
Since then, there has been much discussion and crit-
icism of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem in both
formal [28–39] and informal venues [40–49], as well as a
couple of attempts to derive the same conclusion as Pusey–
Barrett–Rudolph from different assumptions [50,51]. The
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem and its successors all
employ auxiliary assumptions of varying degrees of rea-
sonableness. Without these assumptions, it has been
shown that the wavefunction may be epistemic [52].
Therefore, there has also been subsequent work aimed
at ruling out stronger notions of what it means for the
wavefunction to be epistemic, without using such auxil-
iary assumptions [53–60]. The aim of this review article
is to provide the background necessary for understanding
these results, to provide a comprehensive presentation
and criticism of them, and to explain their implications.
One of the most intriguing things about proving that
the wavefunction must be ontic is that it would imply a
large number of existing no-go results, including Bell’s
Theorem [1] and excess baggage theorems [61–63](i.e.
showing that the size of the ontic state space must be
infinite and must scale exponentially with the number
of systems). Therefore, even apart from its foundational
significance, proving the reality of the wavefunction could
potentially provide a powerful unification of the known
no-go theorems, and may have applications in quantum
information theory.
My aim is that this review should be accessible to as
wide an audience as possible, but I have made three de-
cisions about how to present the material that make my
treatment somewhat more involved than those found else-
where in the literature. Firstly, I adopt rigorous measure
theoretic probability theory. It is common in the literature
to specialize to finite sample spaces or to adopt a less
rigorous approach to continuous spaces, which basically
involves proving all results as if you were dealing with
smooth and continuous probability densities and then
hoping everything still works when you throw in a bunch
of Dirac delta functions. Although a measure theoretic
approach may reduce accessibility, there are important
reasons for adopting it. It would be odd to attempt to
prove the reality of the wavefunction within a framework
that does not admit a model in which the wavefunction
is real in the first place. Since the wavefunction involves
continuous parameters, this means that there is no op-
tion of specializing to finite sample spaces. Furthermore,
there are several special cases of interest for which the
optimistic non-rigorous approach simply does not work,
including the case where the wavefunction, and only the
wavefunction, is the state of reality. Therefore, in order
to cover all the cases of interest, there is really no option
other than taking a measure theoretic approach. As an
aid to accessibility, I outline how the main definitions and
arguments specialize to the case of a finite sample space,
which should be sufficient for those who do not wish to
get embroiled in the technical details.
Secondly, it is common in the literature to assume that
we are interested in modeling all pure states and all pro-
jective measurements on some finite dimensional Hilbert
space, and to specialize results to that context. However,
some results apply equally to subsets of states and mea-
surements, which I call fragments of quantum theory. In
addition, it is known that some fragments of quantum
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theory, have natural models in which the wavefunction is
epistemic [64–66]. Therefore, I think it is important to
emphasize the minimal structures in which the various
results can be proved, rather than just assuming that we
are trying to model all states and measurements on some
Hilbert space.
The third presentation decision concerns my treatment
of preparation contextuality (see §5.3 for the formal def-
inition). The main issue we are interested in is whether
pure quantum states must be ontic, since it is uncontro-
versial that mixed states can at least sometimes represent
lack of knowledge about which of a set of pure states was
prepared. It is common in the literature to assume that
each pure quantum state is represented by a unique prob-
ability measure over the possible states of reality, but I
do not make this assumption. In a preparation contextual
model, different methods of preparing a quantum state
may lead to different probability measures. In fact, this
must occur for mixed states [67], so it seems sensible to
allow for the possibility that it might occur for pure states
as well. In addition, some of the intermediate results to be
discussed hold equally well for mixed states, but this can
only be established by adopting definitions that are broad
enough to encompass mixed states, which are necessarily
preparation contextual.
These three presentation decisions mean that the defini-
tions, statements of results, and proofs that appear in this
review often differ from those in the existing literature.
Generally, this is just a matter of making a few obvious
generalizations, without substantively changing the ideas.
For this reason, I do not explicitly point out where such
generalizations have been made.
The review is divided into three parts. Part I is a gen-
eral review of the distinction between ontic and epistemic
interpretations of the quantum state. It discusses the ar-
guments that had been given for ontic and epistemic in-
terpretations of the wavefunction prior to the discovery
of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem. My aim in this
part is to convince you that there is some merit to the
epistemic interpretation and that previous arguments for
the reality of the quantum state are unconvincing. In this
part, I also give a formal definition of the class of mod-
els to which the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem and
related results apply, and define what it means for the
quantum state to be ontic or epistemic within this class
of models. Following this, I give a detailed discussion of
the other no-go theorems that would follow as corollaries
of proving the reality of the wavefunction.
Part II reviews the three theorems that attempt to
prove the reality of the wavefunction: the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem, Hardy’s Theorem, and the Colbeck–
Renner Theorem. The treatment of the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem is the most detailed of the three, since
it has attracted the largest literature and has been subject
to the largest amount of confusion and criticism. In my
view, it makes the strongest case of the three theorems
for the reality of the wavefunction, although it is still
not bulletproof, so I go to some lengths to sort the silly
criticisms from the substantive ones. The assumptions
behind the Hardy and Colbeck–Renner Theorems receive
a more critical treatment, but the theorems are still pre-
sented in detail because they are interestingly related to
other arguments about realist interpretations of quantum
theory.
Part III deals with attempts to go beyond the rigid dis-
tinction between epistemic and ontic interpretations of
the wavefunction by positing stronger constraints on epis-
temic interpretations. One of the aims of doing this is
to remove the problematic auxiliary assumptions needed
to prove the three main theorems, whilst still arriving at
a conclusion that is morally similar. This part is shorter
than the other two and mostly just summarizes the known
results without proof. The reason for this is that many of
the results are only preliminary and will likely be super-
seded by the time this review is published. My main aim
in this part is to point out the most promising directions
for future research.
Part I. The ψ-ontic/epistemic
distinction
The results reviewed in this paper aim to show that the
quantum state must be ontic (a state of reality) rather than
epistemic (a state of knowledge). What does this mean
and why is it important? The word “ontology” derives
from the Greek word for “being” and refers to the branch
of metaphysics that concerns the character of things that
exist. In the present context, an ontic state refers to some-
thing that objectively exists in the world, independently
of any observer or agent. In other words, ontic states are
the things that would still exist if all intelligent beings
were suddenly wiped out from the universe. On the other
hand, “epistemology” is the branch of philosophy that
studies of the nature and scope of knowledge. An epis-
temic state is therefore a description of what an observer
currently knows about a physical system. It is something
that exists in the mind of the observer rather than in the
external physical world.
In classical mechanics, the distinction between ontic
and epistemic states is fairly clear. A single Newtonian
particle in one dimension has a position x and a momen-
tum p and these are objective properties of the particle
that exist independently of us. All other objective prop-
erties of the particle are functions of x and p. The ontic
state of the particle is therefore the phase space point
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(a) An ontic state is a point in phase space.
p
x
(b) An epistemic state is a probability density on phase space.
Contours indicate lines of equal probability density.
1f 2f
( , )x p
(c) An ontic state (cross) is deemed possible in more than one
epistemic state ( f1 and f2). Phase space has been schemati-
cally collapsed down to one dimension for illustrative pur-
poses.
Figure 1: The distinction between ontic and epistemic states
in single particle classical mechanics.
(x, p). This evolves according to Hamilton’s equations
dp
dt
= −∂H
∂x
dx
dt
=
∂H
∂p
, (1)
where H is the Hamiltonian. On the other hand, if we do
not know the exact position and momentum of the particle
then our knowledge about its ontic state is represented by
a probability density f (x, p) over phase space. By apply-
ing Hamilton’s equations to the individual phase space
points on which f (x, p) is supported, it can be shown that
f (x, p) evolves according to Liouville’s equation
∂ f
∂t
=
∂H
∂x
∂ f
∂p
− ∂H
∂p
∂ f
∂x
. (2)
The probability density f (x, p) is our epistemic state. See
Fig. 1 for an illustration of the distinction between classi-
cal ontic and epistemic states. For other types of classical
system the situation is analogous, the only difference be-
ing the dimension of the phase space, e.g. 6N dimensions
for N particles in 3 dimensional space or a continuum
for field systems. The phase space point is still the ontic
state and a probability density over phase space is the
epistemic state.
Note that calling a probability density “epistemic” is
controversial in some circles. It presupposes a broadly
Bayesian interpretation of probability theory in which
probabilities represent an agent’s knowledge, information,
or beliefs. Fortunately, the issue at stake does not really
depend on this as it also appears in other interpretations of
probability under a different name. What is important is
that the states dubbed “epistemic” only have probabilistic
import so they cannot be regarded as intrinsic properties
of individual physical systems. The key property that this
implies is that a given ontic state is deemed possible in
more than one epistemic state.
On the Bayesian reading, this is due to the fact that
different agents may have different knowledge about one
and the same physical system. For example, perhaps
Alice knows the position of a classical particle exactly
but nothing about its momentum, whilst Bob knows the
momentum precisely but nothing about its position. Alice
and Bob would then assign different probability distribu-
tions to the system, with the crucial property that they
would overlap on the ontic state actually occupied by the
system.
Other interpretations of probability exhibit the same
property in a different way. For example, on a frequentist
account of probability, probabilities represent the relative
frequencies of occurrence of some property in an ensem-
ble of independently and identically prepared systems. In
this context, we would talk about a state being “statistical”
rather than “epistemic”. The statistical state of a system
depends upon the choice of ensemble that the individual
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system is regarded as being a part of. For example, sup-
pose a classical particle occupies the phase space point
(1 m, 1 kgms−1). If we regard it as part of an ensemble
of particles that all have positive position, but some have
negative momentum, then it will be assigned a different
probability distribution than if we regard it as part of an
ensemble of particles all of which have positive momen-
tum, but some have negative position. In the former case,
the probability distribution will have support on negative
momentum phase space points and in the latter case it
will have support on negative position phase space points.
The point is that ensembles consist of more than one indi-
vidual system and the same ontic state may occur as a part
of many different ensembles. A frequentist will not be
lead astray by substituting the word “statistical” for every
occurrence of the word “epistemic” in this article, but
the latter terminology is used here because it has become
standard.
Interpretations of probability that involve single-case
objective chances present more of a challenge for the
ontic/epistemic distinction, since they imply that proba-
bilities can at least sometimes be ontic. Nevertheless, I
believe that an appropriate distinction can still be made in
most of these theories. This discussion is deferred to Ap-
pendix §A since it is mainly of interest to those concerned
with the philosophy of probability. However, it is worth
mentioning that many of those who have felt the need to
introduce objective chances have been motivated in part
by the role that probability plays in physics, and in quan-
tum theory in particular. Since quantum probabilities are
functions of the wavefunction, they only present a novel
issue for the interpretation of probability if the wavefunc-
tion itself is ontic because only then would quantum prob-
abilities need to have a more objective status than they do
in classical physics. Since the status of the wavefunction
is precisely the question at issue, it is perhaps wise to
defer judgment on the necessity of objective chances until
the reality of the wavefunction is decided.
What is at stake then is the following question: When
a quantum state |ψ〉 is assigned to a physical system, does
this mean that there is some independently existing prop-
erty of the individual system that is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with |ψ〉 (up to a global phase), or is |ψ〉 simply
a mathematical tool for determining probabilities, existing
only in the minds and calculations of quantum theorists?
This is perhaps the most hotly debated issue in all of
quantum foundations. I refer to it as the ψ-ontic/epistemic
distinction and use the terms ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic to de-
scribe interpretations that adopt an ontic/epistemic view
of the quantum state. Holders of the ψ-ontic view have
been dubbed ψ-ontologists by Christopher Granade (a
masters student in Rob Spekkens’ quantum foundations
course at Perimeter Institute in 2010) and, continuing in
this vein, I refer to the reality of the quantum state as
ψ-ontology and to theorems that attempt to establish this
view as ψ-ontology theorems.
To avoid misunderstanding, note that the ψ-
ontic/epistemic distinction is not about whether quantum
states are ontic independently of whether quantum the-
ory is exactly true. It is not about whether the ultimate
final theory of physics, if indeed such a thing exists, will
feature quantum states as part of its ontology. We have
little idea of what such a final theory might look like and
consequently we have little idea of what reality is actually
made of at the most fundamental level. Nevertheless, we
can still ask what quantum theory itself says about reality.
In other words, we are imagining a hypothetical world
in which quantum theory is in fact a completely correct
theory of physics, and asking whether quantum states
would have to be ontological in that world. That world
is very unlikely to be our actual world, so the question
is really about the internal structure of quantum theory.
More specifically, it is about what kinds of explanation
are compatible with quantum theory. For example, a
ψ-ontic view implies that we should draw analogies be-
tween quantum states and phase space points when com-
paring quantum and classical physics, and between the
Schro¨dinger equation and Hamilton’s equations, whereas
a ψ-epistemic view says that the appropriate analogies
are between quantum states and probability distributions,
and between the Schro¨dinger equation and Liouville’s
equation. If nothing else, this strongly impacts how we
are to understand the classical limit of quantum theory
(e.g. see [68–71]). So, whilst the ontic/epistemic question
may at first sight seem abstract and philosophical, it does
in fact have concrete implications for physics.
The remainder of this part is structured as follows. §2
discusses arguments in favor of the ψ-epistemic view,
with the aim of convincing you that ψ-ontology theorems
are telling us something deep and surprising. For those
that remain unconvinced, §3 reviews the main arguments
for the reality of quantum states that were given prior to
the discovery of ψ-ontology theorems. In my view, none
of these are particularly compelling, so even someone
who is already convinced of the reality of quantum states
needs something like a ψ-ontology theorem if they aspire
to defend their position with the same sort of conceptual
force with which Bell derived nonlocality. Following
this, §4 introduces the framework of ontological mod-
els, in which ψ-ontology theorems are proven, and gives
the rigorous definition of the ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinc-
tion. Finally, §5 discusses the implications of proving
ψ-ontology, by showing that several existing no-go theo-
rems can be derived from it.
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2. Arguments for a ψ-epistemic
interpretation
Before getting into the details of ψ-epistemic expla-
nations, it is important to distinguish two kinds of ψ-
epistemic interpretation. The most popular type are those
variously described as anti-realist, instrumentalist, or pos-
itivist. Since these labels are often intended as terms of
abuse, I prefer to call these approaches neo-Copenhagen
in order to avoid implications for the philosophy of sci-
ence that go way beyond how we choose to understand
quantum theory. All such interpretations bear a fam-
ily resemblance to the Copenhagen interpretation in that
they are both ψ-epistemic and they deny the need for
any deeper description of reality beyond quantum the-
ory. Here, by “Copenhagen” I mean the views of Bohr,
Heisenberg, Pauli et. al. (see e.g. [5]), which are clearly
ψ-epistemic, rather than the view often found under this
name in textbooks, which is actually due to Dirac [72]
and von Neumann [73] and is more ambiguous about
whether the wavefunction is real. If asked what quantum
states represent knowledge about, neo-Copenhagenists
are likely to answer that they represent knowledge about
the outcomes of future measurements, rather than knowl-
edge of some underlying observer-independent reality.
Modern neo-Copenhagen views include the Quantum
Bayesianism of Caves, Fuchs and Schack [16–18], the
views of of Bub and Pitowsky [19], the quantum pragma-
tism of Healey [21], the relational quantum mechanics
of Rovelli [22], the empiricist interpretation of W. M. de
Muynck [23], as well as the views of David Mermin [24],
Asher Peres [25], and Brukner and Zeilinger [26]. Some
may quibble about whether all these interpretations resem-
ble Copenhagen enough to be called neo-Copenhagen, but
for present purposes all that matters is that these authors
do not view the quantum state as an intrinsic property of
an individual system and they do not believe that a deeper
reality is required to make sense of quantum theory.
The second type of ψ-epistemic interpretation are those
that are realist, in the sense that they do posit some un-
derlying ontology. They just deny that the wavefunction
is part of that ontology. Instead, the wavefunction is
to be understood as representing our knowledge of the
underlying reality, in the same way that a probability
distribution on phase space represents our knowledge of
the true phase space point occupied by a classical parti-
cle. There is evidence that Einstein’s view was of this
type [74]. Ballentine’s statistical interpretation [75] is
also compatible with this view in that he leaves open the
possibility that hidden variables exist and only insists that,
if they do exist, the wavefunction remains statistical (as
a frequentist, Ballentine uses the term “statistical” rather
than “epistemic”). More recently, Spekkens has been a
strong advocate of this point of view [64].
Neo-Copenhagen and realist ψ-epistemic interpreta-
tions share much of the same explanatory structure, since
they both view probability measures as the correct classi-
cal analogy for the wavefunction. Many of the arguments
for adopting a ψ-epistemic interpretation apply equally
to both of them. On the other hand, ψ-ontology theo-
rems only apply to realist interpretations. This is to be
expected as it would be difficult to prove that the wave-
function must be ontic in a framework that does not admit
the existence of ontic states in the first place. Because of
this, ψ-epistemicists always have the option of becoming
neo-Copenhagen in the face of ψ-ontology theorems.
Realist ψ-epistemic interpretations are already strongly
constrained by existing no-go theorems, such as Bell’s
Theorem [1] and the Kochen–Specker Theorem [76],
which go some way to explaining why not many con-
crete ψ-epistemic models have been proposed. However,
there is no reason to view these results as decisive against
realist ψ-epistemic interpretations any more than they
are decisive against realist ψ-ontic interpretations. For
example, Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse
theories still attract considerable support despite display-
ing nonlocality and contextuality, as the existing no-go
theorems imply they must. Thus, we would be guilty
of a double-standard if we ruled out realist ψ-epistemic
interpretations on the basis of these results but still admit-
ted the possibility of ψ-ontic ones. What is needed is a
theorem that explicitly addresses the ψ-ontic/epistemic
distinction, and this is the gap that ψ-ontology theorems
are intended to fill.
In the remainder of this section, the main arguments in
favor of ψ-epistemic interpretations are reviewed. Be-
cause we do not have a fully worked out realist ψ-
epistemic model that covers the whole of quantum theory,
it is helpful to introduce toy models that are similar to
quantum theory in some respects, but in which the anal-
ogous notion to the quantum state is clearly epistemic.
These are intended to demonstrate the kinds of explana-
tion that are possible in ψ-epistemic theories. Spekkens’
toy theory [64], which reinvigorated interest in realist
ψ-epistemic models in recent years, is reviewed in §2.1.
There are also ψ-epistemic models that cover fragments
of quantum theory, e.g. just pure state preparations and
projective measurements of a single qubit or just continu-
ous variable systems when restricted to Gaussian states
and operations. These are reviewed in §2.2. Finally, I
review three further arguments for the ψ-epistemic view
based on the fact that quantum theory can be viewed as a
generalization of classical probability theory in §2.3, on
the collapse of the wavefunction in §2.4, and on the size
of the quantum state space in §2.5.
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Figure 2: The ontic state space of Spekkens toy-bit. The ontic
states are labeled (x, y) where x and y take values ±1, which
are abbreviated to ± for compactness.
2.1. Spekkens toy bit
Spekkens introduced a toy theory [64] that qualitatively
reproduces the physics of spin-1/2 particles (or any other
instantiation of qubits) when they are prepared and mea-
sured in the x, y and z bases. The full version of Spekkens
theory incorporates dynamics and composite systems, in-
cluding reproducing some of the phenomena associated
with entangled states but, for illustrative purposes, we
restrict attention to the simplest case of a single toy bit.
The toy theory is meant to demonstrate the explanatory
power of ψ-epistemic interpretations by providing natu-
ral explanations of many quantum phenomena that are
puzzling if the quantum state is ontic. A toy bit consists
of a system that can be in one of four states, labeled
(−,−), (−,+), (+,−) and (+,+). In Fig. 2, these are de-
picted laid out as a grid in the x − y plane, with the origin
lying at the center of the grid. The ontic states can then be
thought of as representing the coordinates of the centers
of the grid cells, given by (x, y), with ± short for ±1. For
concreteness, one can imagine that the cells of the grid
represent four boxes and that the system is a ball that can
be in one of them. The ontic state (x, y) then represents
the state of affairs in which the ball is in the box centered
on the coordinates (x, y).
The most fine grained description of the toy bit is al-
ways its ontic state, but we might not know exactly which
of the ontic states is occupied. In general, our knowledge
of the system is described by a probability distribution
over the four ontic states, and this probability distribu-
tion is our epistemic state. Spekkens imagines that there
is a restriction on the set of epistemic states that may
States Measurements
| )x+ | )x−
| )y+ | )y−
| )z+ | )z−
X
Y
Z
+
+
+ +
+
+
−
−
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−
Figure 3: The allowed states and measurements of Spekkens’
toy bit. For the states, a red square indicates that the corre-
sponding ontic state has probability 1/2 and a white square
indicates probability 0. For the measurements, a square labeled
+ gives the +1 outcome with certainty and a square labeled −
gives the −1 outcome with certainty.
be assigned to the system, called the knowledge-balance
principle, which is in some ways analogous to the un-
certainty principle. Roughly speaking, the knowledge
balance principle states that at most half of the informa-
tion needed to specify the ontic state can be known at any
given time. This means, for example, that if we know the
x-coordinate with certainty then we cannot know anything
about the y-coordinate. Given this restriction, there are
six possible states of maximal knowledge, termed pure
states, as shown in the left hand side of Fig. 3. The pure
states are denoted |x±) , |y±) , |z±) in analogy to the quan-
tum states |x±〉 , |y±〉 , |z±〉 of a spin-1/2 particle. Note
that the epistemic states |z±) are not states with a definite
value of the z-coordinate. The system is two dimensional
so it does not have a third coordinate. Instead, |z+) is the
state in which we know only that the x and y coordinates
are equal and |z−) is the state in which we know only that
they are different. Defining z = xy, this is equivalent to
saying that |z±) is the state in which we know only that
z = ±1.
Although the knowledge balance principle has been
imposed by hand, it is easy to imagine that it could arise
from a lack of fine-grained control over the system. For
example, imagine a preparation device that pushes the
ball to the left along the x-axis, but that same device also
causes a random disturbance to the y-coordinate, such
that the best we can do after operating the device is to
assign the state |x−).
Having described the epistemic states of the theory, the
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next task is to describe the measurements. Spekkens re-
quires that measurements be repeatable, which means that
if a measurement is repeated twice in succession then it
should yield the same outcome both times. Also, the mea-
surement should respect the knowledge balance principle,
so that our epistemic state after the measurement contains
at most half of the information required to specify the
ontic state. In order to satisfy this second requirement,
the measurement must necessarily cause a disturbance
to the ontic state, since otherwise we could end up in a
situation in which we know the ontic state exactly. For
example, if a measurement of the x-coordinate could be
implemented without disturbance then measuring the x-
coordinate followed by measuring the y-coordinate would
tell us the exact ontic state of the system.
There are three nontrivial measurements that can be
implemented in such a way that they satisfy the two re-
quirements: the X measurement reveals the x coordinate,
the Y measurement reveals the y coordinate, and the Z
measurement reveals the value of z = xy. These are il-
lustrated on the right hand side of Fig. 3. Each of these
measurements causes a random exchange between the
pairs of ontic states that give the same outcome in the
measurement. For example, if we perform an X measure-
ment and get the +1 outcome, then with probability 1/2
nothing happens and with probability 1/2 the states (+,−)
and (+,+) are exchanged. This ensures that we always
end up in an epistemic state that satisfies the knowledge-
balance principle at the end of the measurement, in this
case |x+). It is easy to see that this is the only type of
disturbance that is compatible with both repeatability and
the knowledge-balance principle. For example, for an
X-measurement the random disturbance cannot exchange
ontic states that have different values of the x-coordinate,
e.g. (+,+) and (−,+), since this would violate repeatabil-
ity.
The theory described so far makes exactly the same
predictions as quantum theory for sequences of measure-
ments in the x, y and z directions of spin-1/2 particles
prepared in one of the states |x±〉, |y±〉 and |z±〉 if we
identify these six states with |x±), |y±) and |z±) and the
Pauli observables σx, σy and σz with X, Y and Z. It can
thus be regarded as a hidden variable theory for this kind
of experiment. Further, the quantum states are epistemic
in this representation, as they are each represented by
probability distributions that have support on two ontic
states and nonorthogonal states overlap, e.g. |x+) and |y+)
both assign probability 1/2 to the ontic state (+,+).
Several features of quantum theory that are puzzling
on the ψ-ontic view are present in this theory and have
very natural explanations. Firstly, consider the fact that
nonorthogonal pure states cannot be perfectly distin-
guished by a measurement, e.g. if either the state |x+〉
or the state |y+〉 is prepared, and you do not know which,
then there is no measurement that will enable you to de-
duce this information with certainty. If quantum states
are ontic then the two preparations correspond to distinct
states of reality and it is puzzling that we cannot detect
this difference. On the other hand, the toy theory states
|x+) and |y+) overlap on the ontic state (+,+) and this will
be occupied by the system 50% of the time whenever |x+)
or |y+) is prepared. When this does happen, there is noth-
ing about the ontic state of the system that could possibly
tell you whether |x+) or |y+) was prepared. Therefore,
we must fail to distinguish the two preparations at least
50% of the time. The overlap of the two epistemic states
accounts for their indistinguishability.
Another feature of quantum theory that is easily ac-
counted for in Spekkens’ model is the no-cloning theo-
rem. In quantum theory, there is no transformation that
copies both of two nonorthogonal states. For example,
there is no device that operates with certainty and out-
puts both |x+〉 ⊗ |x+〉 when |x+〉 is input and |y+〉 ⊗ |y+〉
when |y+〉 is input. On the ψ-ontic view this is puzzling
because the two states represent distinct states of reality,
so one might expect that this distinctness could be de-
tected and then copied over to another system. Again,
this is easily explained in Spekkens’ model in terms of
the overlap between the epistemic states |x+) and |y+).
Fig. 4 shows the inputs and outputs of the hypothetical
toy-theory cloning machine. The two input states over-
lap on the ontic state (+,+) and this occurs 50% of the
time regardless of which input state is prepared. Since
the cloning machine only has access to the ontic state,
it must do the same thing to the state (+,+), regardless
of whether it occurs because |x+) was prepared or be-
cause |y+) was prepared. Therefore, 50% of the time, the
input must get mapped to the same set of ontic states,
with the same probabilities, regardless of which state
was prepared, so there must be at least a 50% overlap
of the output states of any physically possible device for
these two input states. In contrast, the output states of the
hypothetical cloning machine only overlap on the ontic
state ((+,+), (+,+)) and this must only occur 25% of the
time at the output for either input state. Therefore, the
cloning machine is impossible. In Spekkens’ toy theory,
both indistinguishability and no-cloning follow from the
more general fact that a stochastic map cannot decrease
the overlap of two probability distributions. In quantum
theory, there is a similar result that no transformation that
can be implemented with certainty can decrease the inner
product between two pure states [77]. This suggests that
the inner product of two quantum states is analogous to
the overlap between two probability distributions, and this
analogy would be most easily explained if quantum states
with nonzero inner product were literally represented by
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Figure 4: Inputs and outputs of a hypothetical toy bit cloning
machine. In order to represent a two toy bit state, the ontic state
space of a single toy bit is represented along one dimension.
For the outputs, the horizontal axis represents the first toy bit
and the vertical axis represents the second toy bit. Dark red
represents ontic states occupied with 50% probability and light
red represents those occupied with 25% probability. The inputs
overlap on an ontic state that they both assign 50% probability,
but the outputs only overlap on an ontic state that they both
assign 25% probability.
overlapping probability distributions on some ontic state
space, i.e. by a realist ψ-epistemic interpretation.
Finally, consider the fact that mixed states in quantum
theory have more than one decomposition into a convex
sum of pure states. For example, the maximally mixed
state of a spin-1/2 particle is I/2, where I is the identity
operator, and this can be written alternatively as
I
2
=
1
2
|x+〉 〈x+| + 1
2
|x−〉 〈x−| (3)
=
1
2
|y+〉 〈y+| + 1
2
|y−〉 〈y−| (4)
=
1
2
|z+〉 〈z+| + 1
2
|z−〉 〈z−| . (5)
Physically speaking, this means that if we prepare a spin-
1/2 particle in the |x+〉 state with probability 1/2 and in
the |x−〉 state with probability 1/2 then no experiment can
tell the difference between this ensemble and that formed
by preparing it in the |y+〉 state with probability 1/2 and
in the |y−〉 state with probability 1/2 (and similarly for
|z±〉). On a ψ-ontic view this is puzzling because the |x±〉
states are ontologically distinct from the |y±〉 (and |z±〉)
states so this difference should be detectable. However, in
Spekkens’ theory this non-uniqueness of decomposition
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
=
=
=
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| )y−
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Figure 5: Multiple pure-state decompositions of a mixed state
in Spekkens toy theory. The maximally mixed state |I/2) can be
written as a 50/50 mixture in three different ways. Light red
indicates a probability of 1/4.
is easily explained because preparing |x+) with probabil-
ity 1/2 and |x−) with probability 1/2 leads to exactly the
same distribution over ontic states as preparing |y+) with
probability 1/2 and |y−) with probability 1/2 (and simi-
larly for |z±)). This is illustrated in Fig. 5. Note that this
is only possible because the distributions corresponding
to nonorthogonal quantum states overlap.
What has been presented in this section is just a small
fraction of the quantum phenomena that are accounted
for in Spekkens’ toy model. Many more can be found
in [64], but I hope the present discussion has conveyed
a flavor of the type of explanation that is possible in a
realist ψ-epistemic theory.
2.2. Models for fragments of quantum
theory
Spekkens’ toy model is qualitatively similar to the stabi-
lizer fragment of quantum theory, which consists of the
set of states that are joint eigenstates of maximal com-
mutative subgroups of the Pauli group (i.e. the group
generated by tensor products of the identity and the three
Pauli operators) and has dynamics given by unitaries that
map the Pauli group to itself (see [78] for details of the sta-
bilizer formalism and [79] for a presentation of Spekkens’
toy theory that closely resembles it). The stabilizer frag-
ment is important in quantum information theory as it
contains all the states and operations needed for quantum
error correction, as well as a number of other quantum
protocols. Spekkens’ model does not exactly reproduce
the stabilizer fragment when dynamics and entanglement
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are taken into account, but other models have been pro-
posed that do reproduce fragments of quantum theory
exactly in a ψ-epistemic manner.
First of all, Spekkens’ toy theory has been generalized
to larger dimensions [65] and to continuous variable sys-
tems [66]. It turns out that for odd dimensional Hilbert
spaces, Spekkens’ model reproduces the stabilizer frag-
ment of quantum theory exactly. For continuous variable
systems, Spekkens’ model reproduces the Gaussian frag-
ment of quantum theory, in which all states are Gaussian
and the transformations and measurements preserve the
Gaussian nature of the states. A Gaussian state is one that
has a Gaussian Wigner function. For a single particle, the
Wigner function is defined in terms of the density opera-
tor ρ as W(x, p) =
∫ +∞
−∞ dse
ips/~
〈
x − s2
∣∣∣ ρ ∣∣∣x + s2〉 and is a
pseudo-probability distribution, i.e. it is normalized to 1
but it does not have to be positive. Gaussian functions are
in fact positive so in this case W(x, p) can be regarded as
a probability distribution and unsurprisingly these are the
epistemic states in Spekkens’ continuous variable theory,
with the ontic states being the phase space points (x, p).
Kochen and Specker gave a model for a single qubit
that is ψ-epistemic [76]. They were not actually try-
ing to generate a ψ-epistemic model, but rather to pro-
vide a counterexample to their eponymous theorem in
2-dimensions in order to show that the theorem requires
a Hilbert space of ≥ 3 dimensions for its proof. Nev-
ertheless, their model is a paradigmatic example of a
ψ-epistemic theory. The details of this model are pre-
sented in §4.3 after we have introduced the formalism for
realist ψ-epistemic models more rigorously. Along simi-
lar lines, Lewis et. al. [52] and Aaronson et. al. [53] have
constructed ψ-epistemic models that work for all finite
dimensional systems. These models were developed as
technical counterexamples to certain conjectures about ψ-
ontology theorems and as such they are not very elegant
or plausible. They are discussed in context in §7.5.
2.3. Generalized probability theory
Apart from specific models, there are also qualitative ar-
guments in favor of the ψ-epistemic view. The first of
these is that quantum theory can be viewed as a noncom-
mutative generalization of classical probability theory.
Classically, consider the algebraA of random variables
on a sample space under pointwise addition and multipli-
cation. A probability distribution can then be regarded
as a positive functional µ : A → R that assigns to each
random variable its expectation value. The quantum gen-
eralization of this is to replace the commutative algebra
A by the noncommutative algebra B (H) of bounded
operators on a Hilbert space H. A quantum state ρ is
isomorphic to a positive functional fρ on B(H) given
by fρ(M) = Tr (Mρ). In fact, by a theorem of von Neu-
mann [73], all positive linear functionals on B (H) that
are normalized such that f (I) = 1, where I is the identity
operator, are of this form.
Both A and B (H) are examples of von Neumann al-
gebras, and a generalization of classical measure theo-
retic probability can be developed by defining generalized
probability distributions to be positive normalized func-
tionals on such algebras [80, 81]. This generalized theory
has both classical probability theory and quantum theory
as special cases. In this theory, quantum states are play-
ing the same role in the quantum case that probability
measures play in the classical case, and so it is natural
to interpret quantum states and classical probabilities as
the same kind of entity. Since classical probabilities are
usually interpreted epistemically, it is natural to interpret
quantum states in the same way.
This line of argument would not be too convincing if
noncommutative probability theory were just a formal
mathematical generalization with no practical applica-
tions. However, the theory has a rich array of applica-
tions in quantum statistical mechanics, and especially in
quantum information theory. The full machinery of von
Neumann algebras is not often needed in quantum infor-
mation, as we are usually dealing with finite dimensional
systems. Nevertheless, whenever the analogy is made
between classical probability distributions and density op-
erators, and between stochastic maps and quantum opera-
tions, generalized probability is at play in the background.
For example, in quantum compression theory [82], a den-
sity operator on a finite Hilbert space is viewed as the
correct generalization of a classical information source
with finite alphabet, which would be described by a classi-
cal probability distribution. Similarly, a quantum channel
is described by a quantum operation, and this is viewed as
generalizing a classical channel, which would be modeled
as a stochastic map.
In fact, it is difficult to find any area of quantum in-
formation and computing in which probabilities are not
viewed as the correct classical analogs of quantum states,
and this includes areas that concern themselves exclu-
sively with pure states and unitary transformations. For
example, the standard circuit model of quantum com-
puting [83] only employs pure states and unitaries, but
quantum computational complexity classes are most of-
ten defined as generalizations of classical probabilistic
complexity classes (see [84] for definitions of the com-
plexity classes mentioned in this section.). The class
BQP, usually thought of as the set of problems that can be
solved efficiently on a quantum computer, is sometimes
loosely described as the quantum version of P, the class
of problems that can be solved in polynomial time on a
deterministic classical computer, but in fact it is the gen-
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eralization of BPP, the set of problems that can be solved
in polynomial time on a probabilistic classical computer
with probability > 2/3. All over quantum computing
theory we find the analogy made to classical probabilistic
computing, and not to classical deterministic computing.
It seems then, that if we take quantum information and
computing seriously, we must take generalized probabil-
ity theory seriously as well. On these and other grounds,
I have argued elsewhere [85, 86] that quantum theory is
indeed best viewed as a generalization of probability the-
ory. The details of this would take us too far afield, but
suffice to say there are good reasons for viewing quantum
states as analogous to probability distributions and, if we
do that, we should try to interpret them both in the same
sort of way.
2.4. The collapse of the wavefunction
A straightforward resolution of the collapse of the wave-
function, the measurement problem, Schro¨dinger’s cat
and friends is one of the main advantages of ψ-epistemic
interpretations. Recall that the measurement problem
stems from the fact that there are two different ways of
propagating a quantum state forward in time. When the
system is isolated and not being observed, the quantum
state is evolved smoothly and continuously according to
the Schro¨dinger equation. On the other hand, when a
measurement is made on the system, the quantum state
must be updated according to the projection postulate,
leading to the instantaneous and discontinuous collapse
of the wavefunction. Since a measurement is presum-
ably just some type of physical interaction between sys-
tem and apparatus, this poses the problem of why it is
not also modeled by Schro¨dinger evolution. However,
doing so leads to seemingly absurd situations, such as
Schro¨dinger’s eponymous cat ending up in a superposi-
tion of being alive and dead at the same time.
The measurement problem is not so much resolved
by ψ-epistemic interpretations as it is dissolved by them.
It is revealed as a pseudo-problem that we were wrong
to have placed so much emphasis on in the first place.
This is because the measurement problem is only well-
posed if we have already established that the quantum
state is ontic, i.e. that it is a direct representation of reality.
Only then does a superposition of dead and alive cats
necessarily represent a distinct physical state of affairs
from a definitely alive or definitely dead cat. On the other
hand, if the quantum state only represents what we know
about reality then the cat may perfectly well be definitely
dead or alive before we look, and the fact that we describe
it by a superposition may simply reflect the fact that we
do not know which possibility has occurred yet.
2.5. Excess baggage
According to the ψ-ontologist, a single qubit contains an
infinite amount of information because a pure state of
a qubit is specified by two continuous complex parame-
ters (ignoring normalization). For example, Alice could
encode an arbitrarily long bit string as the decimal expan-
sion of the amplitude of the |0〉 state. However, according
to the Holevo bound [87], only a single bit of classical
information can be encoded in a qubit in such a way that
it can be reliably retrieved. If the quantum state truly
exists in reality, it is puzzling that we cannot detect all of
this extra information. Hardy has coined the term “onto-
logical excess baggage” to refer to this phenomenon [61].
It seems that ψ-ontologists are attributing a lot more in-
formation to the state of reality than required to explain
our observations.
The ψ-epistemic response to this is to note that a classi-
cal probability distribution is also specified by continuous
parameters. A probability distribution over a single clas-
sical bit requires two real parameters (again ignoring nor-
malization). If probabilities were intrinsic properties of
individual systems then this would present a similar puz-
zle as there would be an infinite amount of information
in a single bit. However, classical bits are in fact always
either in the state zero or one and the probabilities simply
represent our knowledge about that value. In reality, there
is just as much information in a classical bit as we can
extract from it, namely one bit. If the quantum state is
epistemic, then the same resolution is available to the
problem of excess baggage. The continuous parameters
required to specify the state of a qubit simply represent
our knowledge about it, and the actual ontic state of the
qubit, whatever that may be, might only contain a finite
amount of information.
The excess baggage problem is exacerbated by con-
sidering how the state space scales with the number of
qubits. A pure state of n qubits is specified by 2n com-
plex parameters, but only n bits can be reliably encoded
according to the Holevo bound. However, the number of
parameters required to specify a probability distribution
over n bits also scales exponentially, so the ψ-epistemic
resolution of the problem is still available.
In response to this, ψ-ontologists might be inclined to
point out that the number of bits that can be reliably en-
coded in n qubits depends on how exactly the communica-
tion task is defined. If Alice and Bob have pre-shared en-
tanglement then Alice can send 2n bits to Bob in n qubits
via superdense coding [88]. Similarly, qubits perform
better than classical bits in random access coding [89],
wherein Bob is not required to reliably retrieve all of the
bits that Alice sends, but only a limited number of them
of his choice. However, the amount of information that
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Alice can send to Bob does not scale exponentially with
the number of qubits in any of these protocols, so there is
still an excess baggage problem.
3. Arguments for a ψ-ontic
interpretation
Having reviewed the arguments in favor of ψ-epistemic
interpretations, we now look at those that had been put
forward in favor of the reality of quantum states prior to
the discovery of ψ-ontology theorems. Despite receiving
a good deal of support, I hope to convince you that they
are far from compelling. Thus, even those who are already
convinced of the reality of the quantum state should be
interested in establishing their claim rigorously via ψ-
ontology theorems.
A big difficulty in extracting arguments for ψ-ontology
from the literature is that the majority of authors neglect
the possibility of realist ψ-epistemic theories. Instead,
they seem to think that either the wavefunction must be
real, or else we must adopt some kind of neo-Copenhagen
approach. Thus, many purported arguments for the re-
ality of the wavefunction are really just arguments for
the reality of something, regardless of whether that thing
is the wavefunction. Since realist ψ-epistemic interpre-
tations already accept the need for an objective reality,
such arguments can be dismissed in the present context.
From amongst these arguments, I have attempted to sift
out those that say something more substantive about the
wavefunction specifically. I have found four broad classes
of argument, each of which is discussed in turn in this sec-
tion. §3.1 discusses the argument from interference, §3.2
discusses the argument from the eigenvalue-eigenstate
link, §3.3 discusses the argument from existing realist in-
terpretations of quantum theory, and finally §3.4 discusses
the argument from quantum computation.
3.1. Interference
We choose to examine a phenomenon which is
impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain
in any classical way, and which has in it the
heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it con-
tains the only mystery. — R. P. Feynman [90]
[Emphasis in original]
Following Feynman, single particle interference phe-
nomena, such as the double slit experiment, are often
viewed as containing the essential mystery of quantum
theory. The problem of explaining the double slit ex-
periment is usually presented as a dichotomy between
explaining it in terms of a classical wave that spreads out
and travels through both slits or in terms of a classical
particle that travels along a definite trajectory that goes
through only one slit. Neither of these explanations can
account for both the interference pattern and the fact that
it is built out of discrete localized detection events. A
wave would not produce discrete detection events and a
classical particle would not be affected by whether or not
the other slit is open. This is taken as evidence that no
classical description can work, and that something more
Copenhagen-like must be at work.
Of course, the dichotomy between either classical
waves or particles is a false one. If we allow the state
of reality to be something more general, i.e. some sort
of quantum stuff that we do not necessarily understand
yet, then many additional explanations of the experiment
become available. For example, there is the Bohmian
picture in which both a wave and a particle exist, and
the motion of the particle is guided by the wave. The
wave then explains the interference fringes, whilst the
particle explains the discrete detection events. This is
by no means the only possibility, but it does highlight
the gap in the usual argument. Nevertheless, in a realist
picture, it seems that something wavelike needs to exist in
order to explain the interference fringes, and the obvious
candidate is the wavefunction.
However, in order to arrive at the conclusion that the
wavefunction must be real, greater leeway has been given
in determining what the ontic state might be like com-
pared to the original argument, which intended to rule out
both particles and waves. Given this, we should be careful
to rule out other possibilities rigorously, rather than jump-
ing to the conclusion that the wavefunction must be real.
In this broader context, the only thing that the double slit
experiment definitively establishes is that there must be
some sort influence that travels through both slits in order
to generate the interference pattern. It does not establish
that this influence must be a wavefunction.
In fact, interference phenomena occur in some of the
previously discussed ψ-epistemic models, so the inference
from interference to the reality of the wavefunction is
incorrect. In Spekkens’ toy theory, a notion of coherent
superposition can be introduced such that, for example,
|y+) is a coherent superposition of |x+) and |x−). Such
superpositions are preserved under dynamical evolution,
so there is a superposition principle in the theory (see [64]
for details). Further, since all two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces are created equal, there is nothing special about
the interpretation of the toy bit in terms of a spin-1/2
particle. It could equally well be a model of any other
two-dimensional system. For example, consider the two
dimensional subspace of an optical mode spanned by the
vacuum state |0〉 and the state |1〉 where it contains one
photon. The toy bit state |x+) can be reinterpreted as |0〉
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and |x−) as |1〉, and by doing so a whole host of Mach-
Zehnder interferometry experiments can be qualitatively
reproduced by the theory [91]. This includes not only
basic interferometry, but also such seemingly paradoxical
effects as the delayed choice experiment [92] and the
Elitzur-Vaidman bomb test [93]. In this theory, there
is always a fact of the matter about which arm of the
interferometer the photon travels along, but it does not
fall afoul of the standard waves vs. particles argument
because the vacuum state has structure. For example, the
situation in which the photon travels along the left arm of
a Mach-Zehnder interferometer would be represented in
quantum theory by |1〉L ⊗ |0〉R. The |0〉R factor would be
represented by the epistemic state |x+) in the toy theory,
which is compatible with two possible ontic states (+,+)
and (+,−), and these ontic states travel along the right
arm of the interferometer. Hence, when a photon is in
the left arm of an interferometer, and no photon is in
the right arm, there is still a bit of information traveling
along the right arm of the interferometer, corresponding
to whether the ontic state is (+,+) or (+,−), that can be
used to convey information about whether or not its path
was blocked. There is an influence that travels through
both arms, but that influence is not a wavefunction.
Interference phenomena also occur in all of the models
discussed in §2.2 simply because they reproduce frag-
ments of quantum theory exactly and those fragments
contain coherent superpositions. It is arguable whether
the mechanisms explaining interference in all these mod-
els are plausible, but the main point is that the direct
inference from interference to the reality of the wave-
function is blocked by them. If there is an argument from
interference to be made then it will need to employ further
assumptions. Hardy’s ψ-ontology theorem, discussed in
§9, can be viewed as an attempt at doing this, but, in light
of the way that interference is modeled in Spekkens’ toy
theory, its assumptions do not seem all that plausible.
Ultimately, the intuition behind the argument from
interference stems from an analogy with classical fields.
Because wavefunctions can be superposed, they exhibit
interference. Prior to the discovery of quantum theory,
the only entities in physics that obeyed a superposition
principle and exhibited interference were classical fields,
and these were definitely intended to be taken as real. For
example, the value of the electromagnetic field at some
point in space-time is an objective property that can be
measured by observing the motion of test charges. The
interference of wavefunctions is then taken as evidence
that they should be interpreted as something similar to
classical fields.
However, the analogy between wavefunctions and
fields is only exact for a single spinless particle, for which
the wavefunction is essentially just a field on ordinary
three dimensional space. This breaks down for more
than one particle, due to the possibility of entanglement.
The size of the quantum state space scales exponentially
with the number of systems, leading to the previously dis-
cussed excess baggage problem. The wavefunction can no
longer be viewed as field on ordinary three-dimensional
space, so the analogy with a classical field should be
viewed with skepticism. In combination with the fact that
interference phenomena can be modeled ψ-epistemically,
the argument from interference is far from compelling.
3.2. The eigenvalue-eigenstate link
The eigenvalue-eigenstate link refers to the tenet of ortho-
dox quantum theory that when a system is in an eigenstate
|m〉 of an observable M with eigenvalue m then M is a
property of the system that has value m. Conversely,
when the state is not an eigenstate of M then M is not
a property of the system. In other words, the properties
of a system consist of all the observables of which the
quantum state is an eigenstate and nothing else. These
properties are taken to be objectively real, independently
of the observer.
This leads to an argument for the reality of the wave-
function because the quantum state of a system is deter-
mined uniquely by the set of observables of which it is
an eigenstate. Indeed, it is determined uniquely by just
a single observable, since |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of the pro-
jector |ψ〉〈ψ| with eigenvalue 1 and (up to a global phase)
it is the only state in the +1 eigenspace of |ψ〉〈ψ|. The
argument is then that, if a system has a set of definite
properties, and those properties uniquely determine the
wavefunction, then the wavefunction itself must be real.
Roger Penrose is perhaps the most prominent advocate
of this argument, so here it is in his own words.
One of the most powerful reasons for reject-
ing such a subjective viewpoint concerning the
reality of |ψ〉 comes from the fact that what-
ever |ψ〉might be, there is always—in principle,
at least–a primitive measurement whose YES
space consists of the Hilbert space ray deter-
mined by |ψ〉. The point is that the physical
state |ψ〉 (determined by the ray of complex
multiples of |ψ〉) is uniquely determined by the
fact that the outcome YES, for this state, is cer-
tain. No other physical state has this property.
For any other state, there would merely be some
probability, short of certainty, that the outcome
will be YES, and an outcome of NO might oc-
cur. Thus, although there is no measurement
which will tell us what |ψ〉 actually is, the phys-
ical state |ψ〉 is uniquely determined by what
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it asserts must be the result of a measurement
that might be performed on it. . .
To put the point a little more forcefully, imag-
ine that a quantum system has been set up in
a known state, say |φ〉, and it is computed that
after a time t the state will have evolved, under
the action of U, into another state |ψ〉. For ex-
ample, |φ〉 might represent the state ‘spin up’
(|φ〉 = |↑〉) of an atom of spin 12 , and we can
suppose that it has been put in that state by the
action of some previous measurement. Let us
assume that our atom has a magnetic moment
aligned with its spin (i.e. it is a little magnet
pointing to the spin direction). When the atom
is placed in a magnetic field, the spin direction
will precess in a well-defined way, that can be
accurately computed as the action of U, to give
some new state, say |ψ〉 = |→〉, after a time t. Is
this computed state to be taken seriously as part
of physical reality? It is hard to see how this
can be denied. For |ψ〉 has to be prepared for
the possibility that we might choose to measure
it with the primitive measurement referred to
above, namely that whose YES space consists
precisely of the multiples of |ψ〉. Here, this is
the spin measurement in the direction→. The
system has to know to give the answer YES,
with certainty for that measurement, whereas
no spin state of the atom other than |ψ〉 = |→〉
could guarantee this. — Roger Penrose, quoted
in [94].
This argument can be easily countered using any of the
existing ψ-epistemic models, to which the same reasoning
would apply. For example, consider the epistemic state
|x+) in Spekkens’ toy theory. This state assigns the defi-
nite value +1 to the X measurement and indeed it is the
only allowed epistemic state in the theory that does this.
In fact, all of the pure states of a toy bit |x±) , |y±) and |z±)
are uniquely determined by the definite value that they
assign to one of the measurements. Following Penrose’s
reasoning, we would then conclude that these states are
objective properties of the system. However, this is not
the case since the objective properties of the system are
those that are determined by the ontic state, and each
ontic state is compatible with more than one epistemic
state. For example, the ontic state (+,+) is compatible
with |x+), |y+) and |z+). Given the complete specification
of reality, the epistemic state is underdetermined.
One way of exposing the error in the eigenvalue-
eigenstate argument is to note that, in the toy theory, the
fact that observables uniquely determine epistemic states
is a consequence of the knowledge-balance principle and
not a fundamental fact about reality. For example, without
the knowledge-balance principle, it would be permissible
to have an epistemic state that assigns probability 2/3 to
(+,+) and 1/3 to (+,−). Just like |x+), this state assigns
probability 1 to the +1 outcome of the X measurement
and this is the only measurement that is assigned a definite
value. If this state were allowed then it would no longer
be possible to mistake |x+) for an objective property of
the system. Penrose has mistaken the set of states that it
is possible to prepare with current experiments for the set
of all logically possible states.
Another way of exposing the error is to look at the
restrictions on measurements in the toy theory. The mea-
surements only reveal coarse-grained information about
the ontic state. Without the knowledge-balance princi-
ple it would be permissible to conceive of a more fine-
grained measurement that reveals the ontic state exactly.
This measurement reveals a definite property of the sys-
tem because it is determined uniquely by the ontic state.
However, specifying this observable no longer uniquely
determines the epistemic state. For example, if we learn
that the ontic state is (+,+) then this is compatible with
|x+), |y+) and |z+).
In conclusion, the mistake in the eigenvalue-eigenstate
argument is to assume that the observables that we can
actually measure in experiments form the sum total of all
the properties of the system and to assume that the set of
states that we can actually prepare are the sum total of all
logically conceivable states. Without these assumptions,
the argument is simply false.
3.3. Existing realist interpretations
There are a handful of fully worked out realist interpre-
tations of quantum theory, including many-worlds [6–8],
de Broglie–Bohm theory [9–12], spontaneous collapse
theories [13, 14] and modal interpretations [15]. In each
of these interpretations the wavefunction is part of the
ontic state, so there is an argument from lack of imagina-
tion to be made: since all the interpretations of quantum
theory that we have managed to come up with that are
uncontroversially realist have a real wavefunction, then
the wavefunction must be real.
I admit that it behooves the realist ψ-epistemicist to try
to construct a fully worked out interpretation. However,
absence of evidence is not the same thing as evidence
of absence. Nevertheless, I have frequently heard this
argument made in private conversations. Some people
seem to think that since we have a bunch of well worked
out interpretations, we ought to simply pick one of them
and not bother thinking about other possibilities. Ever
since the inception of quantum theory we have been beset
by the problem of quantum jumps, by which I mean that
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quantum theorists are liable to jump to conclusions.
Despite the obvious weakness of this argument, there is
a more subtle point to be made. John Bell was motivated
to work on his eponymous theorem by noting that de
Broglie–Bohm theory exhibited nonlocality. He wanted
to know if this was just a quirk of de Broglie–Bohm theory
or an inescapable property of any realist interpretation
of quantum theory. With this motivation, he ended up
proving the latter. The lesson of this is that if we find
that all realist interpretations of quantum theory share
a property that some find objectionable then we ought
to determine whether or not this is a necessary property.
However, this is a motivation for developing ψ-ontology
theorems, rather than regarding the matter as settled a
priori.
3.4. Quantum computation
The final argument I want to consider is due to David
Deutsch, who put it forward as an argument in favor of
the many-worlds interpretation. However, I think the ar-
gument can be adapted, more generally, into an argument
for the reality of the wavefunction. Here is the argument
in Deutsch’s own words.
To predict that future quantum computers,
made to a given specification, will work in the
ways I have described, one need only solve
a few uncontroversial equations. But to ex-
plain exactly how they will work, some form
of multiple-universe language is unavoidable.
Thus quantum computers provide irresistible
evidence that the multiverse is real. One es-
pecially convincing argument is provided by
quantum algorithms [. . . ] which calculate more
intermediate results in the course of a single
computation than there are atoms in the visible
universe. When a quantum computer deliv-
ers the output of such a computation, we shall
know that those intermediate results must have
been computed somewhere, because they were
needed to produce the right answer. So I is-
sue this challenge to those who still cling to a
single-universe world view: if the universe we
see around us is all there is, where are quantum
computations performed? I have yet to receive
a plausible reply. — David Deutsch [95] [Em-
phasis in original].
Quantum algorithms that offer exponential improve-
ment over existing classical algorithms, such as Shor’s
factoring algorithm [96], start by putting a quantum sys-
tem in a superposition of all possible input strings. Then,
some computation is done on each of the strings before
using interference effects between them to elicit the an-
swer to the computation. If each of the branches of the
wavefunction were not individually real, whether or not
they are interpreted in a many-worlds sense, then where
does the computation get done?
This is not exactly an argument for the reality of the
wavefunction, but it is at least an argument that the size
of ontic state space should scale exponentially with the
number of qubits, and that the ontic state should con-
tain pieces that look like the branches of a wavefunction.
However, whilst I agree with Deutsch that an interpre-
tation of quantum theory should offer an explanation of
how quantum computations work, it is not at all obvi-
ous that the explanation must be a direct translation of
what happens to the wavefunction. The argument would
perhaps be more compelling if there were known expo-
nential speedups for problems where we think that the
best we can do classically is to just search through an
exponentially large set of solutions, since we could then
argue that a quantum computer must be doing just that.
This would be the case if we had such a speedup for the
traveling salesman problem, or any other NP complete
problem. The sort of problems for which we do have
exponential speedup, such as factoring, are more subtle
than this. They lie in NP, but are not NP complete. If
we were to find an efficient classical algorithm for these
problems then it would not cause the whole structure of
computational complexity theory to come crashing down.
If such an algorithm exists, then whatever deeper theory
underlies quantum theory may be exploiting this same
structure to perform the quantum computation.
Even if such a scenario does not play out, Deutsch’s
argument is not decisive against realist ψ-epistemic inter-
pretations. Since we have not yet constructed a viable in-
terpretation of this sort that covers the whole of quantum
theory, who knows what explanations such a theory might
provide? Therefore, as Deutsch says, explaining quantum
computation ought to be viewed as a challenge for the
ψ-epistemic program rather than an argument against it.
4. Formalizing the
ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction
Hopefully, by this point I have convinced you that it is
worth trying to settle the question of the reality of the
wavefunction rigorously. The aim of this section is to pro-
vide a formal definition of what it means for the quantum
state to be ontic or epistemic within a realist model of
quantum theory. This is usually done within the frame-
work of ontological models. This is really no different
from the framework that Bell used to prove his epony-
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mous theorem, and an ontological model is sometimes
alternatively known as a hidden variable theory. However,
I prefer the term “ontological model” because there is a lot
of confusion about the meaning of the term “hidden vari-
ables”. Following the example of Bohmian mechanics, a
hidden variable theory is often thought to be a theory in
which some additional variables are posited alongside the
wavefunction, which is itself conceived of as ontic from
the start. Since the reality of the wavefunction is precisely
the point at issue, we definitely want to include models in
which it is not assumed to be real within our framework.
In addition, in order to cover orthodox quantum theory,
we want our framework to include models in which the
wavefunction is the only thing that is real, i.e. there are
no additional hidden variables. A further confusion is
the commonly held view that a hidden variable theory
must restore determinism, whereas we want to allow for
the possibility that nature might be genuinely stochastic.
For these reasons, I prefer to use the term “ontological
model”. It is either the same thing as a hidden variable
theory or more general, depending on how general you
thought hidden variable theories were in the first place.
Whilst the Hardy and Colbeck–Renner Theorems in-
volve assumptions about how dynamics are represented
in an ontological model, the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph The-
orem only involves prepare-and-measure experiments,
i.e. a system is prepared in some quantum state and is
then immediately measured and discarded. Therefore,
we deal with prepare-and-measure experiments first and
defer discussion of dynamics until it is needed. A ψ-
ontology theorem aims at proving that any ontological
model that reproduces quantum theory must have ontic
quantum states. This does not apply to arbitrary frag-
ments of quantum theory, since we have seen in §2.2 that
there are fragments that can be modeled with epistemic
quantum states. In order to understand both cases, we
need to define ontological models for fragments of quan-
tum theory rather than just for quantum theory as a whole.
The formal definition of a prepare-and-measure fragment
of quantum theory is given in §4.1 and then §4.2 explains
how these are represented in ontological models, with
examples given in §4.3. Based on this, §4.4 gives the
formal definition of what it means for the quantum state
to be ontic or epistemic.
4.1. Prepare and measure experiments
In a prepare-and-measure experiment, the experimenter
performs a preparation of some physical system and then
immediately measures it, records the outcome, and dis-
cards the system. The experimenter can repeat the whole
process of preparing and measuring as many times as she
likes in order to build up frequency statistics for com-
parison with the probabilities predicted by some physical
theory. Each run of the experiment is assumed to be statis-
tically independent of the others and it is assumed that the
experimenter can choose which measurement to perform
independently of the choice of preparation.
For completeness, we consider the most general type of
quantum state—a density operator—and the most general
type of observable —a Positive Operator Valued Measure
(POVM), although we restrict attention to POVMs with a
finite number of outcomes. Readers unfamiliar with these
concepts should consult a standard textbook, such as [83]
or [97].
Definition 4.1. A prepare-and-measure (PM) fragment
F = 〈H,P,M〉 of quantum theory consists of a Hilbert
space H , a set P of density operators on H , and a set
M of POVMs on H . The probability of obtaining the
outcome corresponding to a POVM element E ∈ M when
performing a measurement M ∈ M on a system prepared
in the state ρ ∈ P is given by the Born rule
Prob(E|ρ,M) = Tr (Eρ) . (6)
For many of the results reviewed here, the PM fragment
under consideration is the one in which P is the set of
all pure states onH andM consists of measurements in
a set of complete orthonormal bases. The formalism of
PM fragments allows the sets of states and measurements
required to make ψ-ontology theorems go through to be
made explicit. Additionally, many of the intermediate
results used in proving ψ-ontology theorems apply to PM
fragments in general, including those that feature mixed
states and POVMs, so it is worth introducing fragments
at this level of generality.
When only a single PM fragment is under considera-
tion, it is assumed to be denoted 〈H,P,M〉 so that the
notations ρ ∈ P and M ∈ M can be used without first
explicitly writing down the triple.
4.2. Ontological models
The idea of an ontological model of a PM fragment is
that there is some set Λ of ontic states that give a com-
plete specification of the properties of the physical system
as they exist in reality. When a quantum system is pre-
pared in a state ρ ∈ P, what really happens is that the
system occupies one of the ontic states λ ∈ Λ. However,
the preparation procedure may not completely control
the ontic state, so our knowledge of the ontic state is de-
scribed by a probability measure µ over Λ. This means
that Λ needs to be a measurable space, with a σ-algebra
Σ, and that µ : Σ → [0, 1] is a σ-additive function sat-
isfying µ(Λ) = 1. For those unfamiliar with measure-
theoretic probability, for a finite space Σ would just be
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the set of all subsets of Λ and σ-additivity reduces to
µ(Ω1 ∪ Ω2) = µ(Ω1) + µ(Ω2) for all disjoint subsets Ω1
and Ω2 of Λ.
In general, different methods of preparing the same
quantum state may result in different probability measures
over the ontic states. This is especially true of mixed
states, since they do not have unique decompositions
into a convex mixture of pure states. If one prepares a
mixed state by choosing randomly from one of the pure
states in such a decomposition, then one can prove that
the probability measure must in general depend on the
choice of decomposition. This is known as preparation
contextuality, and is discussed in more detail in §5.3.
For this reason, a quantum state ρ is associated with a
set ∆ρ of probability measures rather than just a single
unique measure. Note that it is possible to find models
in which pure states correspond to unique measures, and
much of the literature implicitly assumes this type of
model. However, it turns out that this assumption is not
necessary, so we allow for the possibility that even a pure
state is represented by a set of probability measures for
the sake of generality.
Turning now to measurements, the outcome of a mea-
surement M ∈ M might not reveal λ exactly but depend
on it only probabilistically. This could be because na-
ture is fundamentally stochastic, but it could also arise
in a deterministic theory if the response of the measur-
ing device depends not only on λ but also on degrees of
freedom within the measuring device that are not under
the experimenter’s control (see [98] for a discussion of
this). To account for this, each POVM M is represented
by a conditional probability distribution Pr(E|M, λ) over
M. In a bit more detail, when a measurement M ∈ M
is performed, each λ must give rise to a well defined
probability distribution over the outcomes, so, for any
fixed λ, we must have Pr(E|M, λ) ≥ 0 for all E ∈ M and∑
E∈M Pr(E|M, λ) = 1. Further, in order to calculate the
probabilities that the model predicts we will observe, we
are going to have to average over our ignorance about λ
so, for any fixed E, Pr(E|M, λ) must be a measurable func-
tion of λ. See Fig. 6 for an illustration of the conditional
probability distribution corresponding to a measurement.
Again, different methods of implementing the same
measurement may result in different conditional proba-
bility distributions. This is known as measurement con-
textuality and it must occur in certain types of model due
to the Kochen–Specker theorem [76]. Measurement con-
textuality is discussed further in Appendix C. For this
reason, a measurement M is associated with a set ΞM
of conditional probability distributions rather than just a
single one.
In order to compute the probabilities that the onto-
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Figure 6: A possible conditional probability distribution
Pr(E j|M, λ) for a two outcome measurement M = {E1, E2}
in an ontological model. Pr(E j|M, λ) is the conditional
probability of obtaining the outcome E j when M is mea-
sured and the ontic state is λ. As a result, it must satisfy
Pr(E1|M, λ) + Pr(E2|M, λ) = 1 for all values of λ. For il-
lustrative purposes, the ontic state space is represented as a
1-dimensional line, but it may actually be an arbitrary measur-
able space.
logical model predicts for the observable outcomes of
measurements, the conditional probabilities Pr(E|M, λ)
have to be averaged over our ignorance of the true ontic
state as specified by µ. This gives,
Pr(E|ρ,M) =
∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ). (7)
Note that, the notation Pr is used for the probabilities
in an ontological model to distinguish them from the
probabilities Prob predicted by quantum theory.
Finally, if the ontological model is to reproduce the
predictions of quantum theory, then; for each ρ ∈ P,
M ∈ M, each µ ∈ ∆ρ, Pr ∈ ΞM must satisfy
Pr(E|ρ,M) = Prob(E|ρ,M), (8)
or in other words∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = Tr (Eρ) . (9)
Summarizing, we have
Definition 4.2. An ontological model of a PM fragment
is a quadruple (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) that consists of:
• A measurable space (Λ,Σ), where Λ is called the
ontic state space.
• A function ∆ that maps each quantum state ρ ∈ P to
a set of probability measures ∆[ρ] = ∆ρ on (Λ,Σ).
• A function Ξ that maps each POVM M ∈ M to a
set of conditional probability distributions over M,
Ξ[M] = ΞM, i.e. each Pr ∈ ΞM is a function from
M×Λ to R that is measurable as a function of λ ∈ Λ
and satisfies, for all λ ∈ Λ,
∀E ∈ M, Pr(E|M, λ) ≥ 0 (10)
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and ∑
E∈M
Pr(E|M, λ) = 1. (11)
The ontological model reproduces the quantum pre-
dictions if, for all ρ ∈ P and M ∈ M, each µ ∈ ∆ρ and
Pr ∈ ΞM satisfies
∀E ∈ M,
∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = Tr (Eρ) . (12)
In what follows, it is convenient to use projectors |ψ〉〈ψ|
to represent pure states instead of vectors |ψ〉 to avoid the
global phase ambiguity. The set of projectors onto the
pure states ofH is known as the projective Hilbert space
ofH . The notation [ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ| and ∆ψ = ∆[ψ] is used to
reduce clutter. Similarly, if a measurement M consists of
projectors onto pure states
[
φ
]
then we use the notation
Pr(φ|M, λ) as shorthand for Pr([φ] |M, λ).
4.3. Examples of Ontological Models
Example 4.3 (Spekkens’ toy bit). Spekkens’ toy bit can
be recast as an ontological model of the PM fragment
〈C2,P,M〉 where
P = {[x+] , [x−] , [y+] , [y−] , [z+] , [z−] , I/2} , (13)
and
M = {{[x+] , [x−]} , {[y+] , [y−]} , {[z+] , [z−]}} . (14)
The ontic state space is Λ = {(+,+), (+,−), (−,+), (−,−)}.
Since Λ is a finite set, the integral in Eq. (12) is just a sum∑
λ∈Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)µ(λ) = Tr (Eρ) , (15)
where, abusing notation slightly, we write µ(λ) for µ({λ}).
In this model, each quantum state is represented by a
unique probability measure. The six probability functions
|x±) , |y±) , |z±) illustrated in Fig. 3 represent the states
[x±] , [y±] , [z±], and |I/2) from Fig. 5 represents the max-
imally mixed state I/2. Each measurement is associated
with a unique conditional probability distribution as de-
scribed in Fig. 3. For example, for the X = {[x+] , [x−]}
measurement we have
Pr(x + |X, (+,+)) = Pr(x + |X, (+,−)) = 1
Pr(x + |X, (−,+)) = Pr(x + |X, (−,−)) = 0
Pr(x − |X, (+,+)) = Pr(x − |X, (+,−)) = 0
Pr(x − |X, (−,+)) = Pr(x − |X, (−,−)) = 1.
(16)
It is easy to check that this reproduces the quantum pre-
dictions for the fragment.
Example 4.4 (The Beltrametti–Bugajski model [99]).
This model is essentially a translation of the orthodox
interpretation of quantum theory into the language of on-
tological models. The PM fragment is 〈Cd,P,M〉 where
P contains all the pure states on Cd andM consists of all
POVMs on Cd. The idea of the model is that the quan-
tum state, and only the quantum state, represents reality.
Therefore, the ontic state space Λ is just the set of pure
states [λ] for |λ〉 ∈ Cd, i.e. states differing by a global
phase are identified so Λ is the projective Hilbert space of
Cd. This space carries a natural topology induced by the
inner product, and we take Σ to be the Borel σ-algebra of
this topology (see [100] for details).
A pure quantum state
[
ψ
]
is then represented by the
point measure
µ(Ω) = δψ(Ω) =
1 if
[
ψ
] ∈ Ω
0 if
[
ψ
]
< Ω.
(17)
Each POVM is represented by a unique conditional
probability distribution and, since the quantum state is
the ontic state in this model, it should come as no surprise
that the response functions simply specify the quantum
probabilities, i.e. if a POVM M ∈ M contains the operator
E then
Pr(E|M, [λ]) = Tr (E [λ]) . (18)
We then trivially have∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, [λ])dµ([λ]) =
∫
Λ
Tr (E [λ]) dδψ([λ])
= Tr
(
E
[
ψ
])
, (19)
so the model reproduces the quantum predictions.
The model can be extended to mixed states by writing
them as convex combinations of pure states. For example,
the maximally mixed state of a spin-1/2 particle can be
written as
I
2
=
1
2
[x+] +
1
2
[x−] . (20)
This means that I/2 can be prepared by flipping a coin,
preparing [x+] if the outcome is heads or [x−] if the
outcome is tails, and then forgetting or erasing the result
of the coin flip. Let’s call this preparation procedure P. It
follows that the predictions of I/2 can be reproduced by
the measure
µ =
1
2
δx+ +
1
2
δx−. (21)
Note however that this is a preparation contextual model
because the maximally mixed state can also be prepared
by mixing a different set of pure states, e.g. the decompo-
sition
I
2
=
1
2
[
y+
]
+
1
2
[
y−] , (22)
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yields the measure
µ =
1
2
δy+ +
1
2
δy−, (23)
which reproduces the quantum predictions just as well. In
general, ∆ρ consists of one convex combination of point
measures for each of the different ways of writing ρ as a
mixture of pure states.
Example 4.5 (The Bell Model [101]). In his review of
no-go theorems for hidden variable theories [101], Bell
introduced an ontological model for measurements in
orthonormal bases on systems with a two-dimensional
Hilbert space. The obvious generalization to arbitrary fi-
nite dimensional systems is presented here, as it is needed
in §7.5. Bell intended his model as a pedagogical device
to point out the flaws in previous no-go theorems, and
he was primarily interested in whether a deterministic
theory could reproduce the quantum predictions. In mod-
ern terms, the Bell model can be thought of as a minimal
modification of the Beltrametti–Bugajski model, intended
to make it deterministic.
The PM fragment of interest is F = 〈Cd,P,M〉, where
P consists of all pure states andM consists of all mea-
surements of the formM =
{[
φ j
]}d−1
j=0
, where
{∣∣∣φ j〉}d−1j=0 is
an orthonormal basis for Cd.
The generalized Bell model employs an ontic state
space Λ = Λ1 × Λ2 that is the Cartesian product of two
state spaces. As in Beltrametti–Bugajski, Λ1 is the pro-
jective Hilbert space of Cd, with Borel σ-algebra Σ1. Λ2
is the unit interval [0, 1], with Borel σ-algebra Σ2, rep-
resenting an additional hidden variable. The measurable
space is then (Λ1 ×Λ2,Σ1 ⊗Σ2), where the tensor product
σ-algebra Σ1 ⊗ Σ2 is the σ-algebra generated by sets of
the form Ω1 ×Ω2 with Ω1 ∈ Σ1, Ω2 ∈ Σ2.
The quantum state
[
ψ
]
is represented by a product mea-
sure
µ(Ω) =
∫
Λ2
µ1(Ωλ2)dµ2(λ2), (24)
where µ1 and µ2 are probability measures on Λ1 and Λ2
respectively, Ω ∈ Σ1 ⊗ Σ2, and
Ωλ2 = {[λ1] ∈ Λ1|([λ1] , λ2) ∈ Ω} . (25)
As in the Beltrametti–Bugajski model, [λ1] represents
the quantum state so µ1 = δψ. The other variable λ2 is
uniformly distributed so µ2 is just the uniform measure
on [0, 1].
The outcome of a measurement M = {
[
φ j
]
}d−1j=0 is de-
termined as follows. For each [λ1], the unit interval is
divided into d subsets of length Tr
([
φ j
]
[λ1]
)
. If λ2 is in
the subset corresponding to
[
φ j
]
then the
[
φ j
]
outcome
occurs with certainty. It does not matter how we choose
0 1
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Figure 7: Example of the conditional probabilities in the Bell
model for a measurement in C4. The unit interval is divided
into 4 subintervals of length Tr
([
φ j
]
[λ1]
)
. If λ2 is in the jth
interval then the outcome will be j. In the case depicted, the
outcome is
[
φ2
]
.
the subsets so long as they are disjoint and of the right
length. One way of doing it is to pick the jth set to be the
interval
j−1∑
k=0
Tr
([
φk
]
[λ1]
) ≤ λ2 < j∑
k=0
Tr
([
φk
]
[λ1]
)
, (26)
as illustrated in Fig. 7.
This corresponds to the conditional probabilities
Pr(φ j|M, [λ1] , λ2) =

1 if
j−1∑
k=0
Tr
([
φk
]
[λ1]
) ≤ λ2;
λ2 <
j∑
k=0
Tr
([
φk
]
[λ1]
)
0 otherwise.
(27)
Note that, in this model, measurement-outcome pairs
represented by the same projector generally correspond
to different response functions. This is because the way
that the unit interval is divided up depends on which other
projectors are present in {
[
φ j
]
}d−1j=0 . This is an example of
measurement contextuality.
It is straightforward to see that this model reproduces
the quantum predictions. If the state prepared is
[
ψ
]
then
the point measure µ1 implies that [λ1] =
[
ψ
]
. Therefore,
the length of the jth subset of the unit interval will be
Tr
([
φ j
] [
ψ
])
. Since µ2 is the uniform measure on [0, 1],
the probability of λ2 being in a subset of [0, 1] is just the
total length of the subset, so the observed probability of
obtaining outcome j is Tr
([
φ j
] [
ψ
])
, as required.
Example 4.6 (The Kochen–Specker model [76]). Kochen
and Specker introduced an ontological model for measure-
ments in orthonormal bases on a two-dimensional system.
The PM fragment is 〈C2,P,M〉 where P consists of all
pure states on C2 andM consists of all measurements of
the form M = {[φ] , [φ⊥]} with {|φ〉 , ∣∣∣φ⊥〉} an orthonormal
basis.
A pure state
[
ψ
]
in a two dimensional Hilbert space
can be represented as a point ~ψ = (sinϑ cosϕ, sinϑ sinϕ,
cosϑ) on the surface of a unit 2-sphere S 2 by choosing a
representative vector |ψ〉 via
|ψ〉 = cos(ϑ
2
) |z+〉 + eıϕ sin(ϑ
2
) |z−〉 , (28)
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| z+〉
| z−〉
| x−〉
| x+〉
| y+〉| y−〉
ϑ
ϕ
ψ

Figure 8: The Bloch sphere representation of a qubit. The
quantum state is represented as a point ~ψ on the surface of a
unit 2-sphere.
where 0 ≤ ϑ < pi and −pi < ϕ ≤ pi. This is known as the
Bloch sphere representation (see Fig. 8).
In the Kochen–Specker model, the ontic state space is
the unit sphere Λ = S 2, which can be thought of as the
Bloch sphere. The quantum state
[
ψ
]
corresponds to a
measure µ that can be written as
µ(Ω) =
∫
Ω
p(~λ) sinϑdϑdϕ, (29)
where ~λ = (sinϑ cosϕ, sinϑ sinϕ, cosϑ) and the density
p is given by
p(~λ) =
1
pi
H(~ψ · ~λ)~ψ · ~λ, (30)
where H is the Heaviside step function
H(x) =
1 if x > 00 if x ≤ 0. (31)
This density is nonzero on the hemisphere defined by
all vectors that subtend an angle of less than pi/2 with ~ψ
and it takes values proportional to the cosine of the angle
between ~λ and ~ψ.
For a measurement M =
{[
φ
]
,
[
φ⊥
]}
, the outcome
[
φ
]
is obtained if the angle between ~λ and ~φ is smaller than
the angle between ~λ and ~φ⊥. Otherwise the outcome[
φ⊥
]
is obtained. This corresponds to the conditional
probabilities
Pr(φ|M, ~λ) = H(~φ · ~λ) (32)
Pr(φ⊥|M, λ) = 1 − Pr(φ|M, ~λ). (33)
A proof that this reproduces the quantum predictions
is given in Appendix B.
4.4. Defining ψ-ontic/epistemic models
We are now in a position to formally define what it means
for the quantum state to be real within an ontological
model. The definition presented here is the one used by
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph [27], which is a slightly more
rigorous version of a definition originally introduced
by Harrigan and Spekkens [74]. It is uncontroversial
that mixed states at least sometimes represent knowl-
edge about which of a set of pure states was prepared,
so they are at least partially epistemic. For this reason,
ψ-ontology theorems are only concerned with proving the
reality of pure quantum states. A ψ-ontic model is then
one in which, if the pure state
[
ψ
]
is prepared, then
[
ψ
]
is
part of the ontic state of the system. In other words, the
ontic state space can be thought of as being composed of
the set of pure quantum states along with possibly some
extra hidden variables. This will be the case if the mea-
sures corresponding to distinct pure state preparations do
not overlap with one another (see Fig. 9). Conversely,
the ψ-epistemic explanations of quantum phenomena dis-
cussed in §2.1 depend crucially on having overlap be-
tween the measures representing different quantum states,
so whether or not there is overlap is the key issue.
The notion of when two probability measures overlap
can be formalized using the variational distance.
Definition 4.7. The variational distance between two
probability measures µ and ν on a measurable space (Λ,Σ)
is
D(µ, ν) = sup
Ω∈Σ
|µ(Ω) − ν(Ω)| . (34)
Note that taking the absolute value in Eq. (34) is op-
tional, since if ν(Ω) > µ(Ω) for some Ω ∈ Σ then
µ(Λ\Ω) − ν(Λ\Ω) = 1 − µ(Ω) − 1 + ν(Ω) = ν(Ω) − µ(Ω),
(35)
so there is always another measurable set for which the
difference of the measures is the same, but µ is larger
than ν. Thus, the variational distance can equivalently be
defined as
D(µ, ν) = sup
Ω∈Σ
(µ(Ω) − ν(Ω)) , (36)
or indeed
D(µ, ν) = sup
Ω∈Σ
(ν(Ω) − µ(Ω)) . (37)
The variational distance is a metric on the set of prob-
ability measures and it has the following operational in-
terpretation. Suppose that a system is prepared according
to one of two preparation procedures, P1 or P2, where P1
corresponds to the measure µ and the P2 to the measure
ν, each case having an equal a priori probability. You
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1[ ]ψ
2[ ]ψ
3[ ]ψ
(a) Ontic model with nonoverlapping quantum states.
Old label New label
1 (ψ1, 1)
2 (ψ1, 2)
3 (ψ2, 1)
4 (ψ3, 1)
5 (ψ3, 2)
6 (ψ1, 3)
7 (ψ3, 3)
8 (ψ2, 2)
9 (ψ3, 4)
10 (ψ3, 5)
(b) Relabeling the ontic states.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1[ ]ψ
2[ ]ψ
3[ ]ψ
1ψ
2ψ
3ψ
1ψ
2ψ
3ψ
1ψ
2ψ
3ψ
(c) Equivalent model in which the quantum state is explicitly
part of the ontology.
Figure 9: In an ontological model, if the probability measures
corresponding to distinct quantum states do not overlap, then
the ontic states can be relabeled such that the quantum state is
explicitly part of the ontology. Panel (a) depicts the measures
corresponding to three quantum states on a discrete ontic state
space consisting of the integers from 1 to 10. Red boxes indicate
the ontic states on which the measures have support. Panel (b)
shows a one-to-one map to a new ontic state space in which
the quantum states are an explicit part of the ontology. The
result is shown in Panel (c).
are then told the actual value of λ and you wish to make
the best possible guess as to which of the two prepara-
tion procedures was used. Your best strategy will be to
choose a set Ω ⊆ Λ and guess P1 if λ ∈ Ω and P2 if
λ < Ω. More generally, you could use a probabilistic
procedure, but convexity implies that this cannot increase
your probability of success. Your probability of success
is then
Prob(P1)Prob(Ω|P1) + Prob(P2)Prob(Λ\Ω|P2)
=
1
2
µ(Ω) +
1
2
ν(Λ\Ω) = 1
2
(1 + µ(Ω) − ν(Ω)) , (38)
so the maximum probability of success over all such
strategies is 12 (1 + D(µ, ν)). Success can occur with unit
probability only when D(µ, ν) = 1, so in this case λ effec-
tively determines which probability density was prepared
uniquely.
More rigorously, D(µ, ν) = 1 is equivalent to the exis-
tence of a measurable set Ω ∈ Σ such that µ(Ω) = 1 and
ν(Ω) = 0. An optimal guessing strategy then consists of
guessing µ if λ ∈ Ω and ν if λ < Ω.
If µ and ν are dominated by a third measure m, i.e.
µ(Ω) =
∫
Ω
p(λ)dm(λ) (39)
ν(Ω) =
∫
Ω
q(λ)dm(λ), (40)
for some m-measurable densities p and q, then
D(µ, ν) =
1
2
∫
Λ
|p(λ) − q(λ)| dm(λ), (41)
which is often the most convenient form for computation.
For those unfamiliar with measure-theoretic probabil-
ity, a measure m dominates a measure µ if, whenever
m(Ω) = 0 then µ(Ω) = 0. If this holds then µ can be
written as a density with respect to m. The measure
m = 12 (µ + ν) dominates both µ and ν, and a similarly for
any finite set of probability measures. For an uncount-
able set of measures there need not exist a measure that
dominates all of them. For example, there is no measure
that dominates all of the point measures δψ occurring in
the Beltrametti–Bugajski model, which is one of the rea-
sons why we work with probability measures instead of
probability densities in the present treatment.
Based on the variational distance, we can define what
it means for two quantum states to have no overlap in an
ontic model.
Definition 4.8. A pair of quantum states ρ, σ ∈ P are
ontologically distinct in an ontological model if, for all
µ ∈ ∆ρ, ν ∈ ∆σ,
D(µ, ν) = 1, (42)
otherwise they are ontologically indistinct.
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The idea here is that, if ρ and σ are ontologically dis-
tinct then, regardless of how they are prepared, they can
be perfectly distinguished given knowledge of the exact
ontic state. In order to take preparation contextuality into
account, all possible pairs of preparations that are repre-
sented by ρ and σ must correspond to measures that have
zero overlap.
If a set of preparations is operationally distinguishable,
i.e. there exists a measurement that perfectly distinguishes
them, then they must also be ontologically distinct. The
intuition behind this is straightforward. Consider the case
of a finite ontic state space. If the measures corresponding
to two operationally distinguishable preparations did have
nontrivial overlap then there would be a finite probability
of an ontic state occurring that is assigned a finite proba-
bility according to both of them, and if this happens then
the ontic state cannot be used to deduce which prepara-
tion was performed with certainty. Hence, such a model
could not reproduce the statistics of the distinguishing
measurement, which does allow this deduction. More
formally,
Definition 4.9. A finite set of quantum states
{
ρ j
}
⊆ P
is operationally distinguishable if there exists a POVM
{E j} ∈ M such that
Tr
(
E jρk
)
= δ jk. (43)
Theorem 4.10. Let D ⊆ P be an operationally distin-
guishable set of states. Then, every pair ρ, σ ∈ D, ρ , σ,
is ontologically distinct in any ontological model that
reproduces the operational predictions.
Proof. Let M ∈ M be a measurement that distinguishes
the states inD. Then, for ρ, σ ∈ D, ρ , σ, there exists a
POVM element E ∈ M such that
Tr (Eρ) = 1 and Tr (Eσ) = 0. (44)
In an ontological model that reproduces the quantum
predictions, this implies that∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = 1 (45)∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dν(λ) = 0, (46)
for all µ ∈ ∆ρ, ν ∈ ∆σ, and for any Pr ∈ ΞM.
Assume that ρ and σ are ontologically indistinct. Then,
there exist µ ∈ ∆ρ, ν ∈ ∆σ such that D(µ, ν) < 1. This
is equivalent to saying that all sets that are of measure 1
according to µ are of nonzero measure according to to ν.
In order to satisfy Eq. (45), Pr(E|M, λ) must be equal to 1
on a set Ω that is of measure one according to µ, and thus
by ontological indistinctness ν(Ω) > 0. However, from
Eq. (46) we have
0 =
∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dν(λ) (47)
≥
∫
Ω
Pr(E|M, λ)dν(λ) (48)
=
∫
Ω
dν(λ) = ν(Ω) > 0, (49)
which is a contradiction. 
Although operationally distinguishable quantum states
are always ontologically distinct, this argument does not
imply that arbitrary pairs of states are. If all pairs of
pure states are nonetheless ontologically distinct then the
ontological model is ψ-ontic.
Definition 4.11. An ontological model is ψ-ontic if all
pairs of pure quantum states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, [ψ] , [φ],
are ontologically distinct. Otherwise the model is ψ-
epistemic.
This definition captures the idea that quantum states
are real in an ontological model if the probability mea-
sures corresponding to distinct pure states do not overlap.
Defining a ψ-epistemic model to be the negation of this
is extremely permissive. For example, a model in which
only a single pair of pure states have any overlap, all other
pairs being ontologically distinct, would be ψ-epistemic
according to this definition. The ψ-epistemic explana-
tions of quantum phenomena discussed in §2.1 would
not apply to such a model. The ψ-ontology theorems
discussed in Part II aim to rule out even this permissive
notion of a ψ-epistemic model, so they obviously rule
out any less permissive definition as well. Nevertheless,
because ψ-ontology theorems require questionable auxil-
iary assumptions, it is still interesting to consider stronger
notions of what it means for the quantum state to be
epistemic. This is done in in §5.2 and Part III.
Note that a ψ-ontic model is not necessarily ψ-
complete, where the latter means that the wavefunction,
and only the wavefunction, is the ontic state. ψ-complete
models are obviously ψ-ontic, but in general ψ-ontic mod-
els may involve other variables in addition to the wave-
function. A lot of confusion may be avoided by clearly
separating the notions of ψ-ontic and ψ-complete models,
particularly since much of the literature on hidden vari-
able theories focuses on the question of whether quantum
theory is complete, i.e. it is assumed that the wavefunction
is real a priori and the only question is whether anything
else needs to be added to it. Obviously, such a framework
is not suited to discussing the question of whether the
wavefunction must be real in the first place.
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Of the examples considered in §4.3, Spekkens’ toy
theory and the Kochen–Specker model are ψ-epistemic,
and the Beltrametti–Bugajski and Bell models are ψ-ontic.
In Spekkens’ theory, the ontic state space is finite, so the
integral in Eq. (41) can be performed with respect to the
counting measure, which yields the sum
D(µ, ν) =
1
2
∑
λ
|µ(λ) − ν(λ)|. (50)
For toy bit, λ takes the values (+,+), (+,−), (−,+) and
(−,−). If µ is the |x+) measure, corresponding to the
quantum state [x+], and ν is |y+), corresponding to [y+]
then we have
D(µ, ν) =
1
2
(∣∣∣∣∣12 − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∣12 − 0
∣∣∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∣∣0 − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ + |0 − 0|) = 12 .
(51)
Thus, the model is ψ-epistemic because D(µ, ν) < 1,
as we expect for overlapping measures. Appendix B
provides a proof that the Kochen–Specker model is ψ-
epistemic by showing that it satisfies the stronger notion
of being maximally ψ-epistemic to be discussed in §5.2.
The Beltrametti–Bugajski model is in fact ψ-complete,
because its ontic state space consists of the set of pure
states and preparing a given pure state causes the corre-
sponding ontic state to be occupied with certainty. It fol-
lows that the model is ψ-ontic because each pure state cor-
responds to a distinct point measure. Thus, for
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
]
the corresponding measures are δψ and δφ. The set
{[
ψ
]}
is measure one according to δψ and measure zero accord-
ing to δφ. Similarly, the Bell model is ψ-ontic, where
now the set
{[
ψ
]} × [0, 1] is measure one for the measure
corresponding to
[
ψ
]
and measure zero for the measure
corresponding to
[
φ
]
. It is, however, not ψ-complete be-
cause of the additional component [0, 1] of the ontic state
space.
5. Implications of ψ-ontology
Before discussing ψ-ontology theorems, it is worth paus-
ing to consider some of their implications. One of the
most interesting things about establishing the reality of
the quantum state within the ontological models frame-
work is that it would imply a lot of existing no-go re-
sults as simple consequences. Thus, even if you are a
neo-Copenhagenist who rejects the ontological models
framework outright, you should still be interested in ψ-
ontology theorems as potentially the most powerful class
of no-go results that we currently have. Additionally, the
ontological models framework can be thought of as an
attempt to simulate quantum theory using classical re-
sources. Just as Bell’s Theorem has implications for the
difference between quantum and classical communication
Excess baggage
ψ-ontology Kochen-Specker
contextuality
(deficiency)
Nonmaximally ψ-epistemic
Bell’s theorem
(nonlocality)
Preparation
contextuality
for mixed states
Figure 10: Hierarchy of constraints on ontological models of
quantum theory. Properties that appear higher in the diagram
imply those that they are connected to lower down. Non maxi-
mal ψ-epistemicity can be derived from either ψ-ontology or
Kochen–Specker contextuality.
complexity, and for device independent quantum cryptog-
raphy [102], ψ-ontology theorems might become a useful
tool in quantum information theory.
The main implications of ψ-ontology are illustrated
in Fig. 10, and each of them is discussed in this section.
There are two main strands of implications, one based on
the size of the ontic state space and one based on results
related to contextuality. The results of the contextuality
strand can alternatively be derived as consequences of
the Kochen–Specker Theorem. Since ψ-ontology is our
main concern here, the connection to the Kochen–Specker
theorem is discussed in Appendix C.
5.1. Excess baggage
The idea of excess baggage has already been discussed in
§2.5 as the tension between the infinite amount of infor-
mation required to specify the quantum state of a qubit
and the fact that it can only be used to reliably transmit a
single bit. Similarly, the number of parameters required
to specify a quantum state scales exponentially with the
number of systems, but the amount of information that
can be transmitted scales only linearly.
Excess baggage theorems show that this tension cannot
be avoided in an ontological model by providing lower
bounds on the size of the ontic state space required to
reproduce quantum theory. The first such result, from
which the “excess baggage” terminology originates, was
due to Hardy, who proved that an infinite number of ontic
states are required to reproduce the predictions of any
quantum system, even just a qubit [61]. Subsequently,
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Montina showed that the number of parameters required
to specify an ontic state must scale exponentially with the
number of systems [62, 63].
If it can be proved that an ontological model of quan-
tum theory must be ψ-ontic then it follows immediately
that the ontic state space must be uncountably infinite
and that the number of parameters required to specify
an ontic state must scale exponentially with the number
of systems. This is because, in a ψ-ontic model, there
must be at least as many ontic states as there are quantum
states.
5.2. Maximally ψ-epistemic models
The concept of a maximally ψ-epistemic model was intro-
duced by Maroney as a stronger notion of what it means
for an ontological model to be ψ-epistemic [58]. An
equivalent concept was introduced earlier by Harrigan
and Rudolph [98], under the terminology “non deficient
model”. As you might imagine from the name, a ψ-ontic
model cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic, but, even with-
out ψ-ontology, maximally ψ-epistemic models are ruled
out by the Kochen–Specker theorem, as discussed in Ap-
pendix C.
The real interest in the concept of a maximally ψ-
epistemic model is that it enables one to devise mea-
sures of the extent to which a model is ψ-epistemic, and
hence to go beyond the sharp dichotomy between ψ-
epistemic and ψ-ontic implied by the definitions adopted
so far [54, 55, 57, 58]. This aspect is discussed in §12.2,
but the concept of a maximally ψ-epistemic model is also
useful as a stepping stone between ψ-ontology and the
next step in the contextuality strand, which is preparation
contextuality.
The basic idea is that, in order to justify the ψ-epistemic
explanation of indistinguishability, we need more than
just that the probability measures corresponding to two
different quantum states,
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
, should have nonzero
overlap. Ideally, when measuring a system prepared in the
state
[
ψ
]
, all of the probability of obtaining the outcome
corresponding to the projector
[
φ
]
should be accounted for
by the overlap region between the probability measures
corresponding to the two states. Since we are comparing
the overlap of
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
, considered as states, with the
probability of obtaining
[
φ
]
as a measurement outcome,
this only makes sense if we are dealing with a PM frag-
ment for which, for every pure state
[
φ
] ∈ P, there exists
a measurement M ∈ M such that [φ] ∈ M. Therefore,
this is a standing assumption for the remainder of this
section.
Definition 5.1. An ontological model of a PM fragment
is maximally ψ-epistemic if, for every pair of pure states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, for all µ ∈ ∆ψ, ν ∈ ∆φ, M ∈ M with[
φ
] ∈ M, and Pr ∈ ΞM,∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) =
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ), (52)
for all sets Ω ∈ Σ such that ν(Ω) = 1.
To unpack this definition a little, let µ ∈ ∆ψ, let ν ∈ ∆φ,
let M be a measurement that contains
[
φ
]
, and let Pr ∈ ΞM .
Suppose Ω is a set of measure one according to ν and Ω′
is a set of measure one according to µ. Then, Eq. (52) is
equivalent to∫
Ω∩Ω′
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) =
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ). (53)
Whatever one might mean by the overlap region between
µ and ν, it should be the intersection of a set that is mea-
sure one according to µ with a set that is measure one
according to ν, and since Eq. (53) must hold for all such
sets, it guarantees that the probability of obtaining out-
come [Φ] when measuring a system prepared in the state[
ψ
]
is entirely accounted for by any such region.
Note that, instead of Eq. (52), previous works [56, 58,
59, 98] imposed the requirement that∫
Λq
Pr(φ|M, λ)p(λ)dλ =
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)p(λ)dλ, (54)
where dλ is a measure that dominates µ and ν, p and q are
densities that represent them, and Λq = {λ ∈ Λ|q(λ) > 0}
is the support of the probability density q. However, the
probability measure ν does not correspond to a unique
density q, since densities that differ on a set of measure
zero according to dλ represent the same probability mea-
sure. This means that Λq is not uniquely specified by ν,
since setting the values of q to zero on a measure zero
set would change Λq but not ν. Therefore, to use this
definition, one has to imagine that the ontological model
specifies a particular density representation for each mea-
sure, rather than just the measure itself. On its own, this
older definition is also not strong enough to entail that
a ψ-ontic model cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic. To
remedy this, one can adopt a standing assumption that
all probability measures appearing in the model are dom-
inated by, i.e. absolutely continuous with respect to, a
canonical measure dλ, as was done explicitly in [56],
and this must be regarded as an implicit assumption in
previous works [58, 59, 98]. However, we do not really
want to make this assumption, because some models of
interest do not satisfy it. For example, an uncountable set
of point measures on distinct points is not dominated by
any measure, and these occur in the Beltrametti–Bugajski
and Bell models.
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It is straightforward to verify that Spekkens’ toy theory
is maximally ψ-epistemic and a proof that the Kochen–
Specker model is maximally ψ-epistemic is given in Ap-
pendix B. On the other hand, a ψ-ontic model that re-
produces the quantum predictions cannot be maximally
ψ-epistemic, so the Beltrametti–Bugajski and Bell models
are not maximally ψ-epistemic.
Theorem 5.2. Consider a PM fragment that contains
at least one pair of nonorthogonal pure states. If an
ontological model of this fragment that reproduces the
quantum predictions is maximally ψ-epistemic then it is
ψ-epistemic.
Proof. Assume the ontological model is ψ-ontic. Then,
for every pair of nonorthogonal pure states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P,
every pair µ ∈ ∆ψ, ν ∈ ∆φ satisfies D(µ, ν) = 1, which
is equivalent to saying that there exists a set Ω that is
measure 0 according to µ and measure 1 according to
ν. However, if the ontological model is maximally ψ-
epistemic then, for all µ ∈ ∆ψ, ν ∈ ∆φ, M ∈ M containing[
φ
]
, and Pr ∈ ΞM,∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) =
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ). (55)
This implies that,
µ(Ω) =
∫
Ω
dµ(λ) (56)
≥
∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) (57)
=
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) (58)
= Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
> 0, (59)
where the second line follows from the fact that
Pr(φ|M, λ) ∈ [0, 1] and the fourth from the fact that the
ontological model reproduces the quantum predictions.
Thus, Ω cannot be of measure zero according to µ, which
contradicts the assertion that the model is ψ-ontic. 
5.3. Preparation contextuality
In [67], Spekkens introduced an operational approach
to contextuality. In addition to generalizing the usual
Kochen–Specker approach to contextuality of measure-
ments, as discussed in Appendix C, Spekkens introduced
a notion of contextuality for preparations. In Spekkens’
approach, the fundamental idea of noncontextuality is that
things that are operationally equivalent, i.e. always lead to
the same observable probabilities, should be represented
in the same way in an ontological model. Preparation non-
contextuality is just this idea applied to states rather than
measurements. This section shows that, when extended
to mixed states, non maximally ψ-epistemic models must
be preparation contextual, a result that was first pointed
out in [56].
Definition 5.3. In an ontological model of a PM frag-
ment, a state ρ ∈ P is preparation noncontextual if ∆ρ
only contains a single measure. Otherwise ρ is prepara-
tion contextual. Similarly, the ontological model itself is
preparation noncontextual if every ρ ∈ P is preparation
noncontextual, and otherwise it is preparation contextual.
Whenever two preparation procedures result in the
same quantum state ρ, there is no measurement that can
distinguish between them because, according to quantum
theory, all of the outcome probabilities for every measure-
ment are exactly the same. Thus, the general principle of
noncontextuality implies that all methods of preparing ρ
should result in the same probability measure.
Note that much of the literature on ψ-ontology im-
plicitly assumes preparation noncontextuality for pure
states by associating a unique measure µψ with each pure
state
[
ψ
]
under consideration. This assumption is fairly
harmless for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the necessity
of preparation contextuality has so far only been estab-
lished for mixed states, so assuming a unique measure
for pure states is not ruled out by any existing no-go theo-
rem. Secondly, adapting results to preparation contextual
models is usually just a matter of modifying the defini-
tions in a fairly obvious way that does not require proofs
to be modified substantively. Nevertheless, I prefer to
take the possibility of preparation contextuality into ac-
count explicitly because it is oddly asymmetric to allow
for contextual measurements but not contextual states,
and because it allows results to be proved under weaker
assumptions.
In order to prove preparation contextuality for mixed
states, a further assumption is required about how convex
combinations of quantum states should be represented in
ontological models. To understand this, let ρ =
∑
j p jσ j
be a convex decomposition of a mixed state ρ into other
(pure or mixed) states σ j, i.e. 0 ≤ p j ≤ 1 and ∑ j p j =
1. One method of preparing ρ is to generate a classical
random variable that takes value j with probability p j (e.g.
by flipping coins, throwing dice, or any other suitable
method), prepare the state σ j if the value of the classical
variable is j, and then discard and forget the value of the
classical variable.
In an ontological model, it is reasonable to assume that,
in the above mixing procedure, if µ j is the probability
measure corresponding to the method used to prepare σ j,
then
∑
j p jµ j is the measure corresponding to preparing ρ
by this mixing procedure. This is because the randomness
used to generate the classical variable could come from
a source that is completely independent of the system
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under investigation, in which case we would expect that
the ontic state of the system only depends on it via its
effect on which of the σ j is prepared. More formally,
Definition 5.4. An ontological model respects convex
decompositions of a state ρ ∈ P if, for every set of states
{σ j} ⊆ P such that ρ = ∑ j p jσ j ∈ P for some coefficients
p j satisfying 0 ≤ p j ≤ 1 and ∑ j p j = 1, for all possible
choices of µ j ∈ ∆σ j , the measure
∑
j p jµ j is in ∆ρ. The
ontological model respects convexity if it respects convex
decompositions of every ρ ∈ P.
For the purpose of connecting non maximally ψ-
epistemic models with preparation contextuality, recall
that an ontological model is non maximally ψ-epistemic
iff there are two nonorthogonal pure states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P,
such that, for some µ ∈ ∆ψ, ν ∈ ∆φ, M ∈ M containing[
φ
]
, and Pr ∈ ΞM there exists an Ω ∈ Σ such that ν(Ω) = 1
but ∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) <
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ). (60)
Preparation contextuality can now be derived from non
maximal ψ-epistemicity via the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5. Consider an ontological model of a PM
fragment that reproduces the quantum predictions, re-
spects convexity and is non maximally ψ-epistemic.
Assume that, for some pair of pure states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈
P that satisfy Eq. (60), the states σψ⊥ = 1d−1
(
I − [ψ]),
σφ
⊥
= 1d−1
(
I − [φ]) and the maximally mixed state I/d
are also in P. Then, I/d is preparation contextual in the
ontological model.
Proof. The maximally mixed state has convex decompo-
sitions
I
d
=
1
d
[
ψ
]
+
d − 1
d
σψ
⊥
(61)
=
1
d
[
φ
]
+
d − 1
d
σφ
⊥
. (62)
Since the ontological and quantum models respect con-
vexity, for every µ ∈ ∆ψ and µ⊥ ∈ ∆σψ⊥ , the measure
1
dµ +
d−1
d µ
⊥ is in ∆I/d. Similarly, for every ν ∈ ∆φ and
ν⊥ ∈ ∆σφ⊥ , the measure 1dν + d−1d ν⊥ is in ∆I/d. Assume
that I/d is preparation noncontextual, so that ∆I/d only
contains one probability measure ζ. Then, we have
ζ =
1
d
µ +
d − 1
d
µ⊥ (63)
=
1
d
ν +
d − 1
d
ν⊥. (64)
Now, since
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
satisfy Eq. (60), and the model
reproduces the quantum predictions, there must exist a
µ ∈ ∆ψ, a ν ∈ ∆φ, an M ∈ M containing [φ], a Pr ∈ ΞM,
and a set Ω ∈ Σ such that ν(Ω) = 1, but∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) < Tr ([φ] [ψ]) . (65)
This means that, in order to reproduce the quantum predic-
tions, there must be a set Ω˜ ⊆ Λ\Ω such that Pr(φ|M, λ)
is nonzero everywhere on Ω˜ and µ(Ω˜) > 0. It is also the
case that ν(Ω˜) = 0 because Ω˜ is a subset of Λ\Ω and Ω is
measure one for ν.
Again, since the ontological model reproduces the
quantum predictions, we must have∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, λ)dν⊥(λ) = Tr
([
φ
]
σφ
⊥)
= 0. (66)
This implies that ν⊥(Ω˜) = 0 because Pr(φ|M, λ) is nonzero
everywhere on Ω˜. Therefore we have
ζ(Ω˜) =
1
d
ν(Ω˜) +
d − 1
d
ν⊥(Ω˜) (67)
= 0, (68)
but also
ζ(Ω˜) =
1
d
µ(Ω˜) +
d − 1
d
µ⊥(Ω˜) (69)
≥ 1
d
µ(Ω˜) (70)
> 0, (71)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, I/d must be prepara-
tion contextual. 
Similar arguments can be used to establish the prepa-
ration contextuality of other mixed states. If σ and τ are
states such that Tr
([
φ
]
σ
)
= 0 and
p
[
ψ
]
+ (1 − p)τ = q [φ] + (1 − q)σ, (72)
for some 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, then the state ρ = p [ψ] + (1 − p)τ
must be preparation contextual by the same argument
given above. Banik et. al. have recently used this method
to show that all mixed states must be preparation contex-
tual in Hilbert spaces of dimension d ≥ 3 [103]. They
also proved the same result for all Hilbert space dimen-
sions, but via a method that does not make use of the
connection with maximal ψ-epistemicity.
5.4. Bell’s Theorem
The purpose of this section is to argue that being com-
mitted to ψ-ontology implies the conclusion of Bell’s
theorem, i.e. any ψ-ontic model must fail to satisfy Bell’s
locality condition. It is not my intention to argue that the
implication from ψ-ontology theorems to Bell’s theorem
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is the best or most elegant way of proving Bell’s theorem.
The argument is quite technical compared to other proofs
of Bell’s theorem and ψ-ontology theorems are based
on auxiliary assumptions that are not required to prove
Bell’s theorem. Instead, the aim is to compare the relative
strength of the conclusions of ψ-ontology theorems with
those of Bell’s theorem.
What we will actually do in this section is to argue
that the kind of preparation contextuality that follows
from the failure of maximal ψ-epistemicity implies the
conclusion of Bell’s theorem. This means that ψ-ontology
implies the same, because it can be used to establish
the failure of maximal ψ-epistemicity. In principle, one
can also view the result of this section as a full-blown
proof of Bell’s theorem that does not rely on ψ-ontology,
since, as established in Appendix C, the Kochen–Specker
theorem can alternatively be used to establish the failure
of maximal ψ-epistemicity without assuming the reality
of the quantum state. However, this would be quite a
convoluted way of deriving Bell’s theorem compared to
the standard proofs.
From a historical perspective, the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen argument [104] could be read as an argument that
ψ-complete models are nonlocal, but a ψ-ontic model may
involve other variables in addition to the wavefunction.
That nonlocality follows from the weaker assumption
of ψ-ontology is implicit in an argument that Einstein
made in correspondence with Schro¨dinger. This was first
pointed out by Harrigan and Spekkens in [74], where
they also provide a more formal version of the argument.
However, both the Einstein and Harrigan-Spekkens argu-
ments employ an additional assumption known as Ein-
stein separability, which is discussed in more detail in
§7.3. Einstein separability is not actually required to
prove Bell’s theorem [105], so I do not make this assump-
tion here. This, in addition to taking care of measure-
theoretic issues, makes the argument presented here a bit
more involved than Harrigan and Spekkens’ treatment.
However, once this is done, weakening their assumption
of ψ-ontology to the failure of maximal ψ-epistemicity
does not significantly change the structure of the argu-
ment. As presented here, the argument is based on an idea
due to Barrett [106] that has appeared in the literature in
an informal version [56].
The basic idea runs as follows. Suppose Alice and Bob
share a composite system with Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB,
HA = HB = Cd, prepared in the entangled state [Φ+]AB,
where ∣∣∣Φ+〉AB = 1√d
d−1∑
j=0
| j〉A ⊗ | j〉B , (73)
and {| j〉}d−1j=0 is an orthonormal basis for Cd. If Alice
performs a measurement described by the projectors
{[
ψ
]T
A , IA −
[
ψ
]T
A
}
, where T denotes transpose in the | j〉
basis and IA is the identity operator on HA, then, with
probability 1/d she obtains the
[
ψ
]T
A outcome and the
state of Bob’s system gets updated to
[
ψ
]
B, and with prob-
ability (d − 1)/d she gets the IA − [ψ]TA outcome and the
state of Bob’s system gets updated to σψ⊥B . If we allow
Alice to postselect on her measurement outcome, then we
can regard this as a method of preparing Bob’s system
in the states
[
ψ
]
B and σ
ψ⊥
B . If she subsequently forgets
and discards her measurement outcome then we can also
regard this as a method of preparing Bob’s system in the
maximally mixed state by mixing
[
ψ
]
B with σ
ψ⊥
B . Similar
remarks apply if Alice measures {[φ]TA , IA − [φ]TA}, which,
by postselection, prepares Bob’s system in the state
[
φ
]
B
or σφ
⊥
B and, upon forgetting the measurement outcome,
prepares it in the maximally mixed state by mixing
[
φ
]
B
with σφ
⊥
B .
Now, given an ontological model for the composite
system that satisfies Bell’s locality condition, we can
use it to derive an ontological model for these prepa-
ration procedures on Bob’s system alone. This model
must be preparation noncontextual for the state I/d be-
cause locality implies that the probability of getting a
particular ontic state for the derived model on Bob’s sys-
tem cannot depend on whether Alice chooses to measure{[
ψ
]T
A , IA −
[
ψ
]T
A
}
or
{[
φ
]T
A , IA −
[
φ
]T
A
}
. However, in order
to construct a model for all possible preparations and
measurements of this form that reproduces the quantum
predictions, preparation noncontextuality must fail for
some such pair because a maximally ψ-epistemic model
is impossible. Therefore, Bell’s locality condition must
fail. The remainder of this section formalizes this argu-
ment.
The type of PM fragment relevant to Bell’s Theorem
involves a bipartite system and local measurements. This
is formalized in the concept of a product measurement
fragment.
Definition 5.6. A product measurement fragment FAB =
〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉 is a PM fragment on a com-
posite system with Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB, whereMA
is a set of POVMs on HA, MB is a set of POVMs on
HB andMA ×MB denotes the set of all POVMs of the
form (MA,MB) = {E j ⊗Fk}, where MA = {E j} ∈ MA and
MB = {Fk} ∈ MB.
To prove Bell’s Theorem, we only need consider a
single bipartite state ρAB, so for the remainder of this
section we assume that PAB just contains this single state.
Most of the concepts can be generalized to fragments
with more than one state in an obvious way.
The first step is to reinterpret experiments on the com-
posite system as prepare-and-measure experiments on
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Bob’s system alone. At the operational level, when the
system is prepared in the state ρAB, Alice makes a mea-
surement MA on system A and Bob makes a measurement
MB on system B, quantum theory predicts the outcome
probabilities
Prob(E, F|MA,MB) = TrAB (E ⊗ FρAB) , (74)
where E ∈ MA and F ∈ MB.
These probabilities can be rewritten in terms of states
and measurements onHB alone by imagining that Alice
performs her measurement before Bob performs his, and
considering how the state of Bob’s system gets updated in
light of Alice’s measurement result. Upon learning that
the outcome of MA was E, the state of Bob’s system gets
updated to
ρB|E =
TrA (E ⊗ IBρAB)
Prob(E|MA) , (75)
where Prob(E|MA) = TrA (EρA) is the probability of Al-
ice’s measurement outcome and ρA = TrB (ρAB). Eq. (74)
can then be rewritten as
Prob(E, F|MA,MB) = Prob(E|MA)TrB (FρB|E) . (76)
By postselecting on obtaining the outcome E, Alice’s
measurement can be viewed as a method of preparing
Bob’s system in the state ρB|E . In doing so, E gets reinter-
preted as specifying a preparation procedure for system
B, instead of a measurement on A, so we now want to
condition the probabilities on E. This gives
Prob(F|MA, E,MB) = Prob(E, F|MA,MB)Prob(E|MA) = TrB
(
FρB|E
)
.
(77)
We also want to consider the case where Alice forgets
her measurement outcome outcome. This prepares Bob’s
system in the state ρB = TrA (ρAB) and we have, for every
MA ∈ MA,
ρB =
∑
E∈MA
Prob(E|MA)ρB|E . (78)
We can now define the conditional fragment on Bob’s
system consisting of all the states that Alice can prepare
on his system in this way.
Definition 5.7. Let FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
be a product measurement fragment, where PAB contains
a single state ρAB. The conditional fragment on B given
A is FB|A = 〈HB,PB|A,MB〉, where PB|A consists of all
states of the form ρB|E as given by Eq. (75) where E ∈ MA
for some MA ∈ MA, as well as the state ρB = TrA (ρAB).
Typically, there are several different methods of prepar-
ing the same quantum state and of implementing the same
measurement in a PM fragment. These different methods
need not correspond to the same probability measures
nor the same conditional probability distributions in an
ontological model. However, the derivation of Bell’s the-
orem is greatly simplified if we focus attention on one
specific method of preparing ρAB and one one method of
implementing each of the measurements MA ∈ MA and
MB ∈ MB. Then, we can assume that ρAB is represented
by a unique measure µ and that each (MA,MB) is repre-
sented by a unique conditional probability distribution
Pr(E, F|MA,MB, λ), where E ∈ MA and F ∈ MB. This
does not weaken the conclusion because the result will
hold regardless of which method of implementation is
chosen. Therefore, for the remainder of this section, we
assume a unique measure and conditional probabilities for
ontological models of the product measurement fragment.
Given such an ontological model of FAB, it is natural
to think that an ontological model for the conditional PM
fragment FB|A might be derivable from it. However, in
general, an ontological model for FAB cannot be cleanly
separated into a part that depends on system A and a part
that depends on system B unless it satisfies Bell’s con-
dition of local causality. To see this, suppose we have
an ontological model of FAB. If Alice chooses to make
the measurement MA and Bob chooses to make the mea-
surement MB then in general, not assuming locality, this
is represented by a conditional probability distribution
Pr(E, F|MA,MB, λ), where E ∈ MA and F ∈ MB. The
model then predicts that the observed probability of ob-
taining the outcomes E and F is given by
Pr(E, F|MA,MB) =
∫
Λ
Pr(E, F|MA,MB, λ)dµ(λ), (79)
where µ is the measure representing ρAB.
At the quantum level, the conditional probability
Prob(F|MA, E,MB) could be rewritten in terms of a state
on HB that depends on E alone and the measurement
operator F, which is also defined onHB. The analogue
at the ontological level would be to absorb the depen-
dence on MA and E into the measure µ and be left with
a conditional probability distribution that only depends
on MB and F. Unfortunately, the conditional probability
distribution Pr(E, F|MA,MB, λ) need not factor cleanly
into a term that only depends on E and MA and a term
that only depends on F and MB. In order to obtain such a
decomposition, a locality assumption is required.
Definition 5.8. An ontological model of a product mea-
surement fragment FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
is Bell local if, for all MA ∈ MA, MB ∈ MB, E ∈ MA,
F ∈ MB, λ ∈ Λ,
Pr(E, F|MA,MB, λ) = Pr(E|MA, λ)Pr(F|MB, λ) (80)
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where Pr(E|MA, λ) is a valid conditional probability dis-
tribution over MA and Pr(F|MB, λ) is a valid conditional
probability distribution over MB.
In a Bell local model of FAB, measures conditional on
MA and E ∈ MA can be defined as follows,
µMA,E(Ω) =
1
Pr(E|MA)
∫
Ω
Pr(E|MA, λ)dµ(λ), (81)
where Pr(E|MA) =
∫
Λ
Pr(E|MA, λ)dµ(λ) is the observed
probability of obtaining the outcome E for the measure-
ment MA according to the ontological model. Eq. (80)
can then be rewritten as
Pr(E, F|MA,MB, ) = Pr(E|MA)
∫
Λ
Pr(F|MB, λ)dµMA,E(λ),
(82)
and conditioning on E gives
Pr(F|MA, E,MB) =
∫
Λ
Pr(F|MB, λ)dµMA,E(λ), (83)
which is the analogue of Eq. (77) at the ontological level.
Further, in the case where Alice does not report her
measurement result we have,
Pr(F|MA,MB) =
∫
Λ
Pr(F|MB, λ)dµ(λ), (84)
Thus, an ontological model for the conditional theory
can be defined as follows.
Definition 5.9. Let FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
be a product measurement fragment, where PAB contains
a single state ρAB, and consider a Bell local ontologi-
cal model of it in which ρAB is represented by a unique
measure µ, each MA ∈ MA is represented by a unique
conditional probability distribution Pr(E|MA, λ), and each
MB ∈ MB is represented by a unique conditional prob-
ability distribution Pr(F|MB, λ). Then, the conditional
ontological model of the conditional fragment FB|A is
defined by
• Placing the measure µMA,E in ∆ρB|E , where
µMA,E(Ω) =
1
PrA(E|MA)
∫
Ω
Pr(E|MA, λ)dµ(λ).
(85)
Note that there may be more than one measure in
∆ρB|E if E occurs in more than one of the POVMs in
MA.
• Associating the unique measure µwith the state ρB =
TrA (ρAB).
• Associating the unique conditional probability distri-
bution Pr(F|MB, λ) as defined in the Bell local model
with each MB ∈ MB.
It is straightforward to see that if the original ontolog-
ical model reproduces the quantum predictions for FAB
then the conditional ontological model reproduces the
quantum predictions of FB|A.
We now specialize to the product measurement frag-
ment of interest for Bell’s Theorem. This is FAB =
〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉, where HA = HB = Cd,
PAB = {[Φ+]AB}, MA consists of all projective mea-
surements of the form MA = {E0, E1} where E0 = [ψ],
E1 = IA − [ψ] for some |ψ〉 ∈ Cd andMB consists of all
measurements onHB.
Given the available measurements inMA, ρB|E0 is al-
ways a pure state and in fact Alice can prepare Bob’s
system in any pure state by choosing an appropriate E0,
i.e.
[
ψ
]T
A if she wants to prepare
[
ψ
]
B.
Theorem 5.10. Consider a Bell local model for the prod-
uct measurement fragment FAB defined above that repro-
duces the quantum predictions for Alice’s measurements,
i.e. for all MA ∈ MA, E ∈ MA,∫
Λ
Pr(E|MA, λ)dµ(λ) = TrAB (E ⊗ IB [Φ+]AB) . (86)
Then, the conditional ontological model of the conditional
fragment FB|A is preparation noncontextual and respects
convex decompositions.
Proof. Given the choice of
[
Φ+
]
AB, there is only one
POVM MA = {E0, E1} that can lead to a given conditional
state ρB|E j . The possible conditional states on Bob’s side
are ρB|E0 =
[
ψ
]
B and ρB|E1 = σ
ψ⊥
B =
1
d−1 (IB−
[
ψ
]
B), which
occur when Alice makes the measurement {[ψ]TA , IA −[
ψ
]T
A}, and so each of Alice’s measurements determine a
unique pair of conditional states for Bob. Therefore, each
∆ρB|E j contains only a single measure, so the model is
preparation noncontextual for these states. Similarly, by
construction, there is a unique measure associated with
I/d.
The only convex combinations that appear in FB|A are
those of the form
IB
d
=
1∑
j=0
Prob(E j|MA)ρB|E j , (87)
where Prob(E j|MA) = TrAB
(
E j ⊗ IB [Φ+]AB). Therefore,
the result follows if
µ =
1∑
j=0
Prob(E j|MA)µMA,E j . (88)
To see this, note that
∑
j Pr(E j|MA, λ) = 1 for all λ, so,
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for Ω ∈ Σ,
µ(Ω) =
∫
Ω
dµ(λ) (89)
=
∫
Ω
∑
j
Pr(E j|MA, λ)
 dµ(λ) (90)
=
∑
j
∫
Ω
Pr(E j|MA, λ)dµ(λ) (91)
=
∑
j
Pr(E j|MA) 1Pr(E j|MA)
∫
Ω
Pr(E j|MA, λ)dµ(λ)
(92)
=
∑
j
Pr(E j|MA)µMA,E j(Ω), (93)
where Pr(E j|MA) =
∫
Λ
Pr(E j|MA, λ)dµ(λ) is the proba-
bility of Alice obtaining outcome E j when measuring
MA according to the ontological model. By assumption,
the model reproduces the quantum predictions for Al-
ice’s measurements, so Pr(E j|MA) = Prob(E j|MA), from
which the result follows. 
Theorem 5.10 is enough to show that a ψ-ontic model
of the above product measurement fragment that repro-
duces the quantum predictions cannot be Bell local. To
see this note that Theorem 5.2 shows that a ψ-ontic model
cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic and hence, by Theo-
rem 5.5, if convexity is respected then preparation non-
contextuality must fail for the maximally mixed state.
However, a Bell local model would give rise to a prepara-
tion noncontextual ontological model for the conditional
theory that respects convexity. Since the conditional frag-
ment contains the states needed for Theorem 5.5, this
implies that Bell locality must fail.
Note that, instead of relying on ψ-ontology one could
use the Kochen–Specker theorem to rule out maximally ψ-
epistemic theories for d ≥ 3, as described in Appendix C.
Then, Theorem 5.10 can be viewed as a full proof of
Bell’s theorem that does not assume ψ-ontology, although
this is quite complicated compared to the standard proofs.
Part II. ψ-ontology theorems
Having understood the implications of ψ-ontology, it is
finally time to look at the extent to which it can be estab-
lished. The first ψ-ontology theorem that was discovered
is due to Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph. Of the available
results, it is the most widely discussed in the literature
and I think it makes the strongest case for ψ-ontology,
so it receives the longest treatment in §7, including a
discussion of generalizations and criticisms. Following
this, I discuss two further ψ-ontology theorems: Hardy’s
Theorem in §9, and the Colbeck–Renner Theorem in §10.
Before getting to these theorems, I discuss the concept
of antidistinguishability in §6 because it plays a key role
in both the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph and Hardy’s theorems,
as well as in some of the results discussed in Part III.
Both Hardy’s Theorem and the Colbeck–Renner Theorem
involve assumptions about how dynamics are represented
in ontological models, so this is discussed in §8 after the
discussion of Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph is completed.
6. Antidistinguishability
According to Theorem 4.10, sets of operationally distin-
guishable states are pairwise ontologically distinct in an
ontological model. However, ψ-ontology requires that all
pairs of pure states must be ontologically distinct, and
most pairs of pure states are not orthogonal. Therefore,
to prove ψ-ontology, it is useful to consider a weaker
concept.
Definition 6.1. A finite set of quantum states {ρ j}nj=1 ⊆P is antidistinguishable if there exists a POVM M ={
E j
}n
j=1
∈ M such that, for each j,
Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 0. (94)
Recall that the definition of distinguishability states
that there should exist a POVM M = {E j}nj=1 ∈ M such
that Tr
(
Ekρ j
)
= δ jk for all j and k. This is equivalent
to requiring Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 1 for all j by the following
argument. Firstly, Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 1 is obviously a spe-
cial case of Tr
(
Ekρ j
)
= δ jk. For the converse direction
note that if there were a k , j such that Tr
(
Ekρ j
)
> 0
then Tr
((
E j + Ek
)
ρ j
)
> 1, but this cannot be the case
if ρ j is a density operator and {E j}nj=1 is a POVM be-
cause then we must have 1 = Tr
(
ρ j
)
= Tr
(∑
m Emρ j
)
≥
Tr
((
E j + Ek
)
ρ j
)
. Therefore, the difference between dis-
tinguishability and antidistinguishability is simply the
replacement of Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 1 with Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 0. To un-
derstand what this means, suppose that one of the states
in a setD is prepared and you do not know which. IfD
is distinguishable then there is a measurement for which
each outcome identifies that a specific member ofD was
definitely the state prepared. On the other hand, if D is
antidistinguishable then there is a measurement for which
each outcome identifies that a specific member ofD was
definitely not the state prepared. In this sense, the two
concepts are opposites.
Antidistinguishability is a weaker property than dis-
tinguishability because, if the measurement outcome j
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Figure 11: A set of nonorthogonal states that can be antidis-
tinguished, and the POVM that antidistinguishes them. The
diagram represents the equator of the Bloch sphere and the
three antidistinguishable states are shown by the solid arrows.
The dashed arrows show three states that are each orthogonal
to one of the states in the antidistinguishable set. A POVM can
be formed by scaling the projectors onto the three dashed states
by a factor of 2/3. By virtue of the orthogonality relations, this
is an antidistinguishing POVM.
tells us that ρ j was definitely prepared, then it also tells
us that ρk was definitely not prepared for all k , j. There-
fore, a distinguishing measurement can be converted to
an antidistinguishing one just by permuting the outcome
indices in such a way that none of them are left invariant,
e.g. if there are n POVM elements then this can be done
by mapping j → j + 1, where n + 1 is identified with 1.
For sets of three or more states, antidistinguishability is
strictly weaker than distinguishability, as there exist sets
of nonorthogonal quantum states that can be antidistin-
guished (see Fig. 11 for an example). For a set of two
states, antidistinguishability is equivalent to distinguisha-
bility because if you know that one of the states was not
the one prepared then you know that it must have been
the other one.
Like distinguishability, antidistinguishability has con-
sequences for the overlaps of probability measures in
ontological models. However, whilst distinguishability
constrains the pairwise overlaps, antidistinguishability
only constrains the n-way overlaps, where n is the num-
ber of states in the antidistinguishable set. Since the
variational distance only applies to two measures, a more
general notion of overlap is needed to capture this.
Definition 6.2. A countable partition {Ωk} of a measur-
able space (Λ,Σ) is an at most countable set of disjoint
subsets Ωk ∈ Σ, Ωk ∩ Ωr = ∅ for k , r, such that
∪kΩk = Λ. T (Λ) denotes the set of countable partitions
of (Λ,Σ).
Definition 6.3. The overlap of an at most countable set
{µ j} of probability measures on a sample space (Λ,Σ) is
given by
L
({
µ j
})
= inf
{Ωk}∈T (Λ)
∑
k
min
j
(
µ j(Ωk)
) . (95)
For a set {µ, nu} of two measures, we write L(µ, ν) for
L({µ, nu}).
It can be shown that if m is a measure that dominates
{µ j} then the overlap is given by
L
({
µ j
})
=
∫
Λ
min
j
(
p j(λ)
)
dm(λ), (96)
where p j is a density that represents µ j with respect to m,
i.e. µ j(Ω) =
∫
Ω
p j(λ)dm(λ). For a finite set of measures,
a dominating measure always exists. This form of the
overlap is often most useful for calculations.
Note that, if {µ j} contains n measures then the optimiza-
tion in Eq. (95) can be restricted to partitions that contain
n subsets. This is because, if a partition contains m > n
subsets, then the same µ j is bound to be the minimum for
more than one Ωk and these sets can then be replaced by
their union without affecting the result. Therefore, the
overlap is given by
L({µ j}) = min{Ωk}∈Tn(Λ)
 n∑
k=1
min
j
(
µ j(Ωk)
) , (97)
where Tn(Λ) is the set of n-fold partitions of Λ. In fact,
this can be simplified further to
L({µ j}) = min{Ω j}∈Tn(Λ)
∑
j
µ j(Ω j)
 , (98)
because the minimizing partition can always be relabeled
such that k gets mapped to the j that minimizes µ j(Ωk).
The overlap has the following operational interpreta-
tion. Suppose that a system is prepared according to one
of n preparation procedures P j, where P j corresponds to
the measure µ j, each case having equal a priori proba-
bility 1/n. You are then told the actual value of λ and
your task is to announce a j between 1 and n such that
P j was not the procedure used to prepare the system,
i.e. you want to antidistinguish the probability measures.
If you adopt a deterministic strategy then the best you
can do is to partition the space into n subsets Ω j and an-
nounce that P j was not the preparation procedure used
when λ ∈ Ω j. The probability of failure when using this
strategy is 1n
∑n
j=1 µ j(Ω j) so the minimal probability of
failure is 1n L({µ j}). By convexity, a probabilistic strategy
cannot do any better than this. Therefore, L({µ j}) = 0
corresponds to the case where the probability measures
can be antidistinguished perfectly.
The overlap generalizes the variational distance in the
following sense.
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Theorem 6.4. For two probability measures µ, ν on
(Λ,Σ), L(µ, ν) = 1 − D(µ, ν), where D is the variational
distance.
Proof. From Eq. (98),
L(µ, ν) = inf
Ω∈Σ
(µ(Ω) + ν(Λ\Ω)) (99)
= inf
Ω∈Σ
(µ(Ω) + 1 − ν(Ω)) (100)
= 1 − sup
Ω∈Σ
(ν(Ω) − µ(Ω)) (101)
= 1 − sup
Ω∈Σ
|µ(Ω) − ν(Ω)| (102)
= 1 − D(µ, ν). (103)

Because of this, the condition for two quantum states ρ
and σ to be ontologically distinct in an ontological model
can be restated as: for all µ ∈ ∆ρ and ν ∈ ∆σ, L(µ, ν) = 0.
The reason for introducing the more general n-way
overlaps is that, being a weaker concept than distinguisha-
bility, antidistinguishability only places constraints on the
n-way overlaps rather than on pairwise overlaps. To un-
derstand the intuition behind these constraints, consider
the case of a finite ontic state space and suppose that there
is an ontic state λ that is assigned nonzero probability by
every measure µ j in a set of probability measures {µ j}nj=1
corresponding to an antidistinguishable set of prepara-
tions {ρ j}nj=1. Then, λ must assign zero probability to
each of the outcomes of the antidistinguishing measure-
ment. However, the probabilities that λ assigns to the
measurement outcomes must form a probability distribu-
tion, so they cannot all be zero. Hence, no such λ can
exist.
In order to formulate this argument rigorously, we have
to deal with measure zero sets. For this reason, it is better
to formulate the argument in terms of the overlap.
Theorem 6.5. Let {ρ j}nj=1 be an antidistinguishable set of
states in a PM fragment. Then, in any ontological model
that reproduces the quantum predictions,
L({µ j}) = 0. (104)
for every possible choice of probability measures µ j ∈
∆ρ j .
Proof. Let M = {E j} be the antidistinguishing POVM,
let µ j ∈ ∆ρ j , and let m be a measure that dominates {µ j}
such that, for Ω ∈ Σ, µ j(Ω) =
∫
Ω
p j(λ)dm(λ) for some
densities p j. In order to reproduce the predictions of M,
for every Pr ∈ ΞM, the ontological model must satisfy∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ)dµ j(λ) =
∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ)p j(λ)dm(λ)
= Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 0. (105)
However, ∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ)p j(λ)dm(λ) ≥∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ) min
k
(pk(λ)) dm(λ), (106)
so ∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ) min
k
(pk(λ)) dm(λ) = 0. (107)
Now, sum both sides over j. Because,
∑
j Pr(E j|M, λ) = 1
for every λ ∈ Λ, this gives∫
Λ
min
k
(pk(λ)) dm(λ) = 0, (108)
or in other words, by Eq. (96), L ({µk}) = 0. 
Finally, a few remarks are in order about terminol-
ogy. Antidistinguishability was first introduced by Caves,
Fuchs and Shack in their study of the compatibility of
quantum state assignments, where it was called “post-
Peierls (PP) incompatibility” [107]. The concept did not
attract much attention until its use in the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem, but since then more systematic studies
of antidistinguishability have appeared [108, 109], where
it goes under the name “conclusive exclusion of quantum
states”. Therefore, if you see the terms “PP incompatibil-
ity” and “conclusive exclusion” in the literature then you
can rest assured that they mean the same thing as antidis-
tinguishability. I think “antidistinguishability” is a more
suggestive name, but time will tell which terminology
becomes standard.
7. The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem
The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem is the most promi-
nent ψ-ontology theorem. It is based on an assumption
known as the Preparation Independence Postulate (PIP),
which essentially says that composite systems prepared
in a product state should be independent of one another.
It is this postulate that allows bounds on n-way overlaps
coming from antidistinguishability to be leveraged into
the bounds on pairwise overlaps needed to establish ψ-
ontology. The PIP is presented in its simplest form in
§7.1 in order to facilitate the simplest possible proof of
the main result in §7.2. However, the PIP is the most
controversial assumption of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem, so its motivation is discussed in §7.3, weak-
enings of it that still allow the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem to go through are discussed in §7.4, its necessity
for proving the theorem is established in §7.5, and criti-
cism of it is discussed in §7.6. Finally, other criticisms of
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the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, not directed at the
PIP, are discussed in §7.7.
7.1. The Preparation Independence
Postulate
The Preparation Independence Postulate (PIP) is an as-
sumption about how composite systems should be mod-
eled when the subsystems are prepared independently of
one another. Suppose Alice prepares her system in a quan-
tum state ρA and Bob prepares his system in a quantum
state ρB, such that their joint state is a product ρA ⊗ ρB.
Suppose further that Alice has an ontological model with
ontic state space (ΛA,ΣA) that reproduces the quantum
predictions for her system in isolation and that µA is the
probability measure that it assigns to her preparation pro-
cedure. Similarly, Bob has an ontological model for his
system with ontic state space (ΛB,ΣB) that assigns the
measure µB to his preparation procedure. Then, the PIP
says that there ought to be an ontological model for the
joint system with ontic state space (ΛA × ΛB,ΣA ⊗ ΣB) in
which the product measure
µA × µB(Ω) =
∫
ΛB
µA(ΩλB)dµB(λB), (109)
reproduces the operational predictions for ρA ⊗ ρB, where
ΩλB = {λA ∈ ΛA|(λA, λB) ∈ Ω}.
This assumption looks superficially plausible, and in-
deed it is not much commented upon in the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph paper. However, since it is the most controversial
assumption of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, it
is worth pausing to define it a bit more rigorously. Dis-
cussion of the motivation for the PIP and criticism of it is
deferred until §7.3–§7.6.
To start with, we need to understand how fragments
for subsystems can be combined to form fragments for
composite systems.
Definition 7.1. Let FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉 and FB =
〈HB,PB,MB〉 be PM fragments. The direct product of
FA and FB is
FA × FB = 〈HA ⊗HB,PA × PB,MA ×MB〉, (110)
where
• PA × PB consists of all product states ρA ⊗ ρB with
ρA ∈ PA and ρB ∈ PB.
• MA ×MB consists of all POVMs of the form {E j ⊗
Fk} with {E j} ∈ MA and {Fk} ∈ MB.
A general product (or just product) of FA and FB is
any PM fragment of the form
FAB = 〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MAB〉, (111)
where
• PA × PB ⊆ PAB.
• MA ×MB ⊆ MAB.
FA and FB are called the factors of FAB.
A direct product fragment represents a situation in
which there are two separated systems and we can only
do separate prepare-and-measure experiments on them
individually. It only allows product states and local mea-
surements, so there is no possibility of entanglement or
even classical correlation between the two systems. A
general product fragment contains all the states and mea-
surements that are in the direct product, but it may, in
addition, include some extra correlated or entangled states
and measurements on the composite system.
Any two ontological models ΘA = (ΛA,ΣA,∆A,ΞA)
and ΘB = (ΛB,ΣB,∆B,ΞB) for FA and FB can
be combined to form an ontological model ΘAB =
(ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) for the direct product FA × FB. To
do so, set
• ΛAB = ΛA × ΛB and ΣAB = ΣA ⊗ ΣB.
• For all ρA ∈ PA, ρB ∈ PB, let ∆AB[ρA ⊗ ρB] =
∆A[ρA] × ∆B[ρB] be the set of measures of the form
µAB = µA×µB, where µA ∈ ∆A[ρA] and µB ∈ ∆B[ρB].
• For all MA ∈ MA, MB ∈ MB, let ΞAB[MA,MB]
be the set of conditional probability distribu-
tions of the form PrAB(E ⊗ F|MA,MBλA, λB) =
PrA(E|MA, λA)PrB(F|MB, λB), where PrA ∈ ΞA[MA]
and PrB ∈ ΞB[MB].
Then, we have, for µAB ∈ ∆AB[ρA ⊗ ρB],
PrAB(E, F|ρA ⊗ ρB,MA,MB)
=
∫
ΛAB
PrAB(E ⊗ F|MA,MB, λA, λB)dµAB(λA, λB)
(112)
=
∫
ΛA
PrA(E|MA, λA)dµA(λA)
×
∫
ΛB
PrB(F|MB, λB)dµB(λB) (113)
= PrA(E|ρA,MA)PrB(F|ρB,MB). (114)
From this, it follows that if ΘA and ΘB reproduce the
quantum predictions for FA and FB respectively, then
ΘAB reproduces the quantum predictions for FA × FB.
The key point is that, in order to model a direct product
fragment, we only need to take the Cartesian product of
the subsystem ontic state spaces and we only need to use
product measures. The PIP states that this should remain
true even if the product fragment is expanded to include
entangled measurements (but still no entangled states). A
little more terminology is required to state this formally.
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Definition 7.2. Let FA = 〈HA,PA,MB〉 and FB =
〈HB,PB,MB〉 be PM fragments. A product state frag-
ment is a product fragment FAB = 〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MAB〉
where PAB = PA ×PB, i.e. it only includes product states,
but it may have entangled measurements.
Definition 7.3. A pair of ontological models ΘA =
(ΛA,ΣA,∆A,ΞA), ΘB = (ΛB,ΣB,∆B,ΞB) for PM frag-
ments FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉 and FB = 〈HB,PB,MB〉
are compatible with an ontological model ΘAB =
(ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) for a product state fragment FAB =
〈HA ⊗HB,PA × PB,MAB〉 if ΘAB satisfies
• The Cartesian Product Assumption (CPA):
ΛAB = ΛA × ΛB, ΣAB = ΣA ⊗ ΣB. (115)
• The No-Correlation Assumption (NCA): For all
ρA ∈ PA, ρB ∈ PB, ∆AB[ρA⊗ρB] = ∆A[ρA]×∆B[ρB]
is the set of measures of the form µA × µB, where
µA ∈ ∆A[ρA] and µB ∈ ∆B[ρB]. This means that
µAB ∈ ∆AB[ρA ⊗ ρB] is of the form
µAB(Ω) =
∫
ΛB
µA(ΩλB)dµB(λB), (116)
where ΩλB = {λA ∈ ΛA|(λA,ΛB) ∈ Ω}, µA ∈ ∆A[ρA]
and µB ∈ ∆B[ρB].
The CPA says that, when modeling independent lo-
cal preparations, there are no additional properties of the
joint system that are not derived from the properties of
the individual systems. In other words, there are no “gen-
uinely nonlocal properties” that are irrelevant for local
measurements but come into play when making joint mea-
surements of the two systems. The NCA says that, further,
local preparations can be modeled as product measures.
Definition 7.4. A pair of ontological models ΘA and ΘB
for PM fragments FA and FB that reproduce the quantum
predictions satisfy the Preparation Independence Postu-
late (PIP) if, for all product state fragments FAB with FA
and FB as factors, there exists an ontological model ΘAB
that is compatible with ΘA and ΘB and reproduces the
quantum predictions.
Note that, it is very important that the PIP only applies
to product state fragments and not to general product
fragments. In other words, it does not have any implica-
tions for how entangled states should be represented in
an ontological model. Suppose we have an ontological
model (ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) for a product state fragment
FAB that satisfies the PIP and we want to extend it to a
more general product fragment F′AB that differs from FAB
by the addition of some entangled states. Then, we have
to allow for the fact that the extended ontological model
(Λ′AB,Σ
′
AB,∆
′
AB,Ξ
′
AB) might have extra ontic states that
have zero measure for all product states, but nonzero mea-
sure for some entangled state. Therefore, all we can con-
clude about the ontic state space of the extended model
from the PIP is that ΛA × ΛB ⊆ Λ′AB, that ΣA ⊗ ΣB is a
σ-subalgebra of Σ′AB, and that independent local prepa-
rations have measure zero outside the ΛA × ΛB subset,
but there may be other ontic states that come into play
when we prepare entangled states. Similarly, probability
measures that induce correlations between ΛA and ΛB
may come into play when we prepare entangled states.
The reason this is important is that ψ-ontic models do
not satisfy Λ′AB = ΛA × ΛB and it would be poor form
to prove a ψ-ontology theorem only to find that ψ-ontic
models are also ruled out by its assumptions. To under-
stand this, consider the Beltrametti–Bugajski model for
two Hilbert spacesHA,HB and for the composite system
HA ⊗ HB. For the two systems individually, we have
the two projective Hilbert spaces consisting of all pure
states
[
ψ
]
A and
[
φ
]
B as the ontic state spaces. If we only
want to model a product state fragment then we only
need states of the form
[
ψ
]
A ⊗
[
φ
]
B, and the set of such
states is isomorphic to the Cartesian product of the two
projective Hilbert spaces. Similarly, the point measure
on
[
ψ
]
A ⊗
[
φ
]
B can be written as the product of a point
measure at
[
ψ
]
A with a point measure at
[
ψ
]
B. Therefore,
the model satisfies the PIP. On the other hand, if we want
to model entangled states then we need additional ontic
states
[
ψ
]
AB that cannot be written as products, and the
point measure at
[
ψ
]
AB cannot be written as a product of
measures on the ontic state spaces of the factors. There-
fore, modeling entangled states requires additional ontic
states and probability measures, but this is not a violation
of the PIP because the PIP only applies to product state
fragments.
For ease of exposition, we have so far confined atten-
tion to composites of two subsystems. The Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem actually requires the generalization to
n systems, but only in the case of n identical factors. The
required generalization should be obvious, but for com-
pleteness here are the definitions.
Definition 7.5. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment.
An n fold product state fragment with factors F is any
fragment Fn of the form
Fn = 〈H⊗n,P×n,M′〉, (117)
whereP×n consists of states of the form ⊗nj=1ρ j for ρ j ∈ P,
andM×n ⊆ M′ whereM×n consists of all POVMs of the
form {⊗nj=1E( j)k j } for {E
( j)
k j
} ∈ M.
Definition 7.6. An ontological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ)
of a fragment F is compatible with an ontological model
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Θn = (Λ′,Σ′,∆′,Ξ′) for an n-fold product state fragment
Fn with factors F if it satisfies:
• The Cartesian Product Assumption (CPA):
Λ′ = Λ×n, Σ′ = Σ⊗n. (118)
• The No-Correlation Assumption (NCA): ∆′⊗nj=1ρ j con-
sists of all product measures of the form ×nj=1µ j,
where µ j ∈ ∆ρ j .
Definition 7.7. An ontological model for a PM fragment
F that reproduces the quantum predictions satisfies the
PIP if it is compatible with an ontological model for
any n-fold product state fragment Fn with factors F that
reproduces the quantum predictions.
7.2. The main result
Recalling Definition 4.11 of a ψ-ontic model, we are now
in a position to prove the main result of the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph paper.
Theorem 7.8 (The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem).
Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment where P contains
all pure states on H. Then, any ontological model of F
that reproduces the quantum predictions and satisfies the
PIP is ψ-ontic.
The proof strategy adopted here is due to Moseley
[110], and is simpler than that of the original Pusey–
Barrett–Rudolph paper. It is based on two lemmas. The
first establishes a connection between antidistinguisha-
bility of product states and ontological distinctness, and
the second establishes that the required antidistinguisha-
bility holds. Because they are quite technical, it is worth
pausing to sketch a special case.
Example 7.9. Let {|0〉 , |1〉} be a basis for C2 and consider
the two states [0] and [+], where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉).
These two states are not orthogonal, so we cannot use
distinguishability to establish their ontological distinct-
ness. Since there are only two of them, they cannot be
antidistinguishable either. However, now consider two
copies of the system and the four states [0]⊗ [0], [0]⊗ [+],
[+]⊗[0] and [+]⊗[+]. It turns out that these four states are
antidistinguishable. The measurement required to antidis-
tinguish them is entangled and consists of the projectors
onto the following four orthonormal vectors.
|φ00〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉) (119)
|φ01〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |−〉 + |1〉 |+〉) (120)
|φ10〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |1〉 + |−〉 |0〉) (121)
|φ11〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |−〉 + |−〉 |+〉) , (122)
where |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). It is easy to check that |φ00〉
is orthogonal to |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, |φ01〉 is orthogonal to |0〉 ⊗ |+〉,
|φ10〉 is orthogonal to |+〉 ⊗ |0〉, and |φ11〉 is orthogonal to
|+〉 ⊗ |+〉, as required.
The second lemma shows that a similar thing hap-
pens for any pair of pure states
[
ψ0
]
,
[
ψ1
]
for which
Tr
([
ψ0
] [
ψ1
]) ≤ 12 . Specifically, the set of states{[
ψ0
] ⊗ [ψ0] , [ψ0] ⊗ [ψ1] , [ψ1] ⊗ [ψ0] , [ψ1] ⊗ [ψ1]} ,
(123)
is always antidistinguishable.
Returning to the example, by Theorem 6.5, antidistin-
guishability implies that, in an ontological model, the
probability measures corresponding to [0]⊗ [0], [0]⊗ [+],
[+]⊗[0] and [+]⊗[+] can have no four-way overlap. How-
ever, if the PIP is assumed, this implies that [0] and [+]
must be ontologically distinct. As a rough sketch of this
argument, consider the case of a finite ontic state space,
let µ0 and µ+ be a pair of measures associated with [0]
and [+] in the ontological model, and assume that there
is some λ to which they both assign nonzero probability.
According to the PIP, the four product states must be rep-
resented by measures of the form µ0×µ0, µ0×µ+, µ+×µ0,
and µ+ × µ+. Each of these assigns a nonzero probability
to (λ, λ), since both µ0 and µ+ assign nonzero probability
to λ, so there is a common ontic state to which all four
measures assign nonzero probability. However, antidistin-
guishability implies that there can be no four-way overlap
between the measures so there is a contradiction, and
hence [0] and [+] must be ontologically distinct.
The first lemma is a more formal and slightly more
general version of this argument. The generaliza-
tion is needed to adapt these ideas to the case where
Tr
([
ψ0
] [
ψ1
])
> 12 .
Lemma 7.10. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
with ontological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) that repro-
duces the quantum predictions, and let ρ0, ρ1 ∈ P. Let
Fn = 〈H⊗n,P×n,M′〉 be an n-fold product state frag-
ment with factors F and let Θn = (Λ×n,Σ⊗n,∆′,Ξ′) be an
ontological model of it that is compatible with Θ.
For j ∈ {0, 1}n, let
ρ j = ρ j1 ⊗ ρ j2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ρ jn , (124)
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where j = ( j1, j2, . . . , jn).
If L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
= 0 for all possible choices of µ j ∈
∆′ρ j then ρ0 and ρ1 are ontologically distinct in Θ.
Proof. Consider any choice of µ j ∈ ∆ρ j . By the NCA,
µ j = µ j1 × µ j2 × · · · × µ jn , (125)
is in ∆′ρ j and hence, by assumption L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
= 0.
Let m be a measure that dominates µ0 and µ1, and let p0
and p1 be corresponding densities. Then,
L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
=
∫
Λ1
dm(λ1) ×
∫
Λ2
dm(λ2) × . . .
×
∫
Λn
dm(λn) min
j∈{0,1}n
 n∏
k=1
p jk (λk)
 . (126)
Here, the subscripts are just being used to identify the
different copies of Λ, so Λ1 = Λ2 = . . . = Λn = Λ
and λk ∈ Λk. Since each term p jk (λ) in the product is
positive, the minimum is attained by minimizing each
term individually. We therefore have
L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}
)
=
(∫
Λ
dm(λ) min
j∈{0,1}
[
p j(λ)
])n
(127)
=
[
L (µ0, µ1)
]n , (128)
and since L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
= 0, this implies that L (µ0, µ1) =
0 because it is a positive function. Since this holds for
any choice of µ j ∈ ∆ρ j , this implies that ρ0 and ρ1 are
ontologically distinct in Θ. 
Lemma 7.11. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment and
let
[
ψ0
]
,
[
ψ1
] ∈ P be pure states that satisfy Tr ([φ] [ψ]) ≤
1
2 . Then there exists a two fold product state fragment
with factors F in which the set of states
D = {[ψ0] ⊗ [ψ0] , [ψ0] ⊗ [ψ1] , [ψ1] ⊗ [ψ0] , [ψ1] ⊗ [ψ1]}
(129)
is antidistinguishable.
Proof. The result follows if there exists a POVM
{E00, E01, E10, E11} on H ⊗ H that antidistinguishes D,
i.e.
Tr
(
E jk
[
ψ j
]
⊗ [ψk]) = 0 (130)
Let |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 be vector representatives of [ψ0] and[
ψ1
]
such that 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 is real and positive. Such vec-
tors can always be found by appropriate choice of global
phases. Then we have 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 ≤ 1√2 so we can write〈ψ0|ψ1〉 = sinϑ, where 0 ≤ ϑ ≤ pi4 . We can then choose
an orthonormal basis {|0〉 , |1〉} for the two dimensional
subspace spanned by |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 such that
|ψ0〉 = |0〉 , |ψ1〉 = sinϑ |0〉 + cosϑ |1〉 . (131)
Note that the POVM elements E jk only need to be defined
on this subspace because the projector onto its orthog-
onal complement can be added on to any one of them
without changing the measurement probabilities given
in Eq. (130). Hence, the special case ϑ = pi4 is just the
case dealt with in Example 7.9, for which the projec-
tors E jk =
[
Φ jk
]
provide the required antidistinguishing
POVM.
The basic idea to deal with the case ϑ < pi4 is to note
that in this case
[
ψ0
]
and
[
ψ1
]
are more distinguishable
than [0] and [+], and there is always a physically allowed
transformation to map a pair of states to any pair of less
distinguishable states. The antidistinguishing measure-
ment therefore consists of performing the transformation
that maps
[
ψ0
]
to [0], i.e. leaves it invariant, and maps[
ψ1
]
to [+], followed by performing the projective mea-
surement
{[
Φ jk
]}
j,k∈{0,1}. Taken together, these two steps
define the required POVM.
More explicitly, consider the linear map E on the set
of density operators onH defined by
E(ρ) = M0ρM†0 + M1ρM†1 , (132)
where the operators M0 and M1 are given by
M0 = |0〉〈0| + tanϑ |1〉〈1| , (133)
M1 =
√
1 − tan2 ϑ
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) 〈1| . (134)
This is an example of a completely-positive, trace-
preserving map, which is a dynamically allowed transfor-
mation of the set of quantum states. It does not matter
if you do not know this formalism, since for present pur-
poses all that matters is that
E([ψ]) = [0] , E([φ]) = [+] , (135)
which can easily be verified, and that, when 0 ≤ ϑ ≤ pi4 ,
M†0 M0 + M
†
1 M1 = IH , (136)
where IH is the identity operator on H, which is again
easily verified.
Next, define the operators
E jk =
1∑
r,s=0
M†r ⊗ M†s
[
Φ jk
]
Mr ⊗ Ms. (137)
These operators form the required antidistinguishing
POVM. To see this, we first have to check that
{E jk} j,k∈{0,1} is a POVM and then that Eq. (130) is sat-
isfied. To see that the operators E jk are positive note
that any operator of the form N†N is positive and hence
setting N =
[
Φ jk
]
Mr ⊗ Ms shows that
M†r ⊗M†s
[
Φ jk
] [
Φ jk
]
Mr ⊗Ms = M†r ⊗M†s
[
Φ jk
]
Mr ⊗Ms,
(138)
Quanta | DOI: 10.12743/quanta.v3i1.22 November 2014 | Volume 3 | Issue 1 | Page 102
is positive, where we have used the fact that
[
Φ jk
]
is a
projector, and hence idempotent. Further, a sum of posi-
tive operators is positive, and hence the E jk’s are positive.
We next need to check that they sum to the identity on
H⊗H. This follows from the fact that ∑ jk [Φ jk] = IH⊗H
together with Eq. (136) as follows.
1∑
j,k=0
E jk =
1∑
j,k=
1∑
r,s=0
M†r ⊗ M†s
[
Φ jk
]
Mr ⊗ Ms (139)
=
1∑
r,s=0
M†r ⊗ M†s
 1∑
j,k=0
[
Φ jk
] Mr ⊗ Ms (140)
=
1∑
r,s=0
M†r ⊗ M†s IH⊗HMr ⊗ Ms (141)
=
1∑
r,s=0
M†r ⊗ M†s Mr ⊗ Ms (142)
=
1∑
r,s=0
M†r Mr ⊗ M†s Ms (143)
=
 1∑
r=0
M†r Mr
 ⊗
 1∑
s=0
M†s Ms
 (144)
= IH ⊗ IH (145)
= IH⊗H . (146)
Finally, the E jk’s satisfy Eq. (130) by virtue of
Eq. (135) and the cyclic property of the trace. For ex-
ample, Tr
(
E00
[
ψ0
] ⊗ [ψ0]) is zero by the following argu-
ment.
Tr
(
E00
[
ψ0
] ⊗ [ψ0])
= Tr
 1∑
r,s=0
M†r ⊗ M†s [Φ00] Mr ⊗ Ms
[
ψ0
] ⊗ [ψ0] (147)
= Tr
[Φ00]
 1∑
r=0
Mr
[
ψ
]
M†r
 ⊗
 1∑
s=0
Ms
[
ψ0
]
M†s


(148)
= Tr
(
[Φ00]E([ψ0]) ⊗ E([ψ0])) (149)
= Tr ([Φ00] [0] ⊗ [0]) = 0. (150)
The other antidistinguishability conditions follow from
similar arguments. 
Proof of Theorem 7.8. Consider any pair of pure states[
ψ0
]
,
[
ψ1
] ∈ P and an ontological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ)
of F that reproduces the quantum predictions and satisfies
the PIP. If Tr
([
ψ0
] [
ψ1
]) ≤ 12 then, by Lemma 7.11, there
exists a two fold product state fragment F2 in which the
states{[
ψ0
] ⊗ [ψ0] , [ψ0] ⊗ [ψ1] , [ψ1] ⊗ [ψ0] , [ψ1] ⊗ [ψ1]}
(151)
are antidistinguishable. Consider an ontological model
Θ2 = (Λ × Λ,Σ ⊗ Σ,∆′,Ξ′) of F2 that is compatible with
Θ. Then, by Theorem 6.5 for any choice of measures
µ jk ∈ ∆′[ψ j]⊗[ψk],
L
({
µ jk
}
j,k∈{0,1}
)
= 0. (152)
Then, by Lemma 7.10,
[
ψ0
]
and
[
ψ1
]
must be ontologi-
cally distinct in any ontological model of F that satisfies
the PIP and reproduces the quantum predictions.
It remains to deal with the case where 12 <
Tr
([
ψ0
] [
ψ1
])
< 1. For this, note that
Tr
([
ψ0
]⊗n [ψ1]⊗n) = Tr ([ψ0] [ψ1])n . (153)
Because of this, we can always find an n such that
Tr
([
ψ0
]⊗n [ψ1]⊗n) ≤ 12 . (154)
Now, consider an n-fold product state fragment Fn. This
must contain the states
[
ψ0
]⊗n and [ψ1]⊗n. For any on-
tological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) of F that satisfies the
PIP, we can construct a compatible ontological model
Θn = (Λ×n,Σ⊗n,∆′,Ξ′) of Fn. This model will also sat-
isfy the PIP (with respect to taking products of Fn with
itself), since a model compatible with F is necessarily
also compatible with Fn. Therefore, we can apply the
argument used in the Tr
([
ψ0
] [
ψ1
]) ≤ 12 case to the states[
ψ0
]⊗n and [ψ1]⊗n and deduce that [ψ0]⊗n and [ψ1]⊗n must
be ontologically distinct in Θn. This means that
L ({µ0, µ1}) = 0, (155)
for any choice of µ0 ∈ ∆′[ψ0]⊗n and µ1 ∈ ∆
′
[ψ1]⊗n
, where
0 denotes the n-bit string (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1 denotes the
n-bit string (1, 1, . . . , 1). Now note that
L ({µ0, µ1}) ≥ L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
, (156)
where µ j ∈ ∆ψ j and[
ψ j
]
=
[
ψ j1
]
⊗
[
ψ j2
]
⊗ · · · ⊗
[
ψ jn
]
. (157)
This is because computing L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
involves min-
imizing over a larger set than computing L ({µ0, µ1}).
Since L is a positive function, we therefore have that
L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
= 0 and hence, by Lemma 7.10,
[
ψ0
]
and[
ψ1
]
must be ontologically distinct. 
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7.3. Motivation for the PIP
The PIP says that ontological models for subsystems
should be compatible with models for product states on
the composite system. Compatibility breaks down into
two assumptions: the CPA, which says that the ontic state
space of the composite system should be a Cartesian prod-
uct of the ontic states spaces of the subsystems, and the
NCA, which says that product states should be modeled
by product measures. We consider the motivations for
each of these requirements in turn.
The CPA is a weakening of a kind of locality assump-
tion known as Einstein separability. The terminology is
due to Howard [111], who defines it as the idea that “two
spatially separated systems possess their own separate
real states”. Einstein formulated this idea in the con-
text of his arguments for the incompleteness of quantum
theory, and expressed it as follows.
If one asks what is characteristic of the realm
of physical ideas independently of the quantum-
theory, then above all the following attracts our
attention: the concepts of physics refer to a
real external world, i.e. ideas are posited of
things that claim a ‘real existence’ indepen-
dent of the perceiving subject (bodies, fields,
etc.), and these ideas are, on the other hand,
brought into as secure a relationship as pos-
sible with sense impressions. Moreover, it is
characteristic of these physical things that they
are conceived of as being arranged in a space-
time continuum. Further, it appears to be es-
sential for this arrangement of the things intro-
duced in physics that, at a specific time, these
things claim an existence independent of one
another, insofar as these things ‘lie in different
parts of space’. Without such an assumption of
the mutually independent existence (the ‘being-
thus’) of spatially distant things, an assumption
which originates in everyday thought, physical
thought in the sense familiar to us would not be
possible. Nor does one see how physical laws
could be formulated and tested without such a
clean separation. Field theory has carried out
this principle to the extreme, in that it local-
izes within infinitely small (four-dimensional)
space-elements the elementary things existing
independently of one another that it takes as ba-
sic, as well as the elementary laws it postulates
for them. — Albert Einstein [112].
The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph argument only makes use
of product state preparations, so we can always imagine
that the individual systems are prepared very far away
from each other and are only later brought together to
perform the entangled measurement. If implemented
this way, the individual systems would occupy spatially
separated regions at their point of preparation and so, ac-
cording to separability, they ought to possess their own
separate real states. Implicit in this is the idea that there
are no inherently global joint properties of the composite
system that are not determined by the properties of the
individual systems. In the language of ontological mod-
els, this means that ontic state spaces should compose
according to the Cartesian product.
Einstein thought that separability should always hold,
regardless of whether we are preparing product states or
entangled states. In light of Bell’s Theorem, the case for
such a general separability assumption is significantly
weakened. Separability is not actually required to prove
Bell’s Theorem [105], but, if we are contemplating a
world in which the effects of measurement can be trans-
mitted instantaneously across space, then it makes sense
to also contemplate a world in which there are inherently
global properties as well. Additionally, since we are in the
business of proving ψ-ontology theorems and the quan-
tum state of an entangled system would, if ontic, be such
an inherently global property, we had better not introduce
any assumptions that rule them out. For this reason, the
CPA is restricted to product state preparations. It says that
separability should hold, not in general, but only when
systems are prepared in product states.
The motivation for assuming separability for product
states is that we generally think that experiments on sepa-
rated systems are independent of one another. It should
not be necessary to gather our system here on Earth to-
gether with one on Mars in order to determine all of the
parameters relevant to our Earth-bound experiment. Of
course, when performing experiments involving systems
on Earth that are correlated with those on Mars, what
happens on Mars is very relevant, but the CPA only ap-
plies to product states. If we allow that genuinely global
properties may be relevant even to an isolated system then
we open up a Pandora’s box. It could well be necessary
to gather together every system in the universe in order
to determine all the parameters that are relevant for our
system here on Earth.
At this point, it is worth noting that the assumptions
behind no-go theorems are often designed to mirror op-
erational features of quantum theory at the ontological
level. This is perhaps clearest in the case of contextuality.
Preparation noncontextuality says that if there is no dif-
ference between two preparation procedures in terms of
the observable statistics they predict, i.e. they are repre-
sented by the same quantum state, then there should be
no difference between them at the ontological level either,
i.e. they should be represented by the same probability
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measure over the ontic states. If this assumption does not
hold then an explanatory gap is opened because, if two
preparations are represented by different probability mea-
sures, then one would generally expect to be able to pick
up this difference in the observed statistics. To prevent
this from happening, the way that measurements are rep-
resented by conditional probability distributions has to be
fine-tuned so that the difference between the two probabil-
ity measures is washed out by averaging. This fine-tuning
has no natural explanation within the ontological model,
other than that it is needed in order to reproduce the quan-
tum predictions. Similarly, on an operational level, local
measurements on entangled states cannot be used to send
signals, so it makes sense to demand locality when mod-
eling them ontologically. Otherwise, we would have to
explain why the purported nonlocal influences cannot be
used to signal. Proofs of preparation contextuality and
Bell’s Theorem therefore expose explanatory gaps in the
ontological models framework.
In this vein, separability can be motivated by the oper-
ational principle known as local tomography. This says
that the state of a joint system, and hence the probabilities
it predicts for any measurement, is completely determined
by the statistics of local measurements made on the sub-
systems. For example, the state of a two-qubit system is
completely determined by the statistics of measurements
of the Pauli observables σx, σy, and σz made on each
qubit individually and their correlations. There are no
parameters of the joint state that require bringing the two
subsystems together and making a joint measurement in
order to determine them. Therefore, it makes sense to
posit an underlying ontology that does not involve gen-
uinely global properties either. Without this assumption,
we would have to explain why the genuinely global prop-
erties do not lead to observable parameters that can only
be determined by bringing the systems together.
Of course, the whole point of no-go theorems, and the
reason they are surprising, is that they show that such
operationally motivated assumptions are not actually vi-
able at the ontological level, at least within the usual
framework. They each imply fine-tunings for which we
currently have no good explanation. My point here is
just that separability bears a family resemblance to the
assumptions behind other no-go theorems, so if you think
that preparation noncontextuality and Bell locality have
intuitive appeal then the same should hold for separabil-
ity as well. If we find, as we have, that some of these
assumptions are not actually viable then it makes sense to
explore the consequences of weakened versions of them,
which maintain some of the appeal but are not yet ruled
out. From this perspective the CPA, as a weakening of
separability, is a reasonable thing to posit.
The NCA can similarly be motivated as mirroring an
operational feature of quantum theory at the ontological
level. When two systems are prepared in a product state
they are completely uncorrelated from each other. No
quantum measurement will ever reveal any pre-existing
correlation. Therefore, it makes sense to think that the
systems are uncorrelated at the ontological level as well.
If not, then it is puzzling that this correlation does not
show up in measurement statistics.
Perhaps the CPA and NCA are not so self-evidently
true that they must never be questioned, but they are
at least as solid as the assumptions that go into other
no-go theorems. Therefore, the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem presents us with a dilemma. Either we must
give up the CPA, the NPA, or ψ-epistemicism, and each
choice opens up an explanatory gap. I think this is at least
as interesting as the dilemmas posed by Bell’s Theorem
and contextuality.
7.4. Weakening the assumptions
The assumptions of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem
have so far been presented in their most intuitively ac-
cessible form. However, it is possible to weaken them
somewhat without affecting the conclusion. This has
been pointed out by Hall [33] and by Schlosshauer and
Fine [38]. The cost of doing this is that the weakened
assumptions are less clearly motivated by operational
properties of quantum theory. Nevertheless, it is inter-
esting to identify the weakest set of assumptions under
which the theorem can be proved.
First of all, note that the only quantum predictions used
in the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph argument involve measure-
ment outcomes that are assigned probability zero by some
quantum state via antidistinguishability. It would make
no difference to the argument if ontological models were
only required to reproduce the probability zero predic-
tions of quantum theory, instead of requiring that they
reproduce all of the quantum predictions exactly. Thus,
the requirement of reproducing the quantum predictions
may be replaced by the following.
Definition 7.12. An ontological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ)
of a PM fragment F = 〈H,P,M〉 reproduces the quan-
tum preclusions if, for all ρ ∈ P, M ∈ M and E ∈ M such
that Tr (Eρ) = 0, each µ ∈ ∆ρ and Pr ∈ ΞM satisfies∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = 0. (158)
Secondly, in the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph argument, the
PIP is only used in Lemma 7.10, where it licenses the
following inference. Given a pair of quantum states
ρ0 and ρ1, if the product states {ρ j1 ⊗ ρ j2 ⊗ · · · ⊗
ρ jn} j∈{0,1}n correspond to nonoverlapping measures µ j,
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i.e. L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
= 0, then the measures µ0 and µ1
corresponding to ρ0 and ρ1 should also not overlap, i.e.
L(µ0, µ1) = 0. Therefore, if we want to avoid using the
PIP, then we can simply make this assumption directly.
Definition 7.13. An ontological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ)
for a PM fragment F = 〈H,P,M〉 is compact with re-
spect to an ontological model Θn = (Λ′,Σ′,∆′,Ξ′) for the
n-fold product state fragment Fn = 〈H⊗n,P×n,M′〉 with
factors F if, whenever L
({
µ j
}
j∈{0,1}n
)
= 0 for all choices
of µ j ∈ ∆′ρ j (where ρ j = ⊗nk=1ρ jk ), then L(µ0, µ1) = 0 for
all choices of µ j ∈ ∆ρ j .
Definition 7.14. An ontological model for a fragment F
that reproduces the quantum preclusions satisfies com-
pactness if it is compact with respect to an ontological
model that reproduces the quantum preclusions for any
n-fold product state fragment Fn with factors F.
The condition of compactness is originally due to
Schlosshauer and Fine [38], and is a slight generaliza-
tion of a condition that Hall called “compatibility” [33].
Here, I have presented it in a slightly more rigorous form
in order to take care of measure zero issues and to allow
for preparation contextuality. In this form, the meaning of
compactness may be somewhat obscure, so it is helpful
to consider the special case of a finite ontic state space.
In this case, when n = 2, compactness says is that, if a
measure µ0 corresponding to ρ0 assigns a nonzero proba-
bility to the ontic state λ and a measure µ1 corresponding
to ρ1 likewise assigns a nonzero probability to λ, then
there ought to be probability measures µ00, µ01, µ10 and
µ11 representing the states ρ0 ⊗ ρ0, ρ0 ⊗ ρ1, ρ1 ⊗ ρ0 and
ρ1 ⊗ ρ1 of the composite system that all assign nonzero
probability to some ontic state λ′. The advantage of this
formulation is that it does not assume that the ontic state
space of the composite system has a Cartesian product
structure because it does not specify how λ′, which is an
ontic state of the composite, is related to λ, which is an
ontic state of the subsystem. It also does not rule out the
possibility of correlations between the two systems at the
ontological level.
However, the motivation for assuming compactness
is somewhat obscure. Unlike the PIP, it is not a weak-
ened form of separability, and has no obvious operational
motivation. It is doubtful that one would come up with
compactness without having the idea of Cartesian prod-
ucts and product measures in mind in the first place. It
amounts to simply assuming that Lemma 7.10 is true by
fiat. Without any examples of natural models that sat-
isfy compactness but not the PIP, it is not clear why one
would make such an assumption. Life would be very
simple if we always just raised the lemmas needed to
prove theorems into assumptions instead of proving them.
Nevertheless, the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem can
be stated in the more general form.
Theorem 7.15 (The “Generalized” Pusey–Barrett–Ru-
dolph Theorem). Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
whereP contains all pure states onH. Then, any ontolog-
ical model of F that reproduces the quantum preclusions
and satisfies compactness is ψ-ontic.
The proof is just the same as the original Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem, except for the removal of Lemma 7.10.
7.5. Necessity of the PIP
The PIP is the most substantive assumption that goes into
the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem. All of the rest of
its assumptions are standard for the ontological models
framework and are common to the vast majority of no-
go theorems for realist models of quantum theory, such
as Bell’s Theorem and the Kochen–Specker Theorem.
Therefore, any criticism of Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph that is
not directed against the PIP could equally well be directed
against these other results. Whilst I do not wish to belittle
such criticisms, and will deal with them in §7.7, it is
more important to deal with objections that are specific
to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, and hence to
the PIP. Before doing so, we should check that the PIP
is a necessary assumption, since if ψ-ontology can be
established without the PIP then the question of whether
to accept it is moot.
The Kochen–Specker model shows that the PIP is nec-
essary for the case of a qubit. However, the case of a qubit
is rather special and the existence of this model does not
rule out the possibility that ontological models for sys-
tems of larger dimension might have to be ψ-ontic. Lewis,
Jennings, Barrett and Rudolph (LJBR) showed that it is
in fact possible to construct a ψ-epistemic model for mea-
surements in orthonormal bases in all dimensions [52].
This was based on an idea due to Rudolph, as discussed
in Morris’ master’s thesis [113]. Subsequently, Aaronson,
Bouland, Chua and Lowther (ABCL) provided an alterna-
tive construction based on the same basic idea [53]. Of
course, none of these models satisfy the PIP. Whilst the
LJBR model is ψ-epistemic, the ABCL construction addi-
tionally shows that, for any pair
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
]
of nonorthogonal
states, a ψ-epistemic model can be constructed in which
measures corresponding to
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
have nonzero over-
lap. Since the main idea is the same, we focus on the
ABCL result here.
Both LJBR and ABCL start from the Bell model de-
scribed in Example 4.5. This is a ψ-ontic model, but
by a simple modification it can be made ψ-epistemic.
Recall that, in the Bell model, the ontic state space is
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Λ = Λ1 ×Λ2, where Λ1 is the set of pure states on Cd and
Λ2 is the unit interval. A state
[
ψ
]
is represented by the
product measure µ = µ1 × µ2, where µ1 = δψ is the point
measure at
[
ψ
]
on Λ1 and µ2 is the uniform measure on
Λ2 = [0, 1]. For each [λ1] ∈ Λ1, the response functions
are set by dividing up the interval [0, 1] into subsets of
length Tr
([
φ j
]
[λ1]
)
that give the
[
φ j
]
outcome with cer-
tainty. In Example 4.5 this was done simply by dividing
[0, 1] up into consecutive intervals of the form
j−1∑
k=0
Tr
([
φk
]
[λ1]
) ≤ λ2 < j∑
k=0
Tr
([
φk
]
[λ1]
)
, (159)
as illustrated in Fig. 7. However, this division could be
done in a different way, providing the total length of the
subset that gives
[
φ j
]
with certainty remains equal to
Tr
([
φ j
]
[λ1]
)
. The first step in converting the Bell model
into a ψ-epistemic model is to change this division.
Following ABCL, let [a] and [b] be two nonorthogonal
states that we would like to make ontologically indis-
tinct. Given a measurement M =
{[
φ j
]}d−1
j=0
, let σ be a
permutation of (0, 1, . . . , d − 1) such that
min
(
Tr
([
φσ(0)
]
[a]
)
,Tr
([
φσ(0)
]
[b]
))
≥ min (Tr ([φσ(1)] [a]) ,Tr ([φσ(1)] [b])) ≥ . . . (160)
≥ min (Tr ([φσ(d−1)] [a]) ,Tr ([φσ(d−1)] [b])) . (161)
Now, the unit interval is divided up in exactly the same
way as before, except with respect to the permuted in-
dices instead of the original ordering of outcomes i.e. the
outcome
[
φσ( j)
]
is obtained with certainty if
j−1∑
k=0
Tr
([
φσ(k)
]
[λ1]
) ≤ λ2 < j∑
k=0
Tr
([
φσ(k)
]
[λ1]
)
. (162)
So far, the model is still ψ-ontic because we have only
modified the conditional probability distributions repre-
senting measurements, so the probability measures rep-
resenting states still have their point measure terms. The
next step is to show that there is an  > 0 such that all
ontic states in the set
Ωa,b = {[a] , [b]} × [0, ], (163)
always return the
[
φσ(0)
]
outcome in any measurement.
Thus, any weight that a probability measure assigns to this
region of the ontic state space can be redistributed in an
arbitrary way without affecting the observed probabilities,
and by doing so the probability measures associated with
[a] and [b] can be made to overlap.
To prove this, let |a〉, |b〉 and
∣∣∣φ j〉 be vector represen-
tatives of [a], [b] and
[
φ j
]
. It is sufficient to show that
there exists an  > 0 such that, for all measurements
M =
{[
φ j
]}d−1
j=0
, there exists a j such that
∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣a〉∣∣∣∣ >  and∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣ > . Then, whatever [φσ(0)] is, it must satisfy∣∣∣〈φσ(0)∣∣∣a〉∣∣∣ >  and ∣∣∣〈φσ(0)∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣ >  because σ orders the
outcomes in decreasing order of min
(∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣a〉∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣).
To show this, note that
|〈a|b〉| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣〈a|
d−1∑
j=0
∣∣∣φ j〉〈φ j∣∣∣
 |b〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (164)
≤
d−1∑
j=0
∣∣∣∣〈a∣∣∣φ j〉 〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣ (165)
≤
d−1∑
j=0
∣∣∣∣〈a∣∣∣φ j〉∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣ , (166)
where we have used the fact that
∑d−1
j=0
∣∣∣φ j〉〈φ j∣∣∣ is a resolu-
tion of the identity and the triangle inequality. The largest
term in the sum must be larger than the average, so we
have
max
j
(∣∣∣∣〈a∣∣∣φ j〉∣∣∣∣ × ∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣) ≥ |〈a|b〉|d , (167)
but since
∣∣∣∣〈a∣∣∣φ j〉∣∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣ are between 0 and 1, this
means
max
j
(
min
(∣∣∣∣〈a∣∣∣φ j〉∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣〈φ j∣∣∣b〉∣∣∣∣)) ≥ |〈a|b〉|d , (168)
and since [a] and [b] are nonorthogonal, |〈a|b〉| /d > 0, so
setting  = |〈a|b〉| /d gives the desired result.
Now, we can replace the measure associated with [a]
with
µ(Ω) =
∫
Λ2
µλ2(Ωλ2)dµ2(λ2), (169)
where as before µ2 is the uniform measure on Λ2 and
Ωλ2 = {[λ1] ∈ Λ1|([λ1] , λ2) ∈ Ω}, but now µλ2 is a mea-
sure on Λ1 that depends on λ2 via
µλ2 =
δa if λ2 > µΩa,b if λ2 ≤ , (170)
where µΩa,b is an arbitrary measure on Ωa,b which, for
example, could be the uniform measure. Similarly for [b],
with δa replaced by δb. Since both measures now agree
on Ωa,b and assign nonzero probability to it, the model is
ψ-epistemic.
This model is only ψ-epistemic in a fairly weak sense,
since only a single pair of pure states has any overlap.
However, the same idea can be used as the basis for con-
structing a model in which every pair of nonorthogonal
pure states has overlap (see §11 for an outline of the
construction).
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The Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem implies that the
ABCL model must necessarily fail to satisfy the PIP. To
see this, we have to show that, given an ABCL model for
Cd, there is some n for which there is no model for prod-
uct states on the composite system
(
Cd
)⊗n
with which it
is compatible. Given that the ABCL construction can be
used to make any single pair of pure states ontologically
indistinct, we can apply it to the states [z+] and [x+] in
C2 from Example 7.9. Then, compatibility implies that
the model for product states on C2 ⊗ C2 would have to
have nonzero four-way overlap for the states [z+] ⊗ [z+],
[z+] ⊗ [x+], [x+] ⊗ [z+] and [x+] ⊗ [x+], since these are
represented by products of the measures representing [z+]
and [x+] in the ABCL model, which have nonzero pair-
wise overlap. However, nonzero overlap for these four
states is ruled out by their antidistinguishability, so no
such model can exist. Similarly, whichever pair of quan-
tum states we choose to make ontologically indistinct, the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem rules out compatibility
with models for the composite system for some n.
7.6. Criticism of the PIP
Since the PIP is necessary for proving the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem, it is important to settle the question
of whether it is reasonable. In this section, two criticisms
of the PIP are discussed, directed at the CPA and NCA
respectively. In §7.6.1, a weakening of the PIP due to
Emerson, Serbin, Sutherland and Veitch (ESSV) [32] is
discussed and we show that, under this weakened assump-
tion, ψ-epistemic models can always be constructed. This
is still a useful criticism, as it highlights the fact that
giving up the CPA need not lead to global parameters
becoming relevant to local measurements, so the spirit
of separability can perhaps be preserved. However, the
weakened PIP is not really a viable constraint on how
systems should compose, as the construction shows that it
can be satisfied trivially. §7.6.2 discusses a criticism due
to Hall [33] that the NCA does not follow from causality
considerations of the type considered in Bell’s Theorem.
Whilst this argument is formally correct, I think it misses
the point as the NCA is not motivated by causality in the
first place.
7.6.1. Criticism of the CPA
Emerson, Serbin, Sutherland and Veitch (ESSV) [32]
have proposed a weakening of the PIP, aimed at criticiz-
ing the CPA, and have shown how a ψ-epistemic model
satisfying their weakened PIP can reproduce the predic-
tions of Example 7.9. Before getting into the details, it is
worth examining what we should expect of a weakened
PIP assumption.
The PIP is a constraint on how subsystems should be
composed at the ontological level. The CPA encodes
the idea that, when preparing two independent systems
in a product state, there should be no genuinely global
properties that are not reducible to local properties of the
individual systems. It is motivated by the idea that, if
this condition were violated, then it might be necessary
to bring the two independent systems together in order
to determine all of the parameters that are relevant even
for just local experiments on one of the systems. Any
proposal for weakening the PIP by introducing global
properties should therefore be evaluated on the following
criteria.
• It ought to demonstrate that the motivation for the
CPA is misguided by showing how the existence
of global properties need not interfere with local
experiments.
• It ought to provide a viable constraint on how sub-
systems should be composed at the ontological level.
In my view, the proposal of ESSV satisfies the first
criterion, but not the second. It does a good job of criti-
cizing the motivation for the CPA, but is not, in itself, a
viable constraint on how subsystems should be composed.
Explanation of what I mean by a viable constraint on
subsystem composition is deferred until after explaining
the details of the ESSV proposal.
The basic idea is as follows. Recall that, in order to
model direct product fragments, we can always get away
with taking the Cartesian product of ontic state spaces
and using product measures to represent states. Therefore,
the only time global properties would necessarily have
to play a role when modeling product state fragments is
when a joint measurement is made, e.g. a measurement in
an entangled basis. Such measurements already involve
an interaction between the two systems at the operational
level, so invoking global properties to explain such ex-
periments does not seem to open up a huge gap between
the structure of the ontological model and the operational
structure of the experiment. The argument that it might
be necessary to bring a system on Earth together with a
system on Mars in order to characterize all the parameters
relevant to experiments on Earth does not hold water if
the genuinely global properties do not have any effect
on the outcomes of local measurements. It would still
be possible to work with separate systems completely
independently of each another, in blissful ignorance of
the global properties, until we decide to do an experiment
that necessarily involves bringing the systems together.
With this in mind, ESSV’s weakened PIP runs as follows.
Definition 7.16. A pair of ontological models ΘA =
(ΛA,ΣA,∆A,ΞA), ΘB = (ΛB,ΣB,∆B,ΞB) for fragments
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FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉 and FB = 〈HB,PB,MB〉 are
weakly compatible with an ontological model ΘAB =
(ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) for a product state fragment FAB =
〈HA ⊗HB,PA × PB,MAB〉 if ΘAB satisfies
• The Weak Cartesian Product Assumption (WCPA):
ΛAB = ΛA × ΛB × ΛNL, ΣAB = ΣA ⊗ ΣB ⊗ ΣNL,
(171)
where ΛNL represents some global degrees of free-
dom not reducible to properties of system A and
system B alone, and ΣNL is a σ-algebra over ΛNL.
• The Weak No-Correlation Assumption (WNCA):
∀ρA ∈ PA, ρB ∈ PB, all µAB ∈ ∆AB[ρA ⊗ ρB] satisfy
µAB(ΩAB × ΛNL) = µA × µB(ΩAB), (172)
for all ΩAB ∈ ΣA⊗ΣB and for some µA ∈ ∆A(ρA) and
µB ∈ ∆B(ρB), i.e. the marginal measure on ΛA × ΛB
satisfies the NCA.
In general, the ontic state space for a composite system
need not break down neatly into a product of local ontic
state spaces and global properties. The WCPA therefore
seems like a relatively mild generalization of the CPA.
The WNCA then says that, if we only have access to
λA and λB, then the probability measures corresponding
to product states look just like product measures, even
though they may in fact be correlated via the third vari-
able λNL. Further, not only do they look like product
measures, they look just like the product of measures
that the ontological models ΘA and ΘB would assign to
the two systems individually. If we assume that ΘA and
ΘB are adequate for modeling FA and FB individually, it
follows that local measurements can be modeled by prod-
ucts of the conditional probability distributions PrA and
PrB assigned by these models, so the outcomes of local
measurements need only depend on λA and λB. Therefore,
under local measurements, this type of model is indistin-
guishable from one that satisfies the PIP. It is only under
joint measurements that there is a difference, since the
outcomes of these may depend on λNL.
Definition 7.17. A pair of ontological models ΘA and
ΘB for fragments FA and FB that reproduce the quantum
predictions satisfy the Weak Preparation Independence
Postulate (WPIP) if, for all product state fragments FAB
with FA and FB as factors, there exists an ontological
model ΘAB that is weakly compatible with ΘA and ΘB
and reproduces the quantum predictions.
Before discussing this further, we prove that the WPIP
places no constraints at all on the local models ΘA and ΘB.
The proof idea is due to Matt Pusey and Terry Rudolph
[114].
Theorem 7.18. Let FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉 and FB =
〈HB,PB,MB〉 be PM fragments and let ΘA =
(ΛA,ΣA,∆A,ΞA) and ΘB = (ΛB,ΣB,∆B,ΞB) be any on-
tological models of them that reproduce the quantum
predictions. Then, ΘA and ΘB satisfy the WPIP.
Proof. Let FAB = 〈HA⊗HB,PA×PB,MAB〉 be a product
state fragment with factors FA and FB. We need to show
that there is an ontological model ΘAB of FAB satisfying
the following three requirements.
• ΘAB satisfies the WCPA, i.e. it is of the form ΘAB =
(ΛA × ΛB × ΛNL,ΣA ⊗ ΣB ⊗ ΣNL,∆AB,ΞAB).
• ΘAB satisfies the WNCA.
• ΘAB reproduces the quantum predictions.
To satisfy the first requirement, we first need to es-
tablish what the measurable space (ΛNL,ΣNL) should
be. For this, consider an arbitrary ontological model
ΘNL = (ΛNL,ΣNL,∆NL,ΞNL) of FAB that reproduces
the quantum predictions. Such an ontological model
always exists. For example, we could use the Beltrametti–
Bugajski model extended to mixed states. Now, just take
(ΛNL,ΣNL) to be the ontic state space of this model. With
this, we have that the model satisfies the WCPA.
For the second requirement, take the sets ∆AB[ρA ⊗ ρB]
to consist of all measures of the form µA×µB×µNL, where
µA ∈ ∆A[ρA], µB ∈ ∆B[ρB] and µNL ∈ ∆NL[ρA ⊗ ρB]. This
assignment satisfies the WNCA.
It remains to show that the model can be made to re-
produce the quantum predictions. There are two cases
to consider: local measurements for which (MA,MB) ∈
MA ×MB, and joint measurements MAB ∈ MAB that are
not inMA ×MB.
For the local measurements, the sets ΞAB[MA,MB] are
chosen to consist of all conditional probability distribu-
tions of the form
PrAB(E, F|MA,MB, λA, λB, λNL)
= PrA(E|MA, λA)PrB(F|MB, λB), (173)
where E ∈ MA and F ∈ MB, and where PrA ∈ ΞA[MA]
and PrB ∈ ΞB[MB]. In other words, the nonlocal variable
is ignored and we just use the conditional probabilities
from the two local ontological models. This reproduces
the quantum predictions by virtue of the fact that ΘA and
ΘB do.
For the nonlocal measurements, the sets ΞAB[MAB] are
chosen to consist of all conditional probability distribu-
tions of the form
PrAB(E|MAB, λA, λB, λNL) = PrNL(E|MAB, λNL), (174)
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where E ∈ MAB, and where PrNL ∈ ΞNL[MAB]. This
reproduces the quantum predictions by virtue of the fact
that ΘNL does. 
If the PIP is replaced with the WPIP, the implications
for ψ-ontology are as follows. Consider the situation in
which the factors FA and FB consist of all pure states
and measurements in orthonormal bases on a finite di-
mensional Hilbert space of dimension d. The ABCL
construction shows that ψ-epistemic models always exist
for these factors. Since any pair of ontological models
satisfy the WPIP, ABCL models do in particular, so the
WPIP cannot be used to prove a ψ-ontology theorem.
One might object that we should demand that the weakly
compatible model of FAB should also be ψ-epistemic, al-
though that was not part of the definition of the WPIP.
However, if we restrict attention to fragments FAB that
consist of measurements in orthonormal bases then this
can be achieved by using an ABCL model for dimen-
sion d2 as ΘNL. Since we can make an arbitrary pair
of states ontologically indistinct in an ABCL model, if[
ψ0
]
A and
[
ψ1
]
A are ontologically indistinct in ΘA and[
φ0
]
B and
[
φ1
]
B are ontologically indistinct in ΘB then
we can choose
[
ψ0
]
A ⊗
[
φ0
]
B and
[
ψ1
]
A ⊗
[
φ1
]
B to be on-
tologically indistinct in ΘNL and then they will remain
so in ΘAB. One might make the further objection that all
four states
[
ψ0
]
A⊗
[
φ0
]
B,
[
ψ0
]
A⊗
[
φ1
]
B,
[
ψ1
]
A⊗
[
φ0
]
B and[
ψ1
]
A⊗
[
φ1
]
B ought to be pairwise ontologically indistinct,
as they would be in the model of the direct product frag-
ment discussed in §7.1, but this can also be arranged by
using the extension of the ABCL model to be discussed
in §11, in which every pair of pure states can be made
ontologically indistinct. Finally, it should be evident that
the construction used in proving Theorem 7.18 can be
iterated to larger numbers of subsystems. We simply in-
troduce a new ΘNL for the joint system every time a new
subsystem is added.
However, the proof of Theorem 7.18 also illustrates
why I do not consider the WPIP to be a viable constraint
on subsystem composition. All we have done is to load
an ontological model ΘNL for the joint system, that could
potentially reproduce the quantum predictions for both lo-
cal and joint measurements all by itself, onto the nonlocal
variable λNL. When we make a local measurement, this
model is completely ignored and we use the local models
ΘA and ΘB instead, but when we make a joint measure-
ment we do the opposite, using the nonlocal model ΘNL
and completely ignoring ΘA and ΘB. This is fully com-
patible with the WPIP, but it is not clear why this model
is better than just using ΘNL on its own in the first place.
I accept the criticism that dropping the CPA need not
necessarily give rise to global parameters becoming rele-
vant to local experiments. However, arguably, the form
of the local ontological models should place some con-
straints on what the model for the joint system should
look like. The PIP, in its original form, does this, but the
WPIP does not, since it is compatible with just assigning
an ontological model to the nonlocal variable that is com-
pletely independent of the local ontological models. In
response to this, I think one should either drop the PIP en-
tirely, or come up with something of intermediate strength
that places nontrivial constraints on the ontological model
for the joint system. Without that, giving examples of
ψ-epistemic models that satisfy the WPIP does not, in my
opinion, strengthen the case against ψ-ontology.
Of course, ESSV do not have in mind the trivial sort of
model constructed here. In their model of Example 7.9,
the nonlocal variable does not contain enough informa-
tion to reproduce the quantum predictions all on its own,
and the probability measures over ΛA×ΛB×ΛNL are non-
trivially correlated. The point is that ESSV have not done
enough to articulate the way in which their model differs
from the trivial construction presented here. On this point,
note that both the ESSV model and the construction given
here share the feature that the amount of overlap between
states is lower than it would be in the model of the direct
product fragment discussed in §7.1, due to the probability
measure on the extra factor ΛNL. One might therefore
impose the additional requirement that the reduction in
overlap introduced by the nonlocal variable ought to be
as small as possible, which could potentially rule out the
construction presented here. One might also demand that
there should be no redundancy in the model, in the sense
that it should not be possible to reproduce the quantum
predictions for local measurements using the nonlocal
variable on its own. Further work along these lines is
needed to determine whether there is a weakened version
of the PIP that can serve as a reasonable constraint on
subsystem composition.
7.6.2. Criticism of the NCA
The PIP has also been criticized on other grounds by
Hall [33] (this criticism is also mentioned by Schlosshauer
and Fine [38]). Hall objects to the NCA on the grounds
that, even if they are space-like separated, the events
corresponding to preparing two systems have a common
past, so their lack of correlation cannot be derived from
causality by the same sort of reasoning that Bell used to
motivate his locality condition. More explicitly, suppose
we have a model that does satisfy the CPA, so that we
can associate separate ontic states λA and λB to Alice
and Bob’s systems. Suppose that the intersection of the
past lightcones of Alice and Bob’s preparation events
also has some physical properties described its own ontic
state λpast. For concreteness, suppose that all the ontic
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state spaces are finite, i.e. the ontic state spaces of Alice’s
system, Bob’s system, and their common past are all finite.
The argument does not depend on this, but it makes things
conceptually simpler.
Suppose that Alice decides to prepare the quantum
state
[
ψ
]
A and Bob decides to prepare the quantum state[
φ
]
B. In general, the resulting λA and λB might depend
on both Alice and Bob’s choices of preparation and the
ontic state λpast of their common past, so the preparation
procedure would be specified by conditional probabilities
Pr(λA, λB| [ψ]A , [φ]B , λpast). Given that the preparation
procedures might occur at space-like separation, it is not
unreasonable to impose a factorization of probabilities
akin to Bell locality, which would read
Pr(λA, λB| [ψ]A , [φ]B , λpast)
= Pr(λA| [ψ]A , λpast)Pr(λB| [φ]B , λpast), (175)
However, this is not enough to entail the NCA because the
measure µ corresponding to the preparation of
[
ψ
]
A⊗
[
φ
]
B
would then be,
µ(λA, λB) =
∑
λpast
Pr(λA| [ψ]A , λpast)
× Pr(λB| [φ]B , λpast)Pr(λpast), (176)
where Pr(λpast) is the prior distribution over the variables
in the common past. This can induce correlations between
λA and λB due to their common dependence on λpast.
This argument is correct, but all it shows is that the
NCA cannot be regarded as a causality assumption akin to
Bell locality. It does not imply that the NCA is necessar-
ily unreasonable. To infer that, one would have to believe
that the only reasonable type of assumption to make in a
no-go theorem is one that follows from Bell-type locality.
In contrast, §7.3 discussed a more general strategy for
positing reasonable assumptions, which is to look at the
operational structure of quantum theory and try to impose
similar structure at the ontological level. In the case of
the NCA, we noted that a product state displays no corre-
lations in any quantum measurement, so it makes sense
to posit that no such correlations exist at the ontological
level either. It is this, and not Bell locality, that is the
motivation for the NCA. Dropping the NCA in light of
the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem is not an obviously
crazy thing to do, but it is the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem itself rather than causality arguments that should
motivate this move. The same reasoning applies to all
other no-go theorems that are not motivated by locality.
For example, I think it is fairly clear that proofs of prepa-
ration contextuality are a good reason for dropping the
assumption of preparation noncontextuality, but the fact
that the latter cannot be derived from Bell locality is a
much less compelling reason for doing so.
7.7. Other Criticisms of the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem
Apart from criticism of the PIP, several other criticisms
of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem have been raised.
§7.7.1 discusses a criticism due to Drezet [30, 31] and
Schlosshauer and Fine [38] based on the idea that the con-
ditional probability distributions representing measure-
ments should depend on the quantum state in addition to
the ontic state. I argue that this criticism is simply a mis-
understanding of what is meant by the term “ontic state”
in the ontological models framework. I then discuss two
further criticisms due to Schlosshauer and Fine [38], the
second of which has also been made by Dutta et. al. [115].
The first criticism, discussed in §7.7.2, is a claim that the
ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinction is merely conventional
because one kind of model can be converted into a struc-
turally equivalent model of the other kind. The second
criticism, discussed in §7.7.3, is based on the idea that
modeling detector inefficiencies offers a way out of the
dilemma posed by the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem.
Whilst this is strictly speaking true, it only concerns the
practical implementation of Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph-type
experiments and has no impact on the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem as a structural result about quantum
theory itself, assuming ideal experiments. If one accepts
the PIP, error analysis can be used to constrain this escape
route in more practical experiments. Finally, in §7.7.4,
I discuss criticisms that reject some aspect of the onto-
logical models framework outright. These criticisms are
mostly based on a neo-Copenhagen point of view, and
thus are easy to deal with as the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem was never intended to rule out such approaches.
Since the criticisms in this section are directed against
the ontological models framework in general, they are
not specific to Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph but could also be
directed against Hardy’s Theorem, the Colbeck–Renner
Theorem and the results discussed in Part III. I discuss
them here because they were made as responses to the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem and not these other
results, but this is simply because the Pusey–Barrett–
Rudolph Theorem was the first and is still the most promi-
nent ψ-ontology theorem.
7.7.1. The conditional probabilities for
measurements should depend on the
quantum state
Several authors have pointed out that, in the ontologi-
cal models framework, the conditional probability dis-
tribution Pr(E|M, λ) representing a measurement is as-
sumed to be independent of the quantum state ρ that is
prepared [30, 31, 38]. If a dependence Pr(E|ρ,M, λ) is
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allowed then the theorem can be trivially evaded. The
conditional probabilities can simply be made independent
of the ontic state and and can just return the quantum
probabilities by setting Pr(E|ρ,M, λ) = Tr (Eρ), since we
then have, for any probability measure µ,
∫
Λ
Pr(E|ρ,M, λ)dµ(λ) = Tr (Eρ)
∫
Λ
dµ(λ) (177)
= Tr (Eρ) . (178)
The ontic state space and probability measures can then
be anything at all, so the model can trivially be made to
satisfy the PIP. For example, Cd could be associated with
the ontic state space Λd = {1, 2, . . . , d} and Cd ⊗ Cd′ with
the Cartesian product Λd × Λd′ , which is isomorphic to
Λdd′ . Then, the uniform measure can be used to represent
all quantum states, which makes the model trivially ψ-
epistemic.
Of course, proponents of this view do not have this sort
of model in mind as a realistic candidate for describing
quantum theory. They think the conditional probabilities
should depend on the ontic states in some way in addition
to the quantum state. The above model is just intended
to show how trivial the ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinction
becomes when the conditional probabilities are allowed
to depend on the quantum state.
I think there are two intuitions behind this sort of ob-
jection. The first is based on elementary probability the-
ory and the second on a misunderstanding of how con-
ventional hidden variable theories, such as de Broglie–
Bohm theory, are meant to fit into the ontological mod-
els framework. First of all, putting aside everything we
know about the ontological models framework for the
moment, suppose we are interested in some PM fragment
F = 〈H,P,M〉 and we have a theory for reproducing its
predictions that involves some sort of additional variable
λ that takes values in a set Λ. For the purposes of this
argument, assume that Λ, P andM are finite, so that ele-
mentary probability theory can be used. This restriction
can easily be lifted, but dealing with the measure theoretic
complications would obscure the argument.
A quite general way that such a theory could be
formulated is in terms of a joint probability distribu-
tion Pr(E, ρ,M, λ) over all the variables involved, where
Pr(E, ρ,M, λ) is specified for every ρ ∈ P, M ∈ M,
E ∈ M, λ ∈ Λ. In order to determine whether such a
model reproduces the quantum predictions, we need to
determine the conditional probabilities Pr(E|ρ,M), i.e.
the probability for an outcome given the choice of state
and measurement, because quantum theory tells us this
should equal Tr (Eρ). This can be computed as follows.
Pr(E|ρ,M) =
∑
λ
Pr(E, λ|ρ,M)
=
∑
λ
Pr(E|ρ,M, λ)Pr(λ|ρ,M), (179)
where the conditional probabilities are defined in terms
of the joint probability in the usual way and the second
equality follows from the law of total probability.
On the other hand, in the ontological models frame-
work, the same quantity would be computed as
Pr(E|ρ,M) =
∑
λ
Pr(E|M, λ)µ(λ), (180)
where µ ∈ ∆ρ and the usual integral has been replaced by
a sum because Λ is finite. Comparing these two expres-
sions, in an ontological model we have
Pr(E|ρ,M, λ) = Pr(E|M, λ) (181)
Pr(λ|ρ,M) = µ(λ). (182)
The left hand side of Eq. (181) depends on ρ, but the
right hand side does not. Similarly, the left hand side of
Eq. (182) depends on M, but the right hand side does not.
Despite appearances, both sides of Eq. (182) depend on
ρ because µ itself is ρ dependent given that it must be a
member of ∆ρ. Therefore, it seems that the ontological
models framework implicitly assumes that the following
conditional independences hold.
Pr(E|ρ,M, λ) = Pr(E|M, λ) (183)
Pr(λ|ρ,M) = Pr(λ|ρ). (184)
The second conditional independence, that λ should
not depend on the choice of measurement, was noted in
the context of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem by
Hall [33], but it is not all that controversial. It is usu-
ally justified by the idea that the measurement setting is
a “free choice” that may be chosen by the experimenter
long after the preparation is completed. Things can be
set up such that the measurement choice is determined
by something that should be independent of the rest of
the experiment, such as a random number generator. The-
ories in which dependence of λ on M nevertheless still
holds in the underlying ontology are often called superde-
terministic. There is a minority that seriously advocates
superdeterminism, but this loophole exists in almost all
no-go theorems for ontological models of quantum theory,
e.g. it applies to Bell’s Theorem as well. Therefore, if it is
taken seriously as a response to Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
then it must be taken seriously for these other results as
well. One way in which dependence on M can happen is
if there are retrocausal influences that travel backwards
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in time. Personally, I am not opposed to developing retro-
causal theories as a response to all the quantum no-go
theorems, although I am not convinced it is the right di-
rection either. Nonetheless, this criticism is not specific
to Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph.
The first conditional independence, that the measure-
ment outcome should be independent of the quantum
state given the ontic state and the choice of measurement,
is the one that is objected to more frequently. However,
this is not really a substantive assumption, but rather it is
part of the very meaning of the term “ontic state”. The
ontic state is supposed to comprise all the properties of
the system that exist in reality. In addition to its own
setting, the response of the measurement device is only
supposed to depend on those properties of the system that
exist in reality, so the ontic state is the only information
about the preparation procedure that it receives. If there is
an additional dependence on the quantum state then that
simply means that we have made an incorrect assertion
about what the ontic state actually is. It must include
all the information that is required to determine the re-
sponse of the measurement device. Therefore, saying
that the conditional probability distribution describing
the measurement should depend on the quantum state is
tantamount to saying that the quantum state is part of the
ontic state, and it is very easy to prove that the quantum
state is ontic if you assume that it is ontic from the outset.
In conclusion, I agree with the critics that the scope of
the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem is restricted to the
case where this conditional independence holds, but this
is part of the definition of the term “ontic state”, rather
than something that can be eliminated in order to arrive
at a more general notion of what it means for a model to
be ψ-epistemic that still conveys the same meaning.
I think that proponents of this objection have been mis-
led by the way in which hidden variable theories, and
de Broglie–Bohm theory in particular, have traditionally
been presented. It is often thought that the aim of a hid-
den variable theory should be to restore determinism,
and so the problem of developing such a theory is often
phrased in terms of whether quantum theory is “com-
plete”. The terminology “complete” suggests taking the
idea that elements of the existing quantum formalism
represent reality for granted, and only asking whether
anything else needs to be added to it. It is obviously
critical to not take this point of view if the reality of the
wavefunction is the very thing under investigation. The
criticism of Drezet [30, 31] exemplifies this mistake. He
suggests that de Broglie–Bohm theory is a counterex-
ample to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph argument. In de
Broglie–Bohm theory, particles have well-defined posi-
tions which evolve deterministically, and the probability
distribution assigned to the particles is given by |ψ(x)|2,
where ψ(x) is the wavefunction. Drezet’s argument is that,
if we view the particle positions as the ontic states of the
system, then their distributions overlap for any pair of
nonorthogonal states because in this case the |ψ(x)|2 dis-
tributions overlap. He claims that this makes the theory
ψ-epistemic.
Now, in the conventional understanding of de Broglie–
Bohm theory, the wavefunction is understood to be part
of the ontic state in addition to the particle positions. It
is true that the particle positions are in some sense more
fundamental than the wavefunction, and they are often
called the “primitive ontology” [116–118] or the “local
beables” of the theory [119]. The particle positions are
supposed to be the things in the theory that provide a
direct picture of what reality looks like to us, e.g. when
we observe the pointer of a measurement device pointing
to a specific value then it is the positions of the particles
that make up the pointer that determine this. Nevertheless,
the wavefunction is still needed as part of the ontology
because it determines how the particles move via the guid-
ance equation. The response of a measurement device
to an interaction with a system it is measuring depends
on the wavefunction of the system as well as the particle
positions, so the wavefunction is still part of the ontic
state, even if it is in some sense less primitive than the
particle positions. Of course, Drezet can get away with
having only the particle positions comprise the ontic state
if he allows the conditional probabilities representing a
measurement to depend on the wavefunction separately.
Indeed, as pointed out by Schlosshauer and Fine [38], this
is often how the probabilities are written in de Broglie–
Bohm theory and other hidden variable theories, but this
is because that framework was addressing the issue of
completeness, which assumes that the wavefunction is
real, rather than the question of whether the quantum
state is real in the first place. As I have argued, it is
part of the definition of an ontic state that it suffices to
completely determine how a measurement device will
react to the system, so if your conditional probabilities
for measurement outcomes depend on the wavefunction
then the wavefunction is ontic and there is nothing left to
prove.
7.7.2. The ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction is
conventional
Fine and Schlosshauer [38] claim that the distinction be-
tween ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic models is merely conven-
tional because a ψ-ontic model can be converted into a
“structurally equivalent” model that is ψ-epistemic and
vice versa. They do not actually define the term “struc-
turally equivalent”, so it is perhaps best to look at the
procedures they propose for converting models.
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Firstly, starting from a ψ-epistemic model it is trivial to
construct a ψ-ontic one. Simply take the new ontic state
space to be the Cartesian product of the existing ontic
state space with the set of pure quantum states. Then, for
each pure state preparation, take the existing probability
measures and form the product with a point measure on
the same pure state in the new component of the ontic
state space. These are the probability measures of the
new model. Finally, extend the conditional probabilities
representing measurements to the new ontic state space
in the most trivial way, by having them not depend on the
new factor at all. Because of the point measures, the new
model is ψ-ontic, but because the conditional probabili-
ties completely ignore this component of the ontic state
space, the model makes the exact same predictions as the
original one.
The construction that Fine and Schlosshauer intend for
converting a ψ-ontic model into a ψ-epistemic model is
less obvious. They simply refer to the LJBR paper for
this [52], which uses the same sort of construction as the
ABCL model, discussed in §7.5. Recall that the idea is
to find regions of the ontic state space associated with
two different quantum states that make the exact same
predictions for all measurements. One can then redis-
tribute any weight that probability measures assign to this
region such that measures associated with distinct quan-
tum states now match on this region, and hence they now
overlap. Fine and Schlosshauer seem to think that such
regions can always be found, but this is not the case. For
example, in the Beltrametti–Bugajski model, the ontic
state space is just the set of pure quantum states and each
quantum state is represented by a different point mea-
sure on this space. The response functions simply return
the quantum probabilities, so each pair of ontic states
makes different predictions for some quantum measure-
ment. Therefore, there are no regions of the ontic state
space corresponding to distinct quantum states that make
identical predictions. Thus, this construction cannot be
used to generate a ψ-epistemic model in this case.
To be fair, Fine and Schlosshauer confine their atten-
tion to deterministic models, but they do not prove that
appropriate regions of the ontic state space can always be
found even in this case. It might be interesting to inves-
tigate this, but nevertheless determinism is deliberately
not an assumption of the ontic models framework, so
the fact that there are non-deterministic models to which
their construction does not apply is enough to defeat the
criticism.
Further, since Schlosshauer and Fine do not define
what they mean by “structurally equivalent”, it is not
clear what their objection is in the first place. The only re-
quirement I can infer from their paper is that “structurally
equivalent” models should make the same predictions for
all quantum measurements. If this is really all that the
term means then any two models that reproduce the quan-
tum predictions would be structurally equivalent. For
example, the Beltrametti–Bugajski model and de Broglie–
Bohm theory would be structurally equivalent by this
criterion. It is clear, however, that they are not explanato-
rially equivalent. Beltrametti–Bugajski is simply a more
precise version of the orthodox interpretation of quantum
theory in which the quantum state, and only the quantum
state, is the state of reality. This brings with it all the
attendant problems of measurement and the collapse of
the wavefunction. On the other hand de Broglie–Bohm
solves these problems by introducing additional variables.
Whether or not you think it is plausible as a fundamental
theory, it does not have a measurement problem. There-
fore, reproducing the same set of predictions does not
mean that two theories are equally viable.
Of course, to some extent, Fine and Schlosshauer are
just pointing out that, without the PIP, both ψ-epistemic
and ψ-ontic models are possible. However, this means
that criticism of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem
should be directed specifically at the PIP, and not at
whether the ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic distinction makes sense
in the first place.
7.7.3. Detector inefficiency
Both Schlosshauer and Fine [38] and Dutta et. al. [115]
have raised an objection to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
theorem based on detector inefficiency. Here is not the
place to go over the fine details of experimental error
analysis, but it is worth taking a little time to explain what
a practical test of a ψ-ontology theorem can be expected
to show, so that we can deal with this more easily.
Experimentally testing a mathematical theorem is a
bizarre concept at first sight, but what it really means is
to test that the quantum theoretical predictions hold in the
experimental scenarios used to prove the theorem, at least
approximately. In the case of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
theorem, this means checking that the antidistinguish-
ing measurements used to prove the theorem really do
antidistinguish the sets of states that they are supposed
to. In practice, the experiments will not reproduce the
quantum predictions exactly. The error analysis therefore
involves figuring out how the conclusions of the theorem
must be modified when the quantum predictions are only
reproduced approximately.
One possible source of error is detector inefficiency.
In the theoretical treatment, we generally assume that,
when performing a measurement of a POVM M = {E j},
one of the outcomes E j actually occurs. In practice, the
measuring device may sometimes simply fail to register
any outcome at all. Thus, for a realistic analysis, we
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should add an extra POVM element Enull to every POVM,
representing the possibility of detector failure. We will
assume that our detectors are reasonably efficient, so
that there is some small η > 0 such that Tr (Enullρ) ≤
η for every state ρ prepared in the experiment. Now,
if a set of states {ρ j}nj=1 is antidistinguishable then this
means that there exists a measurement M = {E j}nj=1 with
exactly n outcomes such that Tr
(
E jρ j
)
= 0. With detector
inefficiency, we have to deal with the fact that there are n+
1 outcomes in the measurement that we actually perform
and that all we can say about the extra Enull outcome is
that Tr
(
Enullρ j
)
≤ η for every ρ j.
Of course, there are other sources of error as well. Even
if the detectors do register an outcome, they may not fire
with the exact probabilities predicted by quantum theory
due to environmental noise and our inability to control the
experimental apparatus with absolute precision. This sort
of error was dealt with in the error analysis in the original
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph paper [27]. There is also a sta-
tistical error arising from the fact that the experiment is
only repeated a finite number of times, so we are inferring
probabilities from a finite sample. This can be dealt with
by the standard techniques of statistics. In any case, the
objection to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem is based
on detector inefficiency, so we do not need to consider
these other sources of error here.
Given an antidistinguishable set of states {ρ j}nj=1, de-
tector inefficiency has implications for what we can say
about the overlaps of the probability measures µ j ∈ ∆ρ j .
Specifically, assuming the ontological model reproduces
these predictions, we now have∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ)p j(λ)dm(λ) = 0 (185)∫
Λ
Pr(Enull|M, λ)p j(λ)dm(λ) ≤ η, (186)
where m is a measure that dominates {µ j} and the p j’s are
corresponding densities.
From these equations, we can immediately infer that∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ) min
k
[
pk(λ)
]
dm(λ) = 0 (187)∫
Λ
Pr(Enull|M, λ) min
k
[
pk(λ)
]
dm(λ) ≤ η. (188)
and since
∑
j Pr(E j|M, λ) + Pr(Enull|M, λ) = 1, we have∫
Λ
min
k
[
pk(λ)
]
dm(λ) ≤ η, (189)
or, in other words L
({
µ j
}n
j=1
)
≤ η.
The reason why L
({
µ j
}n
j=1
)
is no longer zero is fairly
straightforward. Given that there are detector inefficien-
cies, we cannot rule out the possibility that there are ontic
states λ ∈ Λ that always cause the outcome Enull to occur.
If the detector does not fire with probability η, then one
of these ontic states might be occupied with probability
η, regardless of which quantum state was prepared, and
this means that the corresponding probability measures
could have an overlap of up to η.
Both Fine and Schlosshauer [38] and Dutta et. al. [115]
point out that that, since L
({
µ j
}n
j=1
)
is always nonzero re-
gardless of how small the detector inefficiency is, you can
never get a definitive confirmation of ψ-ontology from a
practical experiment. If the aim of such an experiment
is to definitively rule out the possibility of a ψ-epistemic
model, then any nonzero detector inefficiency immedi-
ately makes this impossible.
However, it is important to remember that the defi-
nition of a ψ-epistemic model is very permissive. The
ψ-epistemic explanations of quantum phenomena such as
the indistinguishability of quantum states require much
more than that the overlap should be nonzero. For ex-
ample, the states [0] and [+] of Example 7.9 can only
be distinguished with probability 3/4 in quantum the-
ory. If the corresponding probability measures have an
overlap that is almost, but not exactly, zero, then there
is not enough overlap to explain why they cannot be dis-
tinguished much better than this. For this reason, we do
not need to definitively rule out all ψ-epistemic models
to make ψ-epistemic explanations seem implausible. It is
enough to show that the overlaps are small compared to
the indistinguishability of the quantum states, and experi-
ments should therefore be used to provide upper bounds
on these overlaps, rather than a definitive yes/no result.
I think both Fine and Schlosshauer [38] and Dutta et.
al. [115] have been mislead by the way that detector in-
efficiencies are dealt with in experimental tests of Bell’s
theorem. In that case, one is looking for a definitive
yes/no test of whether a model satisfying Bell’s locality
condition can account for the experimental probabilities
and, in that case, there is indeed a sharp detection effi-
ciency above which such local models can be definitively
ruled out [120]. However, tests of ψ-ontology theorems
simply should not be thought of like this. Instead of a
yes/no result, they yield a numerical upper bound on the
degree of overlap. There is no specific value that this must
take beyond which ψ-epistemic models are definitively
ruled out, but if it is sufficiently close to zero then they
should be regarded as implausible.
In response to the perceived difficulty with detector
inefficiency, Dutta et. al. suggest that experimental tests
of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem should instead be
viewed as definitive yes/no experiments about the possi-
bility of a maximally-ψ-epistemic theory, and they derive
the detection efficiencies required to do this. However,
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in my view, it is more informative to simply report the
overlaps inferred from the experiment rather than trying
to do a definitive test of whether they are below some
fixed threshold.
Fine and Sclosshauer’s version of the objection in-
volves an additional subtlety that stems from the fact
that they prefer the compactness condition to the PIP.
Recall that in the proof of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
theorem, the antidistinguishing measurement acts on mul-
tiple copies of the system prepared in a product state.
The PIP is needed to infer bounds on the overlap of the
measures for a single system from the bounds obtained
from the antidistinguishing joint measurement made on
all of the systems together. The details can be found in
the original Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph paper [27] and I do
not want to rehash them here. The main point is that this
can be done assuming the PIP because the probability
measures of the joint system are products of those for the
individual systems. With compactness, there is no nec-
essary connection between the amount of overlap of the
probability measures on the global system and the amount
of overlap of the measures for the individual subsystems.
Compactness just says that if the former is zero then the
latter must also be zero. Because of this, compactness
does not allow for the derivation of error bounds. How-
ever, we have already argued that compactness is poorly
motivated compared to the PIP, so this is just another
reason for preferring the PIP to compactness.
Fine and Schlosshauer can also be read as making a
prediction that a certain amount of detector efficiency will
necessarily occur when we attempt to make the measure-
ments needed to test the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem.
This amounts to a prediction that the quantum theory can
only be verified to some finite accuracy in these experi-
ments, so it is a prediction that quantum theory will break
down at some point. Again, assuming compactness, this
only requires a nonzero detection inefficiency, but under
the PIP this inefficiency would have to be implausibly
large for some pairs of states, such as [0] and [+], in or-
der to allow for a viable ψ-epistemic model that supports
things like the ψ-epistemic explanation of indistinguisha-
bility. In any case, the idea that quantum theory would be
violated in order to preserve the possibility of ψ-epistemic
explanations is one of the more implausible reasons for
thinking that quantum theory might break down that I
have heard.
7.7.4. Rejecting the ontological models
framework
Finally, several authors have objected to the adoption of
the ontological models framework wholesale [34, 41, 45].
Usually, these objections come from those who adopt neo-
Copenhagen approaches, so I would say that this is just
a misunderstanding of the intended scope of the Pusey–
Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, which was never intended to
rule out such interpretations.
For example, Griffiths [41] wonders why anyone would
still be interested in the ontological models framework
at all, given that existing results like Bell’s Theorem and
the Kochen–Specker Theorem already make it look quite
implausible. To this I would respond that, to the extent
that explicitly nonlocal and contextual theories like de
Broglie–Bohm theory, spontaneous collapse theories and
modal interpretations are currently taken seriously, the
framework is interesting because it encapsulates them and
allows us to study what other constraints must be satisfied
by theories in this category. Beyond that, the ontological
models framework is interesting as a model of how to sim-
ulate quantum systems with classical resources, so even
if the framework is without foundational significance, it
is still relevant to quantum information theory. Of course,
Griffiths thinks he has a superior approach in the form of
decoherent/consistent histories, but to my mind the best
way of understanding this approach is either as a neo-
Copenhagen interpretation or as a way of formulating the
branching structure in a many-worlds interpretation. Both
of these are beyond the intended scope of the ontologi-
cal models framework and the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem.
Similarly, Hofmann [34] thinks that the conclusion
of Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph can be avoided by allowing
exotic probability theories, such as those involving neg-
ative probabilities. Such theories have a long history in
quantum theory, with the most famous example being
the Wigner function [121]. However, exotic probabil-
ity theories are usually couched in neo-Copenhagen or
operationalist terms, i.e. it is fine to use whatever mathe-
matical object you like to represent unobservable things,
so long as you always derive an ordinary positive proba-
bility distribution for observable measurement outcomes.
In the ontological models framework, the ontic state λ is
supposed to be something that objectively exists indepen-
dently of the experimenter. Although we may not know
the exact value of λ and may only be able to detect coarse-
grained properties of it in our experiments, it is supposed
to be knowable in principle, even if only by a hypothetical
super-quantum agent who is not subject to the same limi-
tations as us. For such an agent, the probability assigned
to λ has to have one of its conventional meanings, e.g.
in terms of frequencies, betting odds, etc., since it is not
conceptually different from any other probability. There-
fore, only requiring probabilities to be positive for things
that we can observe is not good enough to constitute a
realist interpretation. One would need to specify what it
means to assign a negative probability to λ for someone
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who can know λ exactly and, as far as I am aware, no
such interpretation of negative probabilities exists.
8. Dynamics in ontological models
The remaining two ψ-ontology theorems—Hardy’s The-
orem and the Colbeck–Renner Theorem—make use of
assumptions about how dynamics are represented in on-
tological models. Two distinct scenarios are relevant.
Firstly, we extend the notion of a PM fragment to include
the possibility of performing discrete unitary transforma-
tions between preparation and measurement. As with
measurements, we do not want to assume that this dynam-
ics is deterministic at the ontological level, so a unitary
transformation is represented by a stochastic transforma-
tion on the ontic state space. This type of dynamics is
discussed in §8.1. An important property of stochastic
transformations is that they cannot increase the varia-
tional distance between probability measures. Therefore,
if two quantum states are ontologically indistinct then
they remain ontologically indistinct after applying a uni-
tary transformation.
Using just unitary dynamics, it is possible to prove ver-
sions of both the Hardy and Colbeck–Renner Theorems,
but they fail to show that all nonorthogonal pure states
must be ontologically distinct. Instead, they show that, if
the inner product of a pair of pure states is less than some
quantity that depends on the Hilbert space dimension,
then they must be ontologically distinct.
The trick to extending these results into full blown
ψ-ontology theorems for arbitrary dimensions is to con-
sider a different type of dynamical transformation. This
involves appending an ancillary system in a fixed state
to the system of interest and is discussed in §8.2. This
does not change the inner product of the original pure
states, but it does increase the dimension of the Hilbert
space. The dimension of the ancillary system can then be
chosen so that the required inequality is satisfied in the
larger Hilbert space. However, our definition of a frag-
ment assumes that the Hilbert space is fixed and adding
an ancillary system changes the Hilbert space. Therefore,
in the present framework, appending a system should be
viewed as a dynamical mapping between two different
fragments and, at the ontological level, as a mapping
between two different ontological models. If appending
an ancilla is modeled by a stochastic transformation in
the same sort of way as unitary dynamics within a fixed
fragment, then it also shares the property that ontolog-
ically indistinct quantum states remain so after such a
transformation.
The property that dynamics preserve ontological dis-
tinctness, be they unitary or the appending of ancillas, is
the only assumption about dynamics needed to prove the
Colbeck–Renner Theorem. Therefore, we state this as an
explicit assumption so that the Colbeck–Renner argument
can be formulated in terms of PM fragments with just this
additional assumption. On the other hand, Hardy’s Theo-
rem involves an additional assumption about dynamics,
to be discussed in §9.1, so it requires the extended notion
of a fragment that includes unitary transformations.
8.1. Unitary dynamics
Definition 8.1. A prepare-measure-transform (PMT)
fragment of quantum theory F = 〈H,P,M,T〉 consists
of a Hilbert spaceH, a set P of density operators onH, a
setM of POVMs onH, and a set T of unitary operators
onH that contains the identity. Additionally, P is closed
under the action of T , i.e. if ρ ∈ P and U ∈ T then
UρU† ∈ P.
The quantum probability of obtaining the outcome E ∈
M of a measurement M ∈ M when the state ρ ∈ P
is prepared and the transformation U ∈ T is applied
between preparation and measurement is
Prob (E|ρ,M,U) = Tr
(
EUρU†
)
. (190)
The constraint that P should be closed under the action
of T is imposed because preparing the state ρ followed
by implementing U provides a method of preparing the
state UρU†. The identity is assumed to be in T because
we want a PMT fragment to be an extension of a PM
fragment, so it should be possible to do nothing between
preparation and measurement, i.e. Eq. (190) reduces to
the probability rule for a PM fragment when U is the
identity. In addition, it is natural to impose further con-
sistency constraints. Firstly, it is common to assume that
if U,V ∈ T then VU ∈ T , because if we can implement
U and V separately then we could apply them one after
the other. This makes T a semigroup. Similarly, it is
usual to assume thatM is closed under the action of T ,
i.e. if {E j} ∈ M and U ∈ T then {U†E jU} ∈ M. This is
because applying U before measuring {E j} is a method of
measuring {U†E jU}. These additional constraints are not
imposed here because they are not required for the Hardy
or Colbeck–Renner Theorems.
In order to construct an ontological model for a PMT
fragment, states and measurements are represented on
an ontic state space (Λ,Σ) as before. The only novel
issue is how to represent transformations. As with mea-
surements, we do not want to assume that U ∈ T acts
deterministically on the ontic states, so in general U is
represented by a Markov kernel γ with source and target
both equal to (Λ,Σ). This means that γ is a measurable
function that associates, to each λ ∈ Λ, a probability mea-
sure γλ on (Λ,Σ). For Ω ∈ Σ, γλ(Ω) is the conditional
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probability that the ontic state will end up in Ω after the
transformation, given that it started in the ontic state λ.
For a finite ontic state space γλ({λ′}) is the probability
that the dynamics causes λ to make a transition to λ′, and
thus a Markov kernel is just the measure theoretic gener-
alization of a transition matrix, which is used to model
stochastic dynamics for a system with finite state space.
If the system is assigned probability measure µ before the
transformation then afterward it is assigned the measure
ν, where
ν(Ω) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω)dµ(λ). (191)
As with states, there is the possibility that differ-
ent methods of implementing U might lead to different
Markov kernels, in which case the model is transforma-
tion contextual [67]. To account for this, each U ∈ T is
associated with a set ΓU of Markov Kernels, rather than
just one.
The consistency constraint that P is closed under T
also needs to be reflected at the ontological level. Suppose
ρ, σ ∈ P and σ = UρU† for some U ∈ T . For every
µ ∈ ∆ρ and γ ∈ ΓU , it should be the case that ν ∈ ∆σ,
where ν is given by Eq. (191). This is because any method
of preparing ρ and applying U is a method of preparing
σ.
Definition 8.2. An ontological model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ, Γ)
of a PMT fragment F = 〈H,P,M,T〉 consists of
• A measurable space (Λ,Σ), where Λ is called the
ontic state space.
• A function ∆ that maps each quantum state ρ ∈ P to
a set of probability measures ∆[ρ] = ∆ρ on (Λ,Σ).
• A function Ξ that maps each POVM M ∈ M to a
set of conditional probability distributions over M,
Ξ[M] = ΞM, i.e. each Pr ∈ ΞM is a function from
M×Λ to R that is measurable as a function of λ ∈ Λ
and satisfies, for all λ ∈ Λ, ∀E ∈ M, Pr(E|M, λ) ≥ 0
and
∑
E∈M Pr(E|M, λ) = 1.
• A function Γ that maps each U ∈ T to a set of
Markov kernels Γ(U) = ΓU , i.e. γ ∈ ΓU is a measur-
able function γ : λ → γλ where γλ is a probability
measure on (Λ,Σ).
In addition, for every ρ, σ ∈ P, U ∈ T such that
σ = UρU†, for every µ ∈ ∆ρ and γ ∈ ΓU , it must be the
case that ν ∈ ∆σ, where
ν(Ω) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω)dµ(λ). (192)
The ontological model reproduces the quantum pre-
dictions if, for all ρ ∈ P and M ∈ M, each µ ∈ ∆ρ and
Pr ∈ ΞM satisfies
∀E ∈ M,
∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = Tr (Eρ) . (193)
Note that we do not have to explicitly impose that, for
all ρ ∈ P, U ∈ T , each µ ∈ ∆ρ, γ ∈ ΓU and Pr ∈ ΞM
satisfies
∀E ∈ M,
∫
Λ
∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ′)dγλ(λ′)dµ(λ) = Tr
(
EUρU†
)
,
(194)
since this is implied by the consistency constraints on
states and the probability densities that represent them.
In fact, as in the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem,
Hardy’s Theorem only depends on the weaker require-
ment that the model reproduces the quantum preclusions,
which means that∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = 0, (195)
whenever Tr (Eρ) = 0.
The following standard result is the basis of the most
common assumption about dynamics used to prove ψ-
ontology theorems.
Theorem 8.3. Let µ and ν be probability measures on a
measurable space (Λ,Σ), let γ be a Markov kernel with
source (Λ,Σ) and target (Λ′,Σ′), and let µ′ and ν′ be the
measures on (Λ′,Σ′) resulting from the action of γ on µ
and ν, i.e. for Ω′ ∈ Σ′,
µ′(Ω′) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω′)dµ(λ) (196)
ν′(Ω′) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω)dν(λ). (197)
Then, D(µ′, ν′) ≤ D(µ, ν), where D is the variational
distance.
Proof. Let m be a measure that dominates µ and ν and let
p and q be corresponding densities. Then, for all Ω′ ∈ Σ′∣∣∣µ′(Ω′) − ν′(Ω′)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣∫
Λ
γλ(Ω′) (p(λ) − q(λ)) dm(λ)
∣∣∣∣∣
(198)
≤
∫
Λ
∣∣∣γλ(Ω′) (p(λ) − q(λ))∣∣∣ dm(λ),
(199)
where the second line follows from the triangle inequality.
However, since 0 ≤ γλ(Ω′) ≤ 1, we have∫
Λ
∣∣∣γλ(Ω′) (p(λ) − q(λ))∣∣∣ dm(λ) ≤∫
Λ
|p(λ) − q(λ)| dm(λ) = D(µ, ν). (200)
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Hence, for all Ω′ ∈ Σ′,∣∣∣µ′(Ω′) − ν′(Ω′)∣∣∣ ≤ D(µ, ν). (201)
Therefore, this also applies for the supremum of the left
hand side, so D(µ′, ν′) ≤ D(µ, ν). 
Corollary 8.4. Let 〈H,P,M,T〉 be a PMT fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ,Γ) be an ontological model of it.
If ρ, σ ∈ P are ontologically indistinct then UρU† and
UσU† are also ontologically indistinct for all U ∈ T .
Proof. If ρ and σ are ontologically indistinct then there
exist µ ∈ ∆ρ and ν ∈ ∆σ such that D(µ, ν) < 1. However,
for any γ ∈ ΓU , µ′ ∈ ∆UρU† and ν′ ∈ ∆UσU† , where, for
all Ω ∈ Σ,
µ′(Ω) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω)dµ(λ) (202)
ν′(Ω) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω)dν(λ). (203)
Hence, by Theorem 8.3, D(µ′, ν′) ≤ D(µ, ν) < 1, so
UρU† and UσU† are also ontologically indistinct. 
If the PMT fragment of interest contains all unitary
transformations on H, then corollary 8.4 implies that
whether or not two pure states are ontologically dis-
tinct depends only on their inner product. This is be-
cause, if
[
ψ′
]
= U
[
ψ
]
U† and
[
φ′
]
= U
[
φ
]
U†, then[
ψ
]
= U†
[
ψ′
]
U and
[
φ
]
= U†
[
φ′
]
U, so applying Corol-
lary 8.4 to both U and U† implies that
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are
ontologically distinct iff
[
ψ′
]
and
[
φ′
]
are.
In fact, Corollary 8.4 is the only property of the way
that unitary dynamics is represented that is used in prov-
ing the Colbeck–Renner Theorem. Therefore, for the
purposes of proving that theorem, all of the detailed con-
siderations about how unitary dynamics are represented
can be replaced by the following assumption.
Definition 8.5. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of it.
Θ preserves ontological distinctness with respect to a
unitary operator U if, for every ρ, σ ∈ P that are ontolog-
ically distinct in Θ, UρU† and UσU† are also ontologi-
cally distinct in Θ whenever UρU†,UσU† ∈ P.
The benefit of this assumption is that, if we can show
that
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are ontologically distinct then it fol-
lows that all pairs
[
ψ′
]
and
[
φ′
]
where Tr
([
φ′
] [
ψ′
])
=
Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
must also be ontologically distinct, so to
prove ψ-ontology we only need to prove that there ex-
ists a pair of ontologically distinct states for every value
of the inner product.
The assumption that unitary dynamics preserves on-
tological distinctness stands independently of how U is
represented in an ontological model, but it is worth bear-
ing in mind that the representation of U as a stochastic
transformation is really what motivates it.
8.2. Appending ancillas
So far, we have considered unitary dynamics on a fixed
Hilbert space. More generally, the Hilbert space of the
system may change during the course of the experiment.
For example, the dimension may be reduced if part of the
system is absorbed into the environment. For present pur-
poses, we only need to consider a very particular kind of
change, in which the experimenter appends an additional
system in a fixed quantum state τ to the system under
investigation. Specifically, if the system is originally de-
scribed by a state ρA on a Hilbert space HA, then after
appending the ancilla it is described by the state ρA ⊗ τB
on the Hilbert spaceHA ⊗HB, whereHB is the Hilbert
space of the ancillary system. In order to prove full-blown
ψ-ontology theorems for arbitrary dimensional Hilbert
spaces, the following assumption is used.
Definition 8.6. Let FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉 and FB =
〈HB,PB,MB〉 be PM fragments and let FAB =
〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MAB〉 be a product fragment with fac-
tors FA and FB. Let ΘA = (ΛA,ΣA,∆A,ΞA) be an onto-
logical model of FA and let ΘAB = (ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB)
be an ontological model of FAB. ΘAB preserves ontologi-
cal distinctness with respect to ΘA if, whenever ρA ⊗ τB
and σA ⊗ τB are ontologically distinct in ΘAB for some
τB ∈ PB, ρA, σA ∈ PA are ontologically distinct in ΘA,
The motivation for this is similar to that for the assump-
tion of preserving ontological distinctness with respect
to unitary transformations. The action of appending an
ancilla is a type of dynamics, and so it should be repre-
sented by a stochastic transformation at the ontological
level. The main difference from the unitary case is that we
are dealing with a transformation that changes the under-
lying Hilbert space, and our definition of a PM fragment
assumes a fixed Hilbert space. Therefore, appending an
ancilla is a map between two distinct fragments and so it
is represented by a stochastic map between two different
ontological models. Specifically, if (ΛA,ΣA) is the ontic
state space of ΘA and (ΛAB,ΣAB) is the ontic state space
of ΘAB, then appending an ancilla would be represented
by a Markov kernel γ with source (ΛA,ΣA) and target
(ΛAB,ΣAB). By Theorem 8.3, this cannot increase the
variational distance of the measures representing quan-
tum states and hence, by the same argument used to prove
Corollary 8.4, it preserves ontological distinctness.
At first, it may seem surprising that appending ancillas
should be modeled at the ontological level in the same sort
of way as unitary dynamics, since they are very different
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types of operations. As additional motivation, note that
the most general type of dynamics of a quantum system
is described by a Completely-Positive Trace-Preserving
(CPT) map and the more general claim is that CPT maps
should be represented by stochastic transformations (see
e.g. [67] for a discussion of this). Both unitary dynamics
and appending an ancilla are examples of CPT maps,
so their representation in terms of stochastic maps are
special cases of this general idea.
9. Hardy’s Theorem
Hardy has proven a ψ-ontology theorem [51] based on an
assumption about how dynamics should be represented in
an ontological model known as ontic indifference. This
assumption is rather unnatural for a ψ-epistemic theory,
but nonetheless Hardy’s Theorem is of interest due to its
close connection with the argument for the reality of the
wavefunction based on interference, which was discussed
in §3.1. Hardy’s Theorem can be regarded as the missing
step in the inference from “something must go through
both slits” to “that thing must be the wavefunction”. The
reason for the failure of the argument from interference
can therefore be pinpointed more precisely as the failure
of ontic indifference.
§9.1 describes the ontic indifference assumption and
the way it can be violated in a ψ-epistemic theory, as well
as explaining Hardy’s motivation for introducing it. §9.2
presents a sketch of a special case of Hardy’s Theorem in
terms of a simple Mach-Zehnder interferometry experi-
ment. This helps to clarify the relation to the argument
from interference. The full theorem and its proof are
given in §9.3.
9.1. Ontic Indifference
To understand Hardy’s assumption, first consider an on-
tological model with a finite ontic state space. Ontic
indifference then says that, if a pure state
[
ψ
]
is invariant
under the action of a unitary U, i.e. U
[
ψ
]
U† =
[
ψ
]
, then
there should be a method of implementing U such that
every ontic state that get assigned a nonzero probability
by
[
ψ
]
is left invariant. As usual, this needs to be modified
to accommodate the general measure-theoretic case.
Definition 9.1. Let F = 〈H,P,M,T〉 be a PMT frag-
ment and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ,Γ) be an ontological model
of it. A state ρ ∈ P satisfies ontic indifference in Θ if, for
every U ∈ T such that UρU† = ρ, for every µ ∈ ∆ρ there
exists a γ ∈ ΓU and a set Ω ∈ Σ such that µ(Ω) = 1 and
γλ(Ω′) = δλ(Ω′) for all Ω′ ∈ Σ,Ω′ ⊆ Ω, where δλ is the
point measure at λ.
The model Θ satisfies ontic indifference if every pure
state
[
ψ
] ∈ P satisfies ontic indifference in Θ. It satisfies
restricted ontic indifference if there exists a pure state[
ψ
] ∈ P that satisfies ontic indifference in Θ.
To see why ontic indifference is suspect from a ψ-
epistemic point of view, it suffices to consider a model
with a finite ontic state space Λ. It is then unclear why
ontic indifference should hold for a quantum state that
is represented by a probability measure with support on
more than one ontic state, and there obviously must be
such states in a ψ-epistemic model. For example, suppose
that
[
ψ
]
is represented by the uniform distribution over
Λ. Then, any permutation of the ontic states leaves this
distribution invariant and hence could potentially repre-
sent the dynamics of a unitary that leaves
[
ψ
]
invariant
without contradicting the quantum predictions. More gen-
erally, the measures corresponding to
[
ψ
]
need only be
fixed points of the stochastic transformations represent-
ing the unitaries that leave them invariant, and even this
is stronger than required, since the stochastic transfor-
mations could also map between different members of
∆ψ.
In fact, permutations that leave the epistemic states in-
variant is precisely how unitary dynamics are represented
in Spekkens’ toy theory. Consider the state [z+], which is
invariant under the action of the unitary operator σz. In
Spekkens’ theory, [z+] is represented by the distribution
|z+) that has equal support on (+,+) and (−,−) and is zero
elsewhere on the ontic state space. The transformation σz
can be represented by the permutation
(+,+)→ (−,−) (204)
(+,−)→ (−,+) (205)
(−,+)→ (+,−) (206)
(−,−)→ (+,+). (207)
This leaves |z+) invariant but does not satisfy ontic indif-
ference because it swaps the two states (+,+) and (−,−)
in the support of |z+). It is straightforward to check that
this permutation acts appropriately on all the other distri-
butions as well. For example, [x+] gets mapped to [x−]
under σz, and, in the toy theory, |x+) has equal support on
(+,+) and (+,−) and is zero elsewhere, whereas |x−) has
equal support on (−,+) and (−,−) and is zero elsewhere.
Since the permutation maps (+,+) to (−,−) and (+,−) to
(−,+), it maps |x+) to |x−) as required.
Given that Spekkens’ toy theory is an archetypal exam-
ple of a ψ-epistemic theory, the fact that it does not satisfy
ontic indifference is evidence that ontic indifference is not
a reasonable assumption for a ψ-ontology theorem. Nev-
ertheless, Hardy does provide a motivation for it based
on locality, which reveals an interesting connection to the
argument from interference.
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x0
x1
x2
xd−1
Figure 12: One way of instantiating d spatial modes in an
interferometer. A single photon is passed through the first
beamsplitter from the left and is repeatedly split at d − 1 beam-
splitters, with the (d − 1)th mode reflected by the mirror at the
bottom.
Hardy’s motivation runs as follows. Consider a single
photon which can be in one of d different spatial modes,
labeled x0, x1, . . . , xd−1. For example, the modes might
represent the arms of an interferometer, as depicted in
Fig. 12. The state in which the photon is in mode x j is
written as
[
x j
]
. Suppose that, at the ontological level,
[
x j
]
is to be thought of as a state in which the photon is literally
in mode x j so it corresponds to a situation in which there
is literally nothing relevant to the behavior of the photon
located in any of the other modes. To model this situation,
the ontic state space is assumed to decompose into sets of
ontic states Λ( j), which are localized at each mode, along
with possibly some additional degrees of freedom ΛNL
which are not so localized. The total ontic state space is
then assumed to be Λ =
(
⊕d−1j=0 Λ( j)
)
⊕ ΛNL. As a concrete
example, each mode might have exactly one ontic state,
with the ontic state corresponding to mode x j labeled
by the integer j. The ontic state space would then be
{0, 1, · · · , d−1, · · · } = {0}⊕{1}⊕ · · ·⊕{d−1}⊕ · · · , where
the second · · · is to leave room for possible additional
ontic states not localized in a mode. More generally, the
structure would be similar, but there could be multiple
ontic states corresponding to each mode. Then, the state[
x j
]
represents a situation in which only ontic states in
Λ( j) can be occupied, so Λ( j) would be a measure one set
according to any probability measure in ∆x j .
Now, any unitary that leaves [x0] invariant can be imple-
mented in such a way that it only involves manipulating
modes x1–xd−1, say by adding phase shifters to them or
combining them at beamsplitters. If implemented in this
way, it makes sense, by locality, to think that this would
have no effect on ontic states localized at x0 and hence
ontic indifference would be satisfied for [x0].
This argument for ontic indifference is based on local-
ity, so it only works for states like
[
x j
]
, which are spatially
localized. Fortunately, Hardy’s Theorem can be proved
under restricted ontic indifference, which only requires
that ontic indifference should hold for a single pure state,
so, in the case of our photon modes setup, this can always
be chosen to be [x0]. Hence the assumption need never
be applied to a state that is not localized.
Even if the argument from locality were sound, we
should be skeptical of imposing locality requirements on
ontological models because of Bell’s Theorem. However,
the argument can be evaded without even giving up on
locality, since it is really the assumption that
[
x j
]
corre-
sponds to a set of ontic states localized at x j that is at fault.
Moving to a Fock space description, in which [n]x j is the
state in which there are n photons in mode x j, makes this
objection clearer. In Fock space, the state [x0] is written
as [1]x0 ⊗ [0]x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ [0]xd−1 , which explicitly shows that
modes x1–xd−1 are in their vacuum state. From quantum
field theory, we know that the vacuum is not a featureless
void, but has some sort of structure. Therefore, it makes
sense that, at the ontological level, there might be more
than one ontic state associated with the vacuum, and a
transformation that does not affect things localized at x0
might still act nontrivially on these vacuum ontic states.
As an explicit example of this, we can construct a “sec-
ond quantized” version of Spekkens’ toy theory, in which
we allow each mode to have at most one photon. The
states [0]x j , [1]x j , [+]x j , [−]x j , [+i]x j and [−i]x j , where
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) (208)
|±i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i |1〉) , (209)
are isomorphic to the states [z+], [z−], [x+], [x−],[
y+
]
and
[
y−] of a spin-1/2 particle. Therefore, since
Spekkens’ toy theory provides a model for these spin-1/2
states under measurements in the corresponding bases, it
also provides a model for the corresponding photon states
and measurements. In this model, the ontic state space for
a mode is Λ( j) = {(+,+)x j , (+,−)x j , (−,+)x j , (−,−)x j} and
the ontic state spaces for modes compose via the Carte-
sian product rather than the direct sum. So, for example,
in the case of two modes x0 and x1, the total ontic state
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space would be Λ = Λ(0) × Λ(1), which is
{[(+,+)x0 , (+,+)x1] , [(+,+)x0 , (+,−)x1] ,[
(+,+)x0 , (−,+)x1
]
,
[
(+,+)x0 , (−,−)x1
]
,[
(+,−)x0 , (+,+)x1
]
,
[
(+,−)x0 , (+,−)x1
]
,[
(+,−)x0 , (−,+)x1
]
,
[
(+,−)x0 , (−,−)x1
]
,[
(−,+)x0 , (+,+)x1
]
,
[
(−,+)x0 , (+,−)x1
]
,[
(−,+)x0 , (−,+)x1
]
,
[
(−,+)x0 , (−,−)x1
]
,[
(−,−)x0 , (+,+)x1
]
,
[
(−,−)x0 , (+,−)x1
]
,[
(−,−)x0 , (−,+)x1
]
,
[
(−,−)x0 , (−,−)x1
]}. (210)
The vacuum state [0]x j is represented by a equal mix-
ture of (+,+)x j and (−,−)x j , just like the [z+] state in
the spin-1/2 case, and the state [1]x j with one photon is
represented by an equal mixture of (+,−)x j and (−,+)x j ,
just like the [z−] state in the spin-1/2 case. The state
[x0] = [1]x0 ⊗ [0]x1 is then represented by the product
of these two distributions, which is an equal mixture of
((+,−)x0 , (+,+)x1), ((+,−)x0 , (−,−)x1), ((−,+)x0 , (+,+)x1)
and ((−,+)x0 , (−,−)x1). A transformation acting locally
on x1 can then switch the states (+,+)x1 and (−,−)x1 , in
violation of ontic indifference, whilst leaving the distri-
bution invariant. Thus, the assumption that local ontic
state spaces compose according to the direct sum, rather
than locality per se., is the main problem with Hardy’s
argument for ontic indifference. Since we expect vacuum
states to have structure, this is not a good assumption on
which to build a ψ-ontology theorem.
Nevertheless, the direct sum construction that moti-
vates ontic indifference is closely related to the argument
from interference discussed in §3.1. To see this con-
nection, it is helpful to outline a simple special case of
Hardy’s Theorem.
9.2. An example
Consider a Mach-Zehnder interferometer as depicted in
Fig. 13. We will outline the argument that ontic indiffer-
ence implies that the state [x0], representing a photon in
the upper arm of the interferometer, must be ontologically
distinct from
[
ψ
]
, where |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|x0〉 + |x1〉), represent-
ing an equal superposition of both paths. The argument in
this section assumes a finite ontic state space. A measure-
theoretic argument is given for the general case in the
next section.
On passing through the second beamsplitter, |x0〉
gets mapped to 1√
2
(|d0〉 + |d1〉) and |x1〉 gets mapped to
1√
2
(|d0〉 − |d1〉), from which we infer that |ψ〉 gets mapped
to |d0〉. Hence, if the state [x0] is prepared then the de-
tectors D0 and D1 will fire with 50/50 probability and if
the state
[
ψ
]
is prepared then D0 will fire with certainty.
For the practically inclined, note that the state
[
ψ
]
can be
x0
x1 D0
D1
d0
d1
s0
Figure 13: The Mach-Zehnder interferometer used in the ex-
ample of Hardy’s Theorem.
prepared by passing a photon from the source s0 through
the first beamsplitter as in Fig. 13 and the state [x0] can be
prepared by removing the first beamsplitter and passing a
photon from s0 directly into the upper arm.
The outcome of this experiment can be altered by plac-
ing a pi phase shifter in the lower arm of the interferometer,
e.g. by altering its path length by half a wavelength rel-
ative to the upper arm. This leaves |x0〉 invariant, but
maps |ψ〉 to |φ〉 = 1√
2
(|x0〉 − |x1〉), which will now cause
the detector D1 to fire with certainty. This is a typical
example of interference, replacing constructive interfer-
ence (D0 fires without the phase shifter) with destructive
interference (D1 fires with the phase shifter).
In an ontological model, assume that there is some
ontic state λ that is assigned nonzero probability by both
[x0] and
[
ψ
]
. We will show that, under the assumption of
ontic indifference, this leads to a contradiction.
Since
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are orthogonal, by Theorem 4.10
they must be ontologically distinct. This can also be seen
more directly because every ontic state assigned nonzero
probability by
[
ψ
]
must cause D0 to fire with certainty,
whereas every ontic state assigned nonzero probability by[
φ
]
must cause D1 to fire with certainty. Therefore,
[
φ
]
must assign zero probability to the ontic state λ.
Now consider the action of the unitary U that adds a pi
phase shift to the mode x1. Since this leaves [x0] invariant,
the assumption of ontic indifference implies that λ must
be left invariant. However, since U maps
[
ψ
]
to
[
φ
]
, it
must also cause λ to transition to an ontic state that causes
D1 to fire with certainty, and no such ontic state has
nonzero probability according to
[
ψ
]
. Therefore λ cannot
be left invariant, which is a contradiction. We conclude
that there can be no λ assigned nonzero probability by
both [x0] and
[
ψ
]
.
By considering Hardy’s motivation for ontic indiffer-
ence, this can be connected to the argument from inter-
ference as follows. Assume that the ontic state space
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decomposes into a direct sum Λ = Λ(0) ⊕ Λ(1) ⊕ ΛNL.
The states in Λ(0) are localized in the upper arm of the
interferometer, representing the photon definitely taking
the upper path, and the states in Λ(1) are localized in the
lower arm of the interferometer, representing the photon
definitely taking the lower path. If we assume that the
placement of a pi phase shifter in the lower arm has no ef-
fect on the ontic states in Λ(0) then we can deduce that
[
ψ
]
cannot assign nonzero probability to states in Λ(0) by the
same argument as above. Switching the roles of x0 and
x1, so that the phase shifter is now placed or not placed in
x0, we can deduce the same for Λ(1). Therefore,
[
ψ
]
must
assign all its weight to ΛNL, which is not localized to ei-
ther arm. You could say that this represents a situation in
which the photon “travels along both paths”, but it would
be more accurate to say that it only has global degrees of
freedom, not localized on either path. Further, if we as-
sume that [x0] and [x1] are entirely supported on Λ(0) and
Λ(1) respectively, then the three quantum states
[
ψ
]
, [x0]
and [x1] must be ontologically distinct. This is a bit fur-
ther along the road to proving ψ-ontology than the more
naive version of the argument from interference. Hardy’s
result then shows that the same sort of assumption can
be used to prove a full blown ψ-ontology theorem, which
seems to vindicate the intuition behind the argument from
interference.
Of course, if we give up the idea that the ontic state
space must decompose as a direct sum of local state
spaces plus some global degrees of freedom, then there
is no motivation for ontic indifference, so the above argu-
ment does not go through. In fact, the second quantized
version of Spekkens’ toy theory is able to account for
almost all the qualitative features of Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometry in a local and ψ-epistemic way [91]. Thus,
any claim that these experiments entail the reality of the
wavefunction or violate locality must involve implicitly
assuming something like ontic indifference. The most
important aspect of Hardy’s analysis is to bring this as-
sumption to the fore more clearly.
9.3. The main result
We are now in a position to state and prove Hardy’s main
result. The proof strategy used here is due to Patra, Piro-
nio and Massar [60] and is conceptually simpler than
Hardy’s original proof.
Theorem 9.2. Let P be the set of pure states on Cd for
d ≥ 3. Then, there exists a set of measurementsM and a
set of unitaries T such that any ontological model of the
PMT fragment F = 〈Cd,P,M,T〉 that reproduces the
quantum preclusions and satisfies restricted ontic indiffer-
ence has the property that any pair of states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P
satisfying Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
]) ≤ (d − 1)/d must be ontologically
distinct.
Before proving this theorem, note that, if we form a
product of F with another fragment F′ and assume that
there exits an ontological model of the larger fragment
that reproduces the quantum preclusions and preserves
ontological distinctness with respect to our ontological
model ofF, then, for any pair
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, we can always
choose the dimensionality of the Hilbert space of F′ such
that Tr
([
φ
] ⊗ [0] [ψ] ⊗ [0]) ≤ (d−1)/d is satisfied, where
[0] is any fixed pure state of F′. Hardy’s Theorem implies
that
[
ψ
] ⊗ [0] and [φ] ⊗ [0] must be ontologically distinct,
and then the assumption that appending ancillas preserves
ontological distinctness implies that
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
must be
ontologically distinct in the original model. Since this
applies to any pair of pure states, the original ontological
model must be ψ-ontic. The case d = 2 is dealt with in a
similar way.
The proof relies on the following three lemmas.
Lemma 9.3. Let F = 〈H,P,M,T〉 be a PMT fragment,
let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ,Γ) be an ontological model of it, let[
ψ
]
be a state that satisfies ontic indifference in Θ, let
{U j} ⊆ T be an at most countable set of unitaries that
leave
[
ψ
]
invariant and suppose that
[
φ
]
is ontologically
indistinct from
[
ψ
]
in Θ. Then there exist measures µ j ∈
∆U j[φ]U†j
, such that L({µ j}) > 0, where L is the overlap.
Proof. Let ν ∈ ∆ψ and suppose that Ω j is a measure one
set left invariant by some γ j ∈ ΓU j , i.e. γ jλ(Ω′j) = δλ(Ω′j)
for λ ∈ Ω j and Ω′j ⊆ Ω j. Then, Ω = ∩ jΩ j is also measure
one according to ν because it is the intersection of an
at most countable set of measure one sets, and Ω is left
invariant by each γ j. Since
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are ontologically
indistinct, there exists a µ ∈ ∆φ such that µ(Ω) > 0. Now,
the measure µ j, defined by µ j(Ω′) =
∫
Λ
γ
j
λ(Ω
′)dµ(λ) for
Ω′ ∈ Σ, is in ∆U j[φ]U†j , and µ j(Ω
′) = µ(Ω′) for Ω′ ⊆ Ω.
Now, consider a partition of Λ into sets Ωk. Then,∑
k
min
j
[
µ j(Ωk)
]
=
∑
k
min
j
[
µ j
(
Ωk ∩Ω
)
+ µ j
(
Ωk ∩ (Λ\Ω)
)]
(211)
≥
∑
k
(
min
j
[
µ j
(
Ωk ∩Ω
)]
+ min
j
[
µ j
(
Ωk ∩ (Λ\Ω)
)])
(212)
≥
∑
k
min
j
[
µ j
(
Ωk ∩Ω
)]
(213)
=
∑
k
µ(Ωk ∩Ω) = µ(Ω) > 0. (214)
Since this holds for all partitions it must also hold for the
infimum, and hence L({µ j}) > 0. 
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The next lemma is also used in the proof of the
Colbeck–Renner Theorem.
Lemma 9.4. Let {| j〉}d−1j=0 be a set of d ≥ 3 orthonormal
vectors in Cd
′
for d′ ≥ d, i.e. not necessarily a complete
basis, and consider the vectors
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
| j〉 , (215)
and
|φ〉 = 1√
d − 1
d−1∑
j=1
eıϕ j | j〉 . (216)
Then, the phases ϕ j may be chosen such that 〈φ|ψ〉 is real
and takes any value between 0 and
√
d−1
d .
Proof. First consider the case where d is odd. In this
case, set ϕ j = ϕ for 1 ≤ j ≤ d−12 and ϕ j = −ϕ for
d+1
2 ≤ j ≤ d − 1. Then, 〈φ|ψ〉 =
√
d−1
d cosϕ, which may
take any value between 0 and
√
d−1
d by varying ϕ from 0
to pi/2.
When d is even, set ϕ1 = 0, ϕ j = φ for 2 ≤ j ≤ d2 ,
and ϕ j = −φ for d2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ d − 1. Then, 〈φ|ψ〉 =√
1
d(d−1) (1 + (d − 2) cosϕ). This is equal to
√
d−1
d for
ϕ = 0 and is equal to 0 for ϕ = pi − cos−1
(
1
d−2
)
and
varies continuously in between, so again any positive real
number between 0 and
√
d−1
d can be obtained. 
Lemma 9.5. Let
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
be two nonorthogonal states
on Cd for d ≥ 3 such that Tr ([φ] [ψ]) ≤ (d − 1)/d. Then,
there exist unitaries {U j}d−1j=0 such that U j
[
ψ
]
U†j =
[
ψ
]
and such that {
[
φ j
]
} is antidistinguishable, where
[
φ j
]
=
U j
[
φ
]
U†j .
Proof. Let |ψ〉 and |φ〉 be vector representatives of [ψ]
and
[
φ
]
. Then,
|φ〉 = α |ψ〉 + β
∣∣∣ψ⊥〉 , (217)
where α = 〈φ|ψ〉 and 〈ψ⊥∣∣∣ψ〉 = 0. By appropriate choice
of the global phase of |ψ〉, it is possible to make α real
and positive.
Let {| j〉}d−1j=0 be a basis in which |ψ〉 is represented as
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
∑d−1
j=0 | j〉 and consider the vector
|φ0〉 = 1√
d − 1
d−1∑
j=0
eıϕ j | j〉 . (218)
By Lemma 9.4, it is possible to choose the phases ϕ j such
that 〈φ0|ψ〉 = α, since α is between 0 and
√
d−1
d .
Making this choice of phases, it follows that
|φ0〉 = α |ψ〉 + β
∣∣∣ψ⊥0 〉 , (219)
where
〈
ψ⊥0
∣∣∣ψ〉 = 0. Let U be a unitary that acts as U |ψ〉 =
|ψ〉 and U
∣∣∣ψ⊥〉 = ∣∣∣ψ⊥0 〉. It follows that |φ0〉 = U |φ〉.
Now, consider the unitary V , where V | j〉 =
| j + 1 mod d〉, which leaves |ψ〉 invariant. Then, U j =
V jU also leaves |ψ〉 invariant for j = 0, 1, . . . , d − 1
and the vectors
∣∣∣φ j〉 = U j |ψ〉 satisfy 〈 j∣∣∣φ j〉 = 0, since,
by construction, 〈0|φ0〉 = 0. Thus, the states
{[
φ j
]}d−1
j=0
are antidistinguished by the measurement
{[
j
]}d−1
j=0 as re-
quired. 
Proof of Theorem 9.2. Let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ,Γ) be an on-
tological model of the PMT fragment F to be constructed.
For the purposes of contradiction, assume that two states[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P satisfying Tr ([φ] [ψ]) ≤ (d − 1)/d are onto-
logically indistinct in Θ and let
[
ψ′
]
be a state that satisfies
ontic indifference in Θ. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that
[
ψ
]
=
[
ψ′
]
. If not, let U be a unitary such
that
[
ψ′
]
= U
[
ψ
]
U† and assume U ∈ T . Then the states[
ψ′
]
and
[
φ′
]
= U
[
φ
]
U† satisfy Tr
([
φ′
] [
ψ′
]) ≤ (d−1)/d
because the inner product is preserved under unitary trans-
formations. Also, by Corollary 8.4, if
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are
ontologically indistinct then so are
[
ψ′
]
and
[
φ′
]
so it is
sufficient to derive a contradiction for these two states.
By Lemma 9.5, there exist unitaries {U j}d−1j=0 that leave[
ψ
]
invariant such that
{
U j
[
φ
]
U†j
}d−1
j=0
is antidistinguish-
able. Assume that each U j is in T and that the an-
tidistinguishing measurement is in M. Then, by The-
orem 6.5, for every set of probability measures {µ j}d−1j=0
with µ j ∈ ∆U j[φ]U†j , L({µ j}) = 0, but by Lemma 9.3 there
must exist a set such that L({µ j}) > 0. Thus, we have a
contradiction so
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
must be ontologically dis-
tinct. 
10. The Colbeck–Renner Theorem
Our final ψ-ontology theorem is due to Colbeck and Ren-
ner [122]. They originally proved a ψ-ontology theorem
as a byproduct of a broader no-go theorem that aimed
to rule out any ontological model of quantum theory in
which more precise predictions can be made given knowl-
edge of the ontic state than if you only know the quantum
state [50, 123, 124]. This broader theorem is quite tricky
to understand, both conceptually and technically, and its
assumptions have been criticized [125–127]. Fortunately,
Colbeck and Renner have recently put forward a simpli-
fied argument for ψ-ontology based on similar ideas that
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bypasses much of the complexity [122]. I present my
own variation of the proof here.
The Colbeck–Renner Theorem is based on a local-
ity assumption known as parameter independence. The
condition of Bell locality, discussed in §5.4, can be de-
composed as the conjunction of parameter independence
and another assumption called outcome independence.
Roughly speaking, parameter independence says that the
measurement outcome at Bob’s side should not depend
on Alice’s choice of measurement, and outcome indepen-
dence says that the measurement outcome at Bob’s side
should not depend on Alice’s measurement outcome. For
a typical Bell inequality experiment, it is in principle pos-
sible to reproduce the quantum predictions by violating
outcome independence and leaving parameter indepen-
dence intact, so the Colbeck–Renner Theorem rules out
the class of ψ-epistemic models that opt for this resolution
to the conundrum presented by Bell’s Theorem. Never-
theless, Bell’s Theorem should lead us to be skeptical
of imposing locality assumptions on ontological models.
Indeed, many notable realist approaches to quantum the-
ory, such as de Broglie–Bohm theory, violate parameter
independence. As well as ruling out ψ-epistemic models,
parameter independence rules out a wide class of viable
ψ-ontic models, so it is perhaps an unreasonably strong
assumption for a ψ-ontology theorem.
It should be noted that Colbeck and Renner claim that
their theorem is not directly based on parameter inde-
pendence, but rather on a broader assumption that they
call “free choice”, aimed at capturing the idea that certain
variables, such as the settings of preparation and measure-
ment devices, are chosen freely by the experimenter and
not constrained by other parameters of the system. Param-
eter independence is just one consequence of their free
choice assumption. However, whether their assumption
truly captures the meaning of making a free choice is one
of the most controversial aspects of the Colbeck–Renner
argument. My own opinion is that, whilst some aspects
of free choice are captured by the Colbeck–Renner as-
sumption, it is at least partly a locality assumption as
well because it implies parameter independence. There-
fore, I prefer to avoid the free choice controversy and just
assume parameter independence directly.
Understanding the Colbeck–Renner Theorem requires
quite a bit of background material, so the discussion is
broken down into four sections. §10.1 gives a formal
definition of parameter independence and shows how,
given an ontological model for a bipartite system, it can
be used to derive an ontological model for the reduced
states on a subsystem. §10.2 introduces chained Bell
measurements, which are the main technical tool used in
proving the Colbeck–Renner Theorem. §10.3 discusses
the equiprobability theorem, which shows that, in a model
that satisfies parameter independence, all ontic states asso-
ciated with a maximally entangled state must assign equal
probability to all the outcomes of some local measure-
ment in an orthonormal basis. Finally, §10.4 leverages
the equiprobability theorem to prove the main result.
10.1. Parameter Independence
As in Bell’s Theorem, the fragment of interest for the
Colbeck–Renner Theorem is a product measurement frag-
ment, consisting of states and local measurements on a
bipartite system (see Definition 5.6). §5.4 discussed the
concept of a conditional fragment on Bob’s system that
results from viewing Alice’s measurements as preparation
procedures for states on Bob’s system. Given an onto-
logical model for a product measurement fragment that
satisfies Bell locality, it is possible to derive a model for
the conditional fragment from it. Here, we are concerned
with a smaller fragment that results from tracing out one
of the systems, but not post-selecting on measurement
outcomes.
Definition 10.1. Let FAB = 〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
be a product measurement fragment. The marginal frag-
ment on A is FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉, where PA consists
of all states of the form ρA = TrB (ρAB) for ρAB ∈ PAB.
The marginal fragment on B is defined similarly, with the
roles of A and B interchanged.
In general, an ontological model ΘAB =
(ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) for a product measurement
fragment FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA × MB〉 spec-
ifies a set of conditional probability distributions
PrAB ∈ ΞAB[MA,MB] for every MA ∈ MA and MB ∈ MB.
These distributions are of the form PrAB(E, F|MA,MB, λ),
where E varies over MA and F varies over MB. If the
model reproduces the quantum predictions, then for all
ρAB ∈ PAB, MA ∈ MA, MB ∈ MB, E ∈ MA and F ∈ MB,∫
ΛAB
PrAB(E, F|MA,MB, λ)dµ(λ) = TrAB (E ⊗ FρAB) ,
(220)
for every µ ∈ ∆AB[ρ] and PrAB ∈ ΞAB[MA,MB]. Sum-
ming both sides of this equation over F ∈ MB gives∫
ΛAB
PrAB(E|MA,MB, λ)dµ(λ) = TrA (EρA) , (221)
where ρA = TrB (ρAB) and PrAB(E|MA,MB, λ) =∑
F∈MB PrAB(E, F|MA,MB, λ). For a fixed MB,
PrAB(E|MA,MB, λ) is a valid conditional probabil-
ity distribution over MA that could be used in an
ontological model of the marginal fragment. Further, if µ
is used to represent ρA, this choice of conditional proba-
bility distributions reproduces the quantum predictions.
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The only difficulty is that PrAB(E|MA,MB, λ) depends on
MB as well as MA, so there is an ambiguity about which
choice of MB should be used to model the marginal
fragment. The assumption of parameter independence
removes this ambiguity.
Definition 10.2. An ontological model ΘAB =
(ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB, ξAB) of a product measurement fragment
FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA × MB〉 satisfies parame-
ter independence if, for all MA ∈ MA, MB ∈ MB and
PrAB ∈ ΞAB[MA,MB],
PrAB(E|MA,MB, λ) = PrAB(E|MA, λ) (222)
PrAB(F|MA,MB, λ) = PrAB(F|MB, λ). (223)
Parameter independence is a locality assumption that
says that Alice’s measurement outcome should not de-
pend on Bob’s choice of measurement and vice versa. It
is a weaker requirement than Bell locality, as it can be
shown that the conjunction of parameter independence
and outcome independence, which reads
PrAB(E|MA,MB, F, λ) = PrAB(E|MA,MB, λ) (224)
PrAB(F|MA, E,MB, λ) = PrAB(F|MA,MB, λ), (225)
is equivalent to Bell locality [128, 129]. For present pur-
poses, the point of this is that, whilst the full Bell locality
condition is needed to derive a well-defined ontological
model for conditional fragments, parameter independence
is sufficient to have unambiguous models for marginal
fragments.
Definition 10.3. Let FAB = 〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
be a product measurement fragment and let ΘAB =
(ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) be an ontological model of it that
satisfies parameter independence. The marginal model
on A, ΘA = (ΛAB,ΣAB,∆A,ΞA) is an ontological model
for the marginal fragment FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉, where,
for ρA ∈ PA,
∆A[ρA] = ∪{ρAB∈PAB|TrB(ρAB)=ρA}∆AB[ρAB], (226)
and ΞA[MA] consists of all conditional probability distri-
butions of the form
PrA(E|MA, λ) =
∑
F∈MB
PrAB(E, F|MA,MB, λ), (227)
for all PrAB ∈ ΞAB[MA,MB]. Note that, by parameter
independence, these distributions are independent of MB.
Eq. (221) implies that if ΘAB reproduces the quantum
predictions for FAB then the marginal model ΘA repro-
duces the quantum predictions for the marginal fragment
FA.
10.2. Chained Bell measurements
The main engine of the proof of the Colbeck–Renner
Theorem is the chained Bell measurements. These were
originally developed in the context of a proof of Bell’s
Theorem that involved chaining together several tests
of the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt inequality [130],
resulting in the chained Bell inequalities [131,132], which
explains the terminology.
We are interested in the product measurement frag-
ment F = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA × MB〉, where HA =
HB = C2 and both MA and MB contain N measure-
ments in orthonormal bases. For later convenience, Al-
ice’s measurements are labeled by even integers and
Bob’s by the odd integers, so we have MaA ∈ MA
for a ∈ EN = {0, 2, . . . , 2N − 2} and MbA ∈ MB for
b ∈ ON = {1, 3, . . . , 2N − 1}. The measurements
are described by pairs of orthogonal rank-1 projectors
MaA = {
[
φa0
]
A
,
[
φa1
]
A
}, MbB = {
[
φb0
]
B
,
[
φb1
]
B
} onto the or-
thonormal bases
{∣∣∣φa0〉A , ∣∣∣φa1〉A} and {∣∣∣φb0〉B , ∣∣∣φb1〉B}. If the
state ρAB is prepared, Alice measures MaA, and Bob mea-
sures MbB, then the outcome probabilities are
Prob
([
φaj
]
,
[
φbk
]
|MaA,MbB, ρAB
)
= TrAB
([
φaj
]
⊗
[
φbk
]
ρAB
)
.
(228)
For later convenience, we introduce two random variables
X and Y that take values 0 and 1 to represent Alice and
Bob’s outcomes and write
Prob(X = j,Y = k|a, b, ρAB)
= Prob
([
φaj
]
,
[
φbk
]
|MaA,MbB, ρAB
)
. (229)
Now consider the following correlation measure for
these outcome probabilities.
IN(ρAB) = Prob(X = Y |0, 2N − 1, ρAB)
+
∑
{(a,b)|a∈EN ,b∈ON ,|a−b|=1}
Prob(X , Y |a, b, ρAB). (230)
The structure of this measure is illustrated in Fig. 14.
Note that smaller values of this measure indicate that the
measurement outcomes are more highly correlated.
Now, let {|0〉 , |1〉} be an orthonormal basis for C2, and
consider the quantum state
[
Φ+
]
AB, where∣∣∣Φ+〉AB = 1√2 (|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B + |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B) . (231)
Let ϑaj =
(
a
2N + j
)
pi, and suppose that the bases for Alice
and Bob’s measurements are given by∣∣∣∣φaj〉A = cos
ϑaj2
 |0〉A + sin ϑaj2
 |1〉A (232)
∣∣∣φbk〉B = cos
ϑbk2
 |0〉A + sin ϑbk2
 |1〉B . (233)
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a = 0
a = 2
a = 4
a = 2N −2
b = 1
b = 3
b = 2N −1
Figure 14: The structure of the correlation measure given in
Eq. (230). A solid line between a and b represents the probabil-
ity that the outcomes of MAa and M
A
b are different and a dotted
line represents the probability that they are the same. The
correlation measure is then the sum of the terms represented
by each line.
The j, k = 0 outcomes of these measurements are illus-
trated on the Bloch sphere in Fig. 15.
With these particular choices, the outcome probabilities
are
Prob
(
X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB)
=
1
2
cos2
((
a − b
2N
+ j − k
)
pi
2
)
, (234)
from which it is straightforward to compute that
IN(
[
Φ+AB
]
) = 2N sin2
pi
4N
≤ pi
2
8N
, (235)
so that the correlation measure tends to zero as N → ∞.
Without going through the whole calculation, it is fairly
easy to see why this should be the case. For the state[
Φ+
]
AB, when Alice performs the measurement M
a
A and
obtains the outcome j, Bob’s state gets updated to
[
φaj
]
B
.
The condition |a − b| = 1 in the sum in Eq. (230) means
that, in the limit of large N, the terms in this sum involve
basis states for Bob that are very close to Alice’s basis
states. Thus, since Bob’s system collapses to the basis
state that Alice obtained in her measurement, the proba-
bility of getting the same outcome is very high, and hence
P(X , Y |a, b, [Φ+]AB) is close to zero. Similarly, the state[
φ2N−1j
]
B
is almost orthogonal to
[
φ0j
]
B
, so the probability
of getting equal outcomes in the first term is also close to
zero.
a= 0
b= 1
a= 2
b= 3
b= 2N−1
( )1 | 0 |1
2
〉 + 〉
| 0〉
|1〉
Figure 15: Alice and Bob’s measurement bases represented on
a great circle of the Bloch sphere.
10.3. The equiprobability theorem
The aim of this section is to prove the main technical
result that the Colbeck–Renner Theorem relies upon. We
first deal with the case where Alice and Bob’s Hilbert
spaces are two dimensional, and then extend this to higher
dimensions.
Theorem 10.4. Let FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
be a product measurement fragment whereHA = HB =
C2, PAB contains the maximally entangled state [Φ+]AB,
where∣∣∣Φ+〉AB = 1√2 (|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B + |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B) , (236)
for some orthonormal basis {|0〉 , |1〉},MA contains mea-
surements in every orthonormal basis on HA and MB
contains measurements in every orthonormal basis on
HB.
Let ΘAB = (ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) be an ontological
model of FAB that reproduces the quantum predictions
and satisfies parameter independence.
Then, for any µ ∈ ∆AB [[Φ+]AB], there exists a set
Ω ∈ ΣAB such that µ(Ω) = 1 and, for the measurement
MA = {[0]A , [1]A}, all PrA ∈ ΞA[MA] in the marginal
model on A satisfy PrA ([0]A|MA, λ) = PrA ([1]A|MA, λ) =
1
2 for λ ∈ Ω.
Before proving this theorem, it is instructive to see how
it can be used to establish ontological distinctness for
some pairs of states. Consider the state [0]A ⊗ [0]B. To re-
produce the quantum predictions, the marginal model on
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A must predict that the [1]A outcome has zero probability.
This means that any ν ∈ ∆AB[[0]A⊗[0]B] must assign zero
measure to any set Ω ∈ ΣAB for which PrA([1]A |MA, λ)
is nonzero for some PrA ∈ ΞA[MA]. However, according
to Theorem 10.4, for any µ ∈ ∆AB [[Φ+]AB] there is such
a set that is measure one according to µ. Thus, for any
µ ∈ ∆AB [[Φ+]AB] and any ν ∈ ∆AB [[0]A ⊗ [0]B], there is
a set that is measure 1 according to µ and measure zero
according to ν, so
[
Φ+
]
AB and [0]A ⊗ [0]B are ontologi-
cally distinct. The Colbeck–Renner Theorem generalizes
this argument to arbitrary pairs of pure states.
The proof of Theorem 10.4 relies on the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 10.5. Let X and Y be random variables
that take values in the set {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} and let
P(X), P′(X),Q(Y),Q′(Y) be probability distributions over
them. For 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, let
P′′(X) = pP(X) + (1 − p)P′(X) (237)
Q′′(Y) = pQ(Y) + (1 − p)Q′(Y). (238)
Then,
D
(
P′′(X),Q′′(Y)
) ≤ pD (P(X),Q(Y))
+ (1 − p)D (P′(X),Q′(Y)) , (239)
where
D (P(X),Q(Y)) =
1
2
d−1∑
j=0
|P(X = j) − Q(Y = j)| , (240)
is the variational distance.
Proof.
D(P′′(X),Q′′(Y))
=
1
2
d−1∑
j=0
|p(P(X = j) − Q(Y = j))
+ (1 − p)(P′(X = j) − Q′(X = j))| (241)
≤ 1
2
d−1∑
j=0
(|p(P(X = j) − Q(Y = j))|
+ |(1 − p)(P′(X = j) − Q′(X = j))|) (242)
= p
1
2
d−1∑
j=0
|P(X = j) − Q(Y = j)|
+ (1 − p)1
2
d−1∑
j=0
|P′(X = j) − Q′(Y = j)| (243)
= pD(P(X),Q(Y)) + (1 − p)(P′(X),Q′(Y)), (244)
where the second step follows from the triangle inequality.

Lemma 10.6. Let X and Y be random variables that take
values in the set {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} and let P(X) and P(Y)
be probability distributions over them. Let P(X,Y) be a
joint distribution such that P(X) =
∑
k P(X,Y = k) and
P(Y) =
∑
j P(X = j,Y). Then,
D (P(X), P(Y)) ≤ P(X , Y), (245)
where D is the variational distance.
Proof. Let P,(X,Y) be the conditional probability distri-
bution of X and Y given that X , Y , let P=(X,Y) be the
conditional probability distribution of X and Y given that
X = Y , let p= = P(X = Y) and let p, = P(X , Y). Then,
by the law of total probability
P(X,Y) = p,P,(X,Y) + p=P=(X,Y). (246)
Taking the marginals of this equation gives
P(X) = p,P,(X) + p=P=(X) (247)
P(Y) = p,P,(Y) + p=P=(Y). (248)
Then, by Lemma 10.5,
D(P(X), P(Y)) ≤ p,D(P,(X), P,(Y))
+ p=D(P=(X), P=(Y)) (249)
≤ p, (250)
= P(X , Y). (251)

Proof of Theorem 10.4. . Consider the chained Bell mea-
surements MaA =
{[
φa0
]
A
,
[
φa1
]
A
}
and MbB =
{[
φb0
]
B
,
[
φb1
]
B
}
defined in §10.2 and note that M0A = {[0]A , [1]A}. From
Eq. (235), the correlation measure IN defined in Eq. (230)
satisfies IN
([
Φ+
]
AB
) ≤ pi28N . For any fixed choice of
PrAB ∈ Ξ[MaA,MbB] for each MaA and MbB, we can also
define a similar correlation measure within the ontologi-
cal model, given by
IN(λ) = P(X = Y |0, 2N − 1, λ)
+
∑
{(a,b)|a∈EN ,b∈ON ,|a−b|=1}
P(X , Y |a, b, λ), (252)
where
P(X = j,Y = k|a, b, λ) = PrAB
([
φaj
]
A
,
[
φb
]
B
∣∣∣∣MaA,MbB, λ) .
(253)
Now, by parameter independence
P(X = j|a, b, λ) = P(X = j|a, λ) = PrA
([
φaj
]∣∣∣∣MaA, λ) ,
(254)
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and
P(Y = k|a, b, λ) = P(Y = k|b, λ) = PrB
([
φbk
]∣∣∣∣MB, λ) ,
(255)
where PrA and PrB are the conditional probability distri-
butions of the marginal models on A and B respectively.
Let X˜ = (X + 1) mod 2, so that if X = 0 then X˜ = 1
and vice versa. Then, P(X = Y |0, 2N − 1, λ) = P(X˜ ,
Y |0, 2N − 1, λ). Now, by parameter independence and
Lemma 10.6,
IN(λ) ≥ D(P(X˜|0, λ), P(Y |2N − 1, λ))
+
∑
{(a,b)|a∈EN ,b∈ON ,|a−b|=1}
D(P(X|a, λ), P(Y |b, λ))
(256)
≥ D(P(X˜)|0, λ), P(X|0, λ)), (257)
where the second step follows from the triangle inequal-
ity for the variational distance and the structure of the
correlation measure shown in Fig. 14.
Since the ontological model reproduces the quan-
tum predictions we have, for any µ ∈ ∆AB [[Φ+]AB],∫
Λ
IN(λ)dµ(λ) = IN
([
Φ+
]
AB
)
and in the limit N → ∞,
this is equal to 0. Therefore, using Eq. (257) gives∫
Λ
D(P(X˜|0, λ), P(X|0, λ))dµ(λ) = 0. (258)
Using Eq. (254), this is equivalent to∫
Λ
∣∣∣∣PrA ([0]A∣∣∣M0A, λ) − Pr ([1]A∣∣∣M0A, λ)∣∣∣∣ dµ(λ) = 0.
(259)
This can only happen if there exists a set Ω ∈ ΣAB such
that µ(Ω) = 1 and PrA
(
[0]A
∣∣∣M0A, λ) = Pr ([1]A∣∣∣M0A, λ) for
λ ∈ Ω. But since PrA
(
[0]A
∣∣∣M0A, λ) + Pr ([1]A∣∣∣M0A, λ) = 1,
this means that PrA
(
[0]A
∣∣∣M0A, λ) = Pr ([1]A∣∣∣M0A, λ) = 12
for λ ∈ Ω. 
The next step is to generalize this result to arbitrary
dimensions.
Theorem 10.7. Let FAB = 〈HA ⊗ HB,PAB,MA ×MB〉
be a product measurement fragment whereHA = HB =
Cd, PAB contains the maximally entangled state [Φ+]AB,
where ∣∣∣Φ+〉AB = 1√d
d−1∑
j=0
| j〉A ⊗ | j〉B , (260)
for some orthonormal basis {| j〉}d−1j=0 ,MA contains mea-
surements in every orthonormal basis on HA, andMB
contains measurements in every orthonormal basis on
HB.
Let ΘAB = (ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) be an ontological
model of FAB that reproduces the quantum predictions
and satisfies parameter independence.
Then, for any µ ∈ ∆AB ([Φ+]AB), there exists a set
Ω ∈ ΣAB such that µ(Ω) = 1 and, for the measurement
MA =
{[
j
]
A
}d−1
j=0 , all PrA ∈ ΞA[MA] in the marginal model
on A satisfy PrA
([
j
]
A
∣∣∣MA, λ) = 1d for λ ∈ Ω.
Proof. The chained Bell measurements can be extended
to higher dimensions by defining
[
φaj
]
A
[
φbk
]
B
as before
for j, k ∈ {0, 1} and setting
[
φaj
]
A
=
[
j
]
A,
[
φbk
]
= [k]B for
2 ≤ j, k ≤ d − 1. Now, define two random variables X
and Y taking values 0, 1, . . . d − 1 and, as before, set
Prob
(
X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB)
= TrAB
([
φaj
]
A
⊗
[
φbk
]
B
[
Φ+
]
AB
)
. (261)
Now, condition these probabilities on the event C = {X ∈
{0, 1} ∩ Y ∈ {0, 1}}, i.e. define
Prob
(
X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB ,C)
=
Prob
(
X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB)∑1
j′,k′=0 Prob (X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB)
, (262)
for j, k ∈ {0, 1}. Straightforward calculation shows that
Prob
(
X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB ,C) is equal to the d = 2
case of the unconditioned probability distribution.
Similarly, at the ontological level, for j, k ∈ {0, 1}, we
can define the conditional probability distribution
P(X = j,Y = k|a, b, λ,C)
=
1
N(λ,MaA,M
b
B)
PrAB
([
φaj
]
,
[
φbk
]∣∣∣∣MaA,MbB, λ) ,
(263)
where
N(λ,MaA,M
b
B) =
1∑
j,k=0
Prob
([
φaj
]
,
[
φbk
]∣∣∣∣MaA,MbBλ) .
(264)
Given that the model reproduces the quantum predictions,
we must have
Prob
(
X = j,Y = k|a, b, [Φ+]AB ,C)
=
∫
ΛAB
1
N(MaA,M
b
B, λ)
PrAB
([
φaj
]
,
[
φbk
]∣∣∣∣MaA,MbB, λ) dµ(λ),
(265)
for j, k ∈ {0, 1} and µ ∈ ∆AB [[Φ+]AB]. Then, The-
orem 10.4 implies that 1N(MA,MB,λ) PrA ([0]A|MA, λ) =
1
N(MA,MB,λ)
PrA ([1]B|MA, λ) for a measure one set Ω0,1 ac-
cording to µ and hence PrA ([0]A|MA, λ) = PrA ([1]|MA, λ)
for λ ∈ Ω0,1.
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Now, the same argument can be repeated by placing
the nontrivial part of the chained Bell measurements
on a different subspace, e.g. on the subspace spanned
by |1〉 and |2〉 rather than the subspace spanned by |0〉
and |1〉 and conditioning on {X ∈ {1, 2} ∩ Y ∈ {1, 2}}
rather than {X ∈ {0, 1} ∩ Y ∈ {0, 1}}. In total, this
shows that, for all j, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} there ex-
ists sets Ω j,k that are measure one according to µ and
such that Pr
([
j
]
A
∣∣∣MA, λ) = Pr ([k]A|MA, λ) for λ ∈ Ω j,k.
Now, Ω = ∩d−1j,k=0Ω j,k is also measure one according
to µ because it is the intersection of a finite collection
of measure one sets. This implies that, for every j
and k, we have PrA
([
j
]
A
∣∣∣MA, λ) = PrA ([k]A|MA, λ) for
λ ∈ Ω. Finally, ∑d−1j=0 PrA ([ j]A∣∣∣MA, λ) = 1 implies that
PrA
([
j
]
A
∣∣∣MA, λ) = 1d for λ ∈ Ω. 
10.4. The main result
Theorem 10.8. Let FAB = 〈HA⊗HB,PAB,MA×MB〉 be
a product measurement fragment whereHA = HB = Cd
for d ≥ 3, PAB contains all pure states onHA ⊗HB,MA
contains all measurements in orthonormal bases onHA,
andMB contains all measurements in orthonormal bases
onHB.
Let ΘAB = (ΛAB,ΣAB,∆AB,ΞAB) be an ontological
model of FAB that satisfies parameter independence, pre-
serves ontological distinctness with respect to all uni-
taries onHA ⊗HB, and reproduces the quantum predic-
tions. Then, any pair of pure states
[
ψ
]
AB ,
[
φ
]
AB ∈ PAB
that satisfies TrAB
([
φ
]
AB
[
ψ
]
AB
) ≤ d−1d is ontologically
distinct in ΘAB.
Before proving this theorem note that it assumes that
ΘAB preserves ontological distinctness with respect to uni-
tary transformations (see Definition 8.5). Recall that this
can be derived from the requirement that unitary transfor-
mations should be represented by stochastic transforma-
tions on the ontic state space, which is a basic framework
assumption of the ontological models framework for PMT
fragments as discussed in §8.
Also, note that, as with Hardy’s Theorem, assuming
that appending ancillas preserves ontological distinctness
allows this to be converted into a full blown ψ-ontology
theorem. In this case, there are two issues to deal with.
The first is that the condition on the inner product is
not satisfied for all states and the second is that not all
fragments have the tensor product structure of a prod-
uct measurement fragment. To deal with the first is-
sue, consider a fragment FA = 〈HA,PA,MA〉 where
HA = Cd, PA contains all pure states on HA, and MA
contains all measurements in orthonormal bases onHA.
A given pair of pure states,
[
ψ
]
A and
[
φ
]
A, either satisfy
the condition TrA
([
φ
]
A
[
ψ
]
A
) ≤ d−1d or they do not. If
they do not then we can introduce a product fragment
FAA′ = 〈HA ⊗HA′ ,PAA′ ,MAA′〉, where we again assume
that PAA′ contains all pure states andMAA′ contains all
measurements in orthonormal bases. The dimension of
HA′ is chosen such that [ψ]A ⊗ [0]A′ and [φ]A ⊗ [0]A′ sat-
isfy the inner product condition, where [0]A′ is a fixed
pure state. If we assume that an ontological model of
FAA′ must preserve ontological distinctness with respect
to an ontological model of FA, then proving the ontologi-
cal distinctness of
[
ψ
]
A ⊗ [0]A′ and
[
φ
]
A ⊗ [0]A′ is enough
to establish the ontological distinctness of
[
ψ
]
A and
[
φ
]
A
in the original model.
To deal with the issue of tensor product structure, first
of all, to avoid cluttered notation, relabel AA′ as A. Then,
we can take FB = 〈HB,PB,MB〉 to be a second copy of
FA, i.e. it has the same Hilbert space, states and measure-
ments, but just a different system label. Then, form a prod-
uct measurement fragment FAB = 〈HA ⊗HB,PAB,MA ×
MB〉 with factors FA and FB, where PAB contains all
pure states on HA ⊗ HB. If TrA ([φ]A [ψ]A) ≤ d−1d then
TrAB
([
φ
]
A ⊗ [0]B
[
ψ
]
A ⊗ [0]B
)
= TrA
([
φ
]
A
[
ψ
]
A
) ≤ d−1d
for any fixed pure state [0]B ∈ PB. Assuming that an on-
tological model of FAB must preserve ontological distinct-
ness with respect to an ontological model of FA means
that proving ontological distinctness of
[
ψ
]
A ⊗ [0]B and[
φ
]
A⊗ [0]B is enough to prove the ontological distinctness
of
[
ψ
]
A and
[
φ
]
A. If we assume further that an ontological
model of FAB must satisfy the conditions of the theo-
rem, i.e. parameter independence, preserving ontological
distinctness with respect to unitary transformations, and
reproducing the quantum predictions, then any ontologi-
cal model of FA must be ψ-ontic.
Proof of Theorem 10.8. By choosing the global phases
appropriately, we can find vector representatives, |ψ〉AB
and |φ〉AB, of
[
ψ
]
AB and
[
φ
]
AB such that 〈ψ|φ〉AB is real
and positive. Since Tr
([
φ
]
AB
[
ψ
]
AB
) ≤ d−1d , we have
0 ≤ 〈φ|ψ〉AB ≤
√
d−1
d .
Let {| j〉}d−1j=0 be an orthonormal basis for Cd and con-
sider the vectors
∣∣∣Φ+〉AB = 1√d
d−1∑
j=0
| j〉A ⊗ | j〉B , (266)
and
|η〉AB =
1√
d − 1
d−1∑
j=1
eiϕ j | j〉A ⊗ | j〉B , (267)
By Lemma 9.4, the phases ϕ j can be chosen in such a
way that
〈
η
∣∣∣Φ+〉AB = 〈φ|ψ〉AB. Thus, there exists a unitary
operator U such that U |ψ〉AB =
∣∣∣Φ+〉 and U |φ〉AB = |η〉AB.
Given that ΘAB preserves ontological distinctness with
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respect to unitaries, if
[
Φ+
]
AB and
[
η
]
AB are ontologically
distinct in ΘAB then
[
ψ
]
AB and
[
φ
]
AB must also be onto-
logically distinct.
Let µ ∈ ∆AB [[Φ+]AB] and ν ∈ ∆AB [[η]AB]. Consider
the measurement MA =
{[
j
]
A
}d−1
j=0 . By Theorem 10.7, any
conditional probability distribution PrA ∈ ΞA[MA] must
satisfy PrA ([0]A|MA, λ) = 1/d on a set Ω that is measure
one according to µ. However, in order to reproduce the
quantum predictions, we must have∫
ΛAB
PrA ([0]A|MA, λ) dν(λ) = 0, (268)
because |η〉AB is orthogonal to |0〉A. Thus,
PrA ([0]A|MA, λ) can only be nonzero on a set that
is of measure zero according to ν. Hence, µ(Ω) = 1
and ν(Ω) = 0, so
[
Φ+
]
AB and
[
η
]
AB are ontologically
distinct. 
Part III. Beyond the
ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction
Part II presented three theorems that aimed to rule out
ψ-epistemic ontological models. In each case, auxil-
iary assumptions were required to prove the theorem:
the preparation independence postulate for the Pusey–
Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, ontic indifference for Hardy’s
Theorem, and parameter independence for the Colbeck–
Renner Theorem. Each of these auxiliary assumptions are
question begging. We also saw, in §7.5, that ψ-epistemic
theories are possible if we do not make any auxiliary
assumptions.
However, as noted in §4.4, the definition of a ψ-
epistemic model is highly permissive in that it only re-
quires probability measures corresponding to two states
to have overlap in an ontological model. Most pairs of
nonorthogonal states may still be ontologically distinct
and furthermore the overlaps that do exist may be arbi-
trarily small. Clearly, more than this is needed if the
ψ-epistemic explanations of quantum phenomena like the
indistinguishability of nonorthogonal states are to be vi-
able. Therefore, one might hope that viable ψ-epistemic
interpretations might be ruled out without making auxil-
iary assumptions by imposing stronger requirements on
the overlaps in ontological models. This part discusses
four proposals for such requirements.
§11 discusses the requirement that all pairs of
nonorthogonal states should correspond to measures that
have nonzero overlap. Aaronson et. al. [53] have shown
that such models exist in all dimensions, but they have
also shown that imposing additional assumptions can rule
them out. One of these is that the model should satisfy
a fairly reasonable symmetry requirement, but the other
severely restricts the class of ontic state spaces. §12 dis-
cusses the requirement that ontological models should be
continuous, in the sense that quantum states with large
inner product should correspond to measures with large
overlap. Two different notions of continuity have been
discussed in the literature. Patra, Pironio and Massar have
proven a theorem ruling out models that satisfy a very
strong notion of continuity [60]. However, their notion
of continuity is so strong that it rules out many quite
reasonable ψ-epistemic models. This is discussed§12.1.
§12.2 discusses a version of Lipschitz continuity, which
says that the ratio of overlaps in an ontological model to
the quantum probabilities should be bounded. This can
be used as the basis of measuring the degree to which a
model is ψ-epistemic by comparing the overlaps of mea-
sures in the ontological model with the inner products
of the corresponding quantum states. The idea here is
that if the former is small for a pair of states with large
inner product then the ψ-epistemic explanation of the in-
distinguishability of quantum states is not really viable.
Several results bounding these overlaps have recently
been obtained [54, 55, 57, 58], culminating in a proof by
Branciard [55] that Lipschitz continuity is impossible in
an ontological model that reproduces the quantum pre-
dictions in Hilbert space dimension ≥ 4. Finally, §13
discusses the concept of a sometimes ψ-ontic model and
its converse, a never ψ-ontic model. In a sometimes ψ-
ontic model, for each pure state there is a region of the
ontic state space to which its probability measures assign
nonzero measure, but this region is assigned zero measure
by the probability measures corresponding to all other
pure states. Thus, if the system happens to occupy an on-
tic state in one of these regions then the quantum state that
was prepared can be deduced uniquely. The system need
not always occupy such an ontic state though; hence the
terminology “sometimes” ψ-ontic. In the context of re-
producing the predictions of all projective measurements
for all pure states on Cd, all ψ-epistemic models that have
been proposed to date are sometimes ψ-ontic for d ≥ 3,
but the question of whether this must necessarily be the
case is open.
Even if you think the additional assumptions of the
ψ-ontology theorems discussed in Part II are reasonable,
there are still important reasons to look for stronger no-
tions of ψ-epistemicity that might be ruled out without
them. In §5, we discussed the implications of assum-
ing that the quantum state is ψ-ontic, ranging from ex-
cess baggage to preparation contextuality and nonlocality.
However, if your claim of ψ-ontology is based on the
existing theorems then the implications from ψ-ontology
to these other features of ontological models inherit the
auxiliary assumptions made in the existing ψ-ontology
theorems. Since we can already prove these things with-
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out such additional assumptions, e.g. the standard proof
of Bell’s Theorem does not require assuming the prepara-
tion independence postulate or making assumptions about
how dynamics is represented, the claim that ψ-ontology
theorems are the strongest known no-go theorems for
ontological models is somewhat weakened. From this
point of view, proving that models must be sometimes
ψ-ontic would be particularly interesting, since all of the
implications discussed in §5 would follow from it. This
is also discussed in §13.
The discussion in this part is less detailed than in Parts 1
and 5.4. This is because going beyond the ψ-ontic/ψ-
epistemic distinction is a relatively new development and
many of the known results are only provisional. I expect
that some of the material in this section will be obsolete by
the time this review is published, so it is more important
to outline the main ideas than to give detailed proofs.
11. Pairwise ψ-epistemic models
One of the deficiencies in the definition of a ψ-epistemic
model is that it only requires that a single pair of pure
states is ontologically indistinct. Clearly, in order to ex-
plain the indistinguishability of every pair of nonorthog-
onal states in terms of the overlap of the corresponding
probability measures, all such pairs should to be onto-
logically indistinct. This is what is meant by a pairwise
ψ-epistemic model.
Definition 11.1. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of it. Θ
is pairwise ψ-epistemic if all pairs of nonorthogonal pure
states in P are ontologically indistinct in Θ.
Aaronson, Bouland, Chua and Lowther (ABCL) have
shown that pairwise ψ-epistemic models exist for the
fragment consisting of the set of all pure states and all
measurements in orthonormal bases in any finite dimen-
sional Hilbert space [53]. They also prove a theorem
ruling out such models by imposing some additional as-
sumptions, which generalize a class of models considered
by Rudolph [133] who previously provided numerical
evidence that they could not reproduce quantum theory.
One of their assumptions is a quite reasonable symmetry
requirement, but the other is that the ontic state space
describing a system with Hilbert space Cd is either the
projective Hilbert space, i.e. the set of pure states on Cd,
or the set of unitary operators on Cd. This is obviously
a very restricted setting, so their theorem should be re-
garded as a provisional step towards ruling out pairwise
ψ-epistemic models by symmetry requirements. Here, I
give a rough outline of their construction of a pairwise ψ-
epistemic theory in finite dimensional Hilbert spaces and
give a brief account of the symmetry assumption behind
their theorem.
§7.5 described ABCL’s construction of an ontologi-
cal model wherein any fixed pair of nonorthogonal pure
states could be made ontologically indistinct. The key
to constructing a pairwise ψ-epistemic model is to find
a way of mixing ontological models together such that
any states that are ontologically indistinct in the original
models remain so in the mixture. Then, if one mixes
sufficiently many ABCL models the result will be pair-
wise ψ-epistemic. A mixture of two ontological models
is defined as follows.
Definition 11.2. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ1 = (Λ1,Σ1,∆1,Ξ1) and Θ2 = (Λ2,Σ2,∆2,
Ξ2) be ontological models of it. The model Θ3 =
(Λ3,Σ3,∆3,Ξ3) = pΘ1 + (1 − p)Θ2, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, is
defined as follows.
• Λ3 = Λ1 ⊕ Λ2 and Σ3 consists of all sets of the form
Ω1 ⊕Ω2 for Ω1 ∈ Σ1, Ω2 ∈ Σ2.
• For all ρ ∈ P, ∆3ρ consists of all measures of the form
pµ1 + (1 − p)µ2, (269)
for µ1 ∈ ∆1ρ and µ2 ∈ ∆2ρ.
• For all M ∈ M, Ξ3M consists of all conditional prob-
ability distributions of the form
Pr3 (E|M, λ) = Pr1 (E|M, λ) + Pr2 (E|M, λ) , (270)
for Pr1 ∈ Ξ1M and Pr2 ∈ Ξ2M.
A few words of clarification are in order here. First of
all, the direct sum of two spaces is essentially just the two
spaces placed side-by-side. More formally, Λ1 ⊕ Λ2 is
the union of the set of objects of the form (1, λ1) with the
set of objects of the form (2, λ2). This is different from
the union of Λ1 and Λ2, since Λ1 and Λ2 might contain
some common elements. The addition of the integer label
is to ensure that we have two copies of such common
elements, with the label indicating whether it is the copy
that belongs to Λ1 or to Λ2. However, to simplify notation,
I generally omit the integer label. When µ1 is a probability
measure on (Λ1,Σ1), I also denote by µ1 the probability
measure on (Λ3,Σ3) that satisfies µ1(Λ2) = 0 and agrees
on Σ1. Similarly, when Pr1 is a probability distribution
conditioned on Λ1 the same notation denotes the function
on Λ3 that agrees on Λ1 and is zero on Λ2. Note, this is
not a valid conditional probability distribution because∑
E∈M Pr1 (E|M, λ2) = 0 for λ2 ∈ Λ2, but when added to a
probability distribution conditioned on Λ2, as in Eq. (270),
the result is a valid conditional probability distribution.
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Similar remarks apply under the exchange of 1 and 2. It is
then straightforward to check that if Θ1 and Θ2 reproduce
the quantum predictions then so does Θ3.
Theorem 11.3. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM frag-
ment and and let Θ1 = (Λ1,Σ1,∆1,Ξ1) and Θ2 =
(Λ2,Σ2,∆2,Ξ2) be ontological models of it. Let Θ3 =
pΘ1 + (1 − p)Θ2 for some 0 < p < 1. If [ψ] and [φ] are
ontologically indistinct in either Θ1 or Θ2 then they are
ontologically in distinct in Θ3.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that
[
ψ
]
and[
φ
]
are ontologically indistinct in Θ1, since the proof for
Θ2 follows the same logic. Then, there exist µ1 ∈ ∆1ψ
and ν1 ∈ ∆1φ such that c = D(µ1, ν1) < 1, where D is the
variational distance. Let µ2 ∈ ∆2ψ and ν2 ∈ ∆2φ. Then, µ3 =
pµ1 + (1 − p)µ2 ∈ ∆3ψ and ν3 = pν1 + (1 − p)ν2 ∈ ∆3φ. Let
Ω ∈ Σ3 and define Ω1 = Ω ∩ Λ1 and Ω2 = Ω ∩ Λ2. Then,
for any measure µ on (Λ3,Σ3), µ(Ω) = µ(Ω1) +µ(Ω2), but
we also have µ1(Ω2) = ν1(Ω2) = µ2(Ω1) = ν2(Ω1) = 0.
Hence,
|µ3(Ω) − ν3(Ω)|
= |pµ1(Ω1) + pν1(Ω1) + (1 − p)µ2(Ω2) + (1 − p)ν2(Ω2)|
(271)
≤ p |µ1(Ω1) − ν1(Ω1)| + (1 − p) |µ2(Ω2) − ν2(Ω2)|
(272)
≤ pc + (1 − p) (273)
= 1 − (1 − c)p, (274)
and this is < 1 because 0 ≤ c < 1 and p > 0. Since
this holds for any Ω ∈ Σ3 it also holds for the supremum.
Hence, D(µ3, ν3) < 1 and so
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are ontologically
indistinct in Θ3. 
The rough idea of the ABCL construction is now quite
simple to describe. Let F = 〈Cd,P,M〉 be the PM frag-
ment where P consists of all pure states on Cd and M
consists of all measurements in orthonormal bases. In
§7.5, we showed that, for any pair of nonorthogonal states[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, there exists an ontological model Θψ,φ in
which
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
are ontologically indistinct. Therefore,
by Theorem 11.3, the model pΘψ,φ+(1−p)Θψ′,φ′ has both([
ψ
]
,
[
φ
])
and
([
ψ′
]
,
[
φ′
])
as ontologically indistinct pairs.
This construction can then be iterated in order to obtain a
model in which any finite set of pairs of nonorthogonal
pure states are ontologically distinct.
The remaining difficulty is to extend this construction
to an infinite number of pairs, i.e. all pairs of pure states on
Cd. The details of this are quite technical but straightfor-
ward once one understands the basic idea. The interested
reader should consult [53].
ABCL go on to prove a theorem ruling out pairwise
ψ-epistemic models under an additional symmetry re-
quirement. They also impose that the ontic state space for
a quantum system with Hilbert space Cd is either the pro-
jective Hilbert space of Cd or the set of unitary operators
on Cd. In the more general context of arbitrary models,
their symmetry assumption runs as follows.
Definition 11.4. Let F = 〈H,P,M,T〉 be a PMT frag-
ment and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ,Γ) be an ontological model
of it. Θ satisfies ABCL symmetry if, for all pairs
[
ψ
] ∈ P
and U ∈ T such that U [ψ] U† = [ψ], there exists a
µ ∈ ∆ψ and a γ ∈ ΓU such that
µ(Ω) =
∫
Λ
γλ(Ω)dµ(λ). (275)
This says that, if a unitary leaves a pure state invariant,
then there should be a probability measure representing
that state and a Markov kernel representing the unitary
such that the measure is invariant under the stochastic map
representing the unitary. ABCL then show that, for the
fragment consisting of all pure states, all measurements
in orthonormal bases, and all unitaries on Cd, if the ontic
state space is either the projective Hilbert space of Cd
or the set of unitary operators on Cd and the dynamics
is represented by the usual action of the unitary group
on these spaces, then no ABCL symmetric and pairwise
ψ-epistemic model exists.
Imposing additional symmetry requirements of the
type suggested by ABCL is a promising direction for
ψ-ontology theorems, but their setup is so restricted that
one cannot really draw any firm conclusions about onto-
logical models in general from it. The proof itself is quite
technical and not obviously generalizable to other ontic
state spaces, so the details are omitted here.
12. Continuity
The idea of continuity is that if two pure quantum states
are close to one another, in the sense of having large inner
product, then there should be probability measures repre-
senting them that have large overlap. Imposing continuity
is not a bad idea, since presumably models in which a
small change in experimental conditions leads to a large
change at the ontological level would be quite contrived.
The most basic notion of continuity runs as follows.
Definition 12.1. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
where P consists of pure states and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ)
be an ontological model of it. Θ is continuous if, for all
 > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that if Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
> 1− δ
for some pure states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, then there exists µ ∈ ∆ψ
and ν ∈ ∆φ such that L(µ, ν) > 1 − .
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This notion of continuity is quite permissive because
it imposes no constraints on how δ should be related to
. It is easy to see that any pairwise ψ-epistemic model
is continuous in this sense, since all it requires is that
the overlap of measures corresponding to nonorthogonal
states should be bounded away from zero. Since ABCL
have shown that pairwise ψ-epistemic models exist, this
notion of continuity cannot be used to derive a no-go
theorem.
Therefore, it is interesting to look at stronger notions
of continuity that might be reasonable for a ψ-epistemic
model. In the remainder of this section, two such notions
are discussed. §12.1 discusses a notion of continuity
due to Patra, Pironio and Massar [60] and discusses a
theorem that they proved to rule such models out. I argue
that their definition of continuity is unreasonable for a
ψ-epistemic model. §12.2 discusses a different notion
based on Lipschitz continuity, which has been used in a
number of recent works to derive measures of the extent
to which a model is ψ-epistemic. The best known bound
shows that the ratio of the overlap to the inner product
must be zero for Hilbert spaces of dimension ≥ 4.
12.1. The Patra–Pironio–Massar Theorem
PPM’s continuity assumption runs as follows.
Definition 12.2. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment,
where P consists of pure states, let δ > 0 and, for [ψ] ∈ P,
let Bδψ =
{[
φ
] ∈ P∣∣∣∣ √Tr ([φ] [ψ]) ≥ 1 − δ} be the ball of
radius δ centered at
[
ψ
]
. An ontological model Θ =
(Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) of F is PPM-δ-continuous if, for every pure
state
[
ψ
] ∈ P and every set {[φ j]} ⊆ P where [φ j] ∈
Bδψ, there exist probability measures µ j ∈ ∆φ j such that
L({µ j}) > 0.
For the case of a finite ontic state space, the PPM-δ-
continuity assumption says that, for every set of quantum
states that are sufficiently close some common state
[
ψ
]
,
there should be at least one ontic state to which they all
assign nonzero probability. This is stronger than the basic
notion of continuity given in Definition 12.1, which only
constrains pairwise overlaps.
Based on their assumption, PPM prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 12.3. Let F = 〈Cd,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
with {[k]}d−1k=0 ∈ M for some orthonormal basis {|k〉}d−1k=0 . If
[
ψ
] ∈ P and {[φ j]}d−1j=0 ⊆ P, where
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
|k〉 (276)
∣∣∣φ j〉 = 1√
d − 1
∑
k, j
|k〉 , (277)
then there is no PPM-δ-continuous ontological model
of F that reproduces the quantum preclusions for δ ≥
1 − √(d − 1)/d.
As with the Hardy and Colbeck–Renner Theorems, the
constraint on δ can be removed by assuming that adding
ancillas preserves ontological distinctness.
Proof of Theorem 12.3. Let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an onto-
logical model of F and let µ j ∈ ∆φ j . The states
[
φ j
]
all lie
within Bδψ for δ = 1 −
√
(d − 1)/d. However, the states[
φ j
]
are antidistinguished by the measurement {[k]}d−1k=0
and hence, by Theorem 6.5, L
({
µ j
})
= 0. 
This proof is remarkably simple, but it does not mean
much as PPM-δ-continuity is unreasonably strong. In
order to see the problem, it is helpful to consider a
simple example. Therefore, consider how the fragment
F = 〈Cd,P,M〉 might be modeled, where P just contains
the states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ j
]
and M only contains the measure-
ment M = {[k]}dk=1. A natural way of doing this is to
use the ontic state space Λ = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}, model[
ψ
]
by the uniform distribution, and model
[
φ j
]
by the
distribution that is zero on j and uniformly distributed
over the rest of the ontic state space. Then, it is straight-
forward to see that setting the conditional probabilities
Pr ([k]|M, j) = δ jk yields a model that reproduces the
quantum predictions. Furthermore, this model is pairwise
ψ-epistemic, and hence satisfies the more basic notion of
continuity, because D(µ j, µk) = 1/(d − 1) for j , k.
From this, it is easy to see that the problem with PPM-δ-
continuity comes from ontological states that are assigned
a small weight in the distribution. If a distribution corre-
sponding to some quantum state assigns a small weight to
all of the ontic states in its support then one way of mak-
ing a small change to that distribution is to set the weight
assigned to one of the ontic states to zero and redistribute
it over the other ontic states. If those distributions all
happen to represent quantum states that are close to the
original one, and there is no reason why they should not,
then these quantum states will have no ontic state that is
common to all of them, and hence PPM-δ-continuity will
be violated.
In fact, the same criticism applies to classical models.
Suppose we have a system consisting of a ball that can
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be in one of d boxes, labeled 0, 1, . . . , d − 1. The system
is prepared in one of the following ways. Either a box
is chosen uniformly at random and the ball is placed in
that box, or first an integer j from 0 to d − 1 is specified
and box j is removed, then the ball is placed uniformly
at random in one of the remaining boxes, before finally
returning box j to its place. Suppose you are given a table
which specifies the probabilities of finding the ball in each
of the boxes for each of these d+1 preparation procedures.
You are, however, not told anything about where these
probabilities come from, i.e. you are not told about the
ball and boxes but rather just given a table that tells you
that if preparation j is made then the probability of getting
outcome k is 0 if k = j and 1/(d− 1) otherwise. Your task
is to try and come up with a model of what is going on in
reality in order to generate these statistics; a task perfectly
analogous to the project of constructing an ontological
model for some fragment of quantum theory. If you im-
posed upon yourself the analog of PPM-δ-continuity, that
sets of preparations having close operational predictions
must have an ontic state in common, you would never be
able to come up with the ball and box model that is ac-
tually generating the probabilities and, in fact, no model
satisfying this condition exists. That, in a nutshell, is
what is wrong with PPM-δ-continuity. A condition that
rules out a classical probabilistic description of a classi-
cal probabilistic model is clearly way to strong to prove
anything meaningful about quantum theory.
12.2. Lipschitz continuity
In order for the ψ-epistemic explanation of the indistin-
guishability of quantum states to be viable, quantum
states that have large inner product should correspond
to probability measures with large overlap, but quantum
states that are almost orthogonal need have very little
overlap at the ontic level. In between these extremes, an
amount of overlap that scales with the inner product in
some way is needed. This motivates the definition of
Lipschitz continuity.
Definition 12.4. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
where P consists of pure states and where, for every[
ψ
] ∈ P, there exists an M ∈ M such that [ψ] ∈ M.
Let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of F. Θ is
Lipschitz continuous if there exists a K > 0 such that, for
all
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P,
L(µ, ν) ≥ KTr ([φ] [ψ]) , (278)
for some µ ∈ ∆ψ, ν ∈ ∆φ.
The first bounds on K were obtained by Maroney [58],
followed by Barrett et. al. [54] and myself [57]. However,
Branciard [55] has recently proved a theorem to the effect
that, for Hilbert spaces of d ≥ 4, K must be zero, or, in
other words, Lipschitz continuous models are not possible.
This could be regarded as a ψ-ontology theorem in its
own right, if we regard Lipschitz continuity as a stronger
definition of what it means for a model to be ψ-epistemic.
However, Lipschitz continuity is quite a strong require-
ment. It says that there should be a fixed bound on the
ratio of L(µ, ν) to Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
, that is independent of the
states
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
under consideration. Is this really re-
quired to maintain the viability of ψ-epistemic explana-
tions of quantum phenomena, such as the indistinguisha-
bility of quantum states?
In any ontological model, regardless of whether it is ψ-
epistemic or ψ-ontic, there are two mechanisms that can
account for the indistinguishability of a pair of quantum
states. The first is overlap of the probability measures
corresponding to states, which I have referred to as the
ψ-epistemic explanation of indistinguishability. Even if
you are told the exact ontic state occupied by the sys-
tem, your probability of correctly guessing whether
[
ψ
]
or
[
φ
]
was prepared is bounded by 12 (2 − L(µ, ν)), where
µ ∈ ∆ψ and ν ∈ ∆φ. Hence, if L(µ, ν) > 0, the states are
necessarily indistinguishable. However, there is also a
second mechanism. We do not usually have complete
knowledge about the ontic state, but are instead only able
to infer information about it via the outcomes of quantum
measurements. The conditional probability distributions
Pr(E|M, λ) corresponding to measurements typically do
not reveal the value of λ exactly, but only give coarse-
grained information about it. This will render quantum
states less distinguishable than they would be if we knew
the exact ontic state, so this mechanism can also explain
part of their indistinguishability. In fact, in a ψ-ontic
model, the indistinguishability of quantum states must
be explained entirely by this second mechanism as there
is no overlap of probability measures. In general, there
will be a tradeoff between the two effects, with some por-
tion of the indistinguishability of quantum states being
explained by overlap of probability measures, and some
being explained by the coarse-grained nature of measure-
ments. Clearly, some portion of the indistinguishability
must be explained by overlap in a ψ-epistemic theory, as
the theory would be ψ-ontic if there were no overlap, but
how much of it ought to be explained in this way?
It is easy to see that measurements must only reveal
coarse-grained information about λ in certain types of
ontological model, regardless of whether they are ψ-
epistemic or ψ-ontic. For example, in an outcome de-
terministic model, such as the Kochen–Specker model, in
which the probabilities Pr(φ|M, λ) for measurements in
orthonormal bases are all either 0 or 1, exact knowledge
of λ would entail exact knowledge of the outcomes of all
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measurements, which would violate the uncertainty prin-
ciple and hence cannot be compatible with reproducing
the quantum predictions. Further, recall that Spekkens’
toy theory was derived from the knowledge-balance prin-
ciple, which states that at most half of the information
needed to specify the ontic state can be known at any
given time. This also entails that measurements can
only reveal coarse-grained information about the ontic
state. Therefore, even in an archetypal ψ-epistemic theory,
which is derived entirely from epistemic principles, mea-
surements only reveal coarse-grained information about
λ. For these reasons, it is to be expected that both overlap
of probability measures and the coarse-grained nature
of measurements will be present in a viable ψ-epistemic
theory.
Because of this, it is not obvious that there is some
definite value of the ratio L(µ, ν)/Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
below which
ψ-epistemic models ought to be discarded as implausible.
Further, it is also not obvious that this ratio should have
a fixed bound, independent of the choice of
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
.
It is conceivable that the amount of indistinguishability
explained by overlap and the amount explained by the
coarse-grained nature of measurements could vary for
different pairs of states, e.g. it might vary with Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
.
Therefore, it is interesting to see what can be inferred
from the results mentioned above [54, 55, 57, 58] without
assuming Lipschitz continuity.
All of these papers consider some family of states
Sn = {
[
ψ j
]
}nj=1, i.e. there are sets of states with increas-
ing values of n. Without Lipschitz continuity, the results
provide an upper bound on the ratio
Rn = min
[ψ],[φ]∈Sn
L(µψ, νφ)
Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
]) , (279)
for any choice of µψ ∈ ∆ψ, νφ ∈ ∆φ. In other words, we
can infer that there exists at least one pair of states in the
set for which the ratio is at least this bad, but we can no
longer infer that this holds for all states in the Hilbert
space as we could under Lipschitz continuity. Given
that it is difficult to say just how much of the indistin-
guishability of quantum states needs to be explained by
overlap of probability measures in a viable ψ-epistemic
theory, this type of bound is only really interesting if it
shows that L(µψ, νφ)/Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
must be close to zero
for a wide range of different pairs of states. Since the
state families used in these constructions can be unitarily
transformed without changing the result, this means that
L(µψ, νφ)/Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
should be close to zero for a wide
range of values of Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
.
The best bound so far obtained comes from Branciard’s
work [55], in which he shows that there exists a family
of states in any Hilbert space of dimension ≥ 4, such
that Rn → 0 as n → ∞. However, all of the existing
results share the feature that min[ψ],[φ]∈Sn Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])→
0 as n → ∞ as well, so all we can really say without
assuming Lipschitz continuity is that the ratio is close
to zero for pairs of states that are almost distinguishable.
It is difficult to tell the difference between states that
are perfectly distinguishable and states that are almost
distinguishable in a practical experiment, so it is arguable
whether it matters that the ψ-epistemic explanation of
indistinguishability plays almost no role for such states.
It is still an open possibility that the ratio might be much
higher for states with a larger inner product, so what
is really needed is to find families of states for which
Rn → 0 as n→ ∞, but min[ψ],[φ]∈Sn Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
takes on
a wide range of values.
13. Never ψ-ontic models
To conclude, I would like to discuss one further strength-
ening of the notion of a ψ-epistemic model, first intro-
duced informally by Montina [134], about which very
little is currently known. This is the notion of a never
ψ-ontic model.
Definition 13.1. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of it. Θ
is sometimes ψ-ontic if, for all pure states
[
ψ
] ∈ P, there
exists a Ω ∈ Σ such that µ(Ω) > 0 for some µ ∈ ∆ψ, but
for all other pure states
[
φ
] ∈ P, [φ] , [ψ], every ν ∈ ∆φ
has ν(Ω) = 0. Otherwise the model is never ψ-ontic.
Roughly speaking, in a sometimes ψ-ontic model, each
pure state has a special region of the ontic state space all
to itself. If you know that the ontic state occupies this
region then you can identify the quantum state that was
prepared with probability one. However, the ontic state
need not always occupy such a region; hence the terminol-
ogy “sometimes” ψ-ontic. In contrast, in a never ψ-ontic
model, every region of the ontic state space is shared non-
trivially by more than one quantum state. Considerations
about the degree of overlap of pairs of states do not really
bear on the question of whether a never ψ-ontic model is
possible, since arbitrary overlaps may occur outside the
special regions in a sometimes ψ-ontic model.
The reason why the notion of a sometimes ψ-ontic
model is interesting is that all of the implications of ψ-
ontology discussed in §5 can be derived from sometimes
ψ-ontology instead. Whilst the fact that a maximally ψ-
epistemic model is impossible is enough to derive prepa-
ration contextuality and Bell’s Theorem, it does not imply
excess baggage. However, excess baggage follows di-
rectly from sometimes ψ-ontology, since there must be at
least as many ontic states as there are pure quantum states
if each quantum state is to be assigned its own region of
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ontic state space. Further, a sometimes ψ-ontic model
cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic, so we obtain all the
implications of that as well.
Theorem 13.2. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of it. If Θ
is sometimes ψ-ontic then it is not maximally ψ-epistemic.
Proof. Assume that Θ is maximally ψ-epistemic. Then,
for all
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, all µ ∈ ∆ψ, all ν ∈ ∆φ, and all Ω ∈ Σ
such that ν(Ω) = 1,∫
Ω
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) =
∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ), (280)
for all M ∈ M, Pr ∈ ΞM.
Let Ω′ be the region uniquely assigned to
[
ψ
]
so that
ν(Ω′) = 0 and µ(Ω′) > 0. Then Ω can be chosen such
that Ω ∩ Ω′ = ∅. Summing Eq. (280) over E then gives
µ(Ω) = µ(Λ) = 1. However, µ(Ω) cannot be equal to
one because µ(Ω′) > 0 and Ω and Ω′ are disjoint, so this
would make µ(Λ) > 1. Hence, there is a contradiction, so
Θ cannot be maximally ψ-epistemic. 
The Kochen–Specker model is never ψ-ontic, but all
the existing ψ-epistemic models for Hilbert spaces of di-
mension ≥ 3 are sometimes ψ-ontic, so whether never
ψ-ontic models exist in all dimensions is an open ques-
tion. Since it is impossible to prove ψ-ontology without
auxiliary assumptions, sometimes ψ-ontology is perhaps
the strongest result about the reality of the quantum state
that we could hope to prove without such assumptions.
For this reason, I consider this to be the most important
open question in this area.
14. Discussion and conclusions
14.1. Summary
This review article was divided into three parts. In the
first part, I explained the distinction between ontic and
epistemic interpretations of the quantum state, outlined
the pre-existing arguments for epistemic and ontic in-
terpretations, and explained how many existing no-go
theorems would follow from proving that the quantum
state is ontic. The aim of this part was to convince you
that the ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction is interesting, that
the question is unresolved by qualitative arguments, and
that it is the sort of issue that should be addressed with
the conceptual rigor that Bell brought to nonlocality.
The second part discussed three existing ψ-ontology
theorems: the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem, Hardy’s
Theorem, and the Colbeck–Renner Theorem. Each of
these results involve auxiliary assumptions, of varying
degrees of reasonableness. Hardy’s ontic indifference
assumption is not really appropriate for a ψ-epistemic
theory, but it does allow the flaw in the argument for the
reality of the wavefunction from interference to be ex-
posed more clearly. Colbeck and Renner’s assumption
of parameter independence is doubtful in light of Bell’s
Theorem. Whilst violations of Bell inequalities can arise
from the failure of outcome independence alone, many
viable realist interpretations of quantum theory, such as
de Broglie–Bohm theory, violate parameter independence
instead, and one really wants the scope of a no-go theo-
rem to include as many viable realist interpretations as
possible. In my view, the preparation independence pos-
tulate of the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem is the best
of the bunch. It is not completely unassailable, since
weakening it slightly to allow for genuinely nonlocal
degrees of freedom does potentially allow for a viable
ψ-epistemic interpretation. Nevertheless, the PIP is sat-
isfied in theories like de Broglie–Bohm, so, unlike the
Colbeck–Renner Theorem, the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph
Theorem does explain why the wavefunction must be real
in theories of that type.
Without auxiliary assumptions, ψ-epistemic models do
exist, so the third part of this review discussed strength-
enings of the notion of a ψ-epistemic model that may be
needed in order to make the ψ-epistemic explanations
of phenomena like the indistinguishability of quantum
states and the no cloning theorem go through. Whilst the
case is not yet watertight, I expect that future work on
bounding the ratio of the overlap of probability measures
to the quantum probabilities of the states they represent
will eventually make ψ-epistemic explanations look im-
plausible within the ontological models framework.
14.2. Open questions
Part of the aim of this review was to provide the neces-
sary background for researchers who would like to begin
working in this area. In this regard, several open questions
were raised in the main text, and solving some of them
would help to put the non viability of ψ-epistemic inter-
pretations on a more secure footing. For easy reference,
the following list collects all the open problems together
in one place, and adds a couple of new ones. The section
numbers indicate where in the review you can find a more
detailed description.
1. §7.7.2: Can a deterministic ψ-ontic model always be
converted into a ψ-epistemic one by finding regions
of the ontic state space associated with different
pure states that make the exact same predictions?
One of Schlosshauer and Fine’s criticisms of the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem was based on the
idea that this can always be done. It is not true
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for nondeterministic theories, but it may be true for
deterministic theories.
2. §11: Can reasonable symmetry requirements be used
to rule out pairwise ψ-epistemic models without re-
strictive assumptions on the nature of the ontic state
space? The theorem of Aaronson et. al. only applies
if the ontic state space is projective Hilbert space or
the set of unitary operators, which is a very restric-
tive class of models.
3. §12.2: Does the overlap of probability measures
representing nonorthogonal states have to tend to be
close to zero for pairs of states with a fixed inner
product? The existing results only imply this for
families of states that become orthogonal in the n→
∞ limit, so this only implies that the ψ-epistemic
explanation of indistinguishability is implausible for
states that are almost distinguishable.
4. §13: Does a never ψ-ontic model exist for the frag-
ment consisting of all pure states and projective mea-
surements in Cd for d ≥ 3? In my view, this is the
most important open question, as proving that all
models must be sometimes ψ-ontic has the same
implications as ψ-ontology.
5. Are better ψ-ontology results possible with POVMs?
The known ψ-epistemic models, including the
Kochen–Specker model discussed in §4.3 and the
ABCL model discussed in §7.5, only reproduce
quantum theory for measurements in orthonormal
bases. Morris has shown that the Kochen–Specker
model cannot be extended to all POVMs [113].
Therefore, it is still possible that there are no ψ-
epistemic models that reproduce the quantum predic-
tions for all POVMs, and it may be possible to prove
this without auxiliary assumptions. Further, most
of the proofs of ψ-ontology results presented here
are based on measurements in orthonormal bases, so
it is possible that simpler proofs and/or better over-
lap bounds could be derived using POVMs. This
is the case for the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph theorem,
as the simplified proof presented here does involve
POVMs.
6. Do ψ-ontology results have applications in quantum
information theory, beyond those of the implications
discussed in §5? The ontological models framework
is already regarded as implausible by some physi-
cists, but it is worth investigating anyway because it
provides a way of simulating quantum experiments
using classical resources. Results derived in this
framework often go on to have applications in quan-
tum information theory. In this regard, Montina
proved an upper bound on the classical communi-
cation complexity of simulating the identity chan-
nel for a qubit using the Kochen–Specker model,
which is maximally ψ-epistemic [135]. It is possi-
ble that the nonexistence of such models in higher
dimensions could be used to prove lower bounds on
the communication complexity of the identity chan-
nel in higher dimensions. Conversely, Montina et.
al.’s recent results on the communication complexity
of simulating the identity channel [136–139] might
be used to derive ψ-ontology results. Some work
has also been done on deriving quantum advantages
from antidistinguishability [108, 109].
14.3. Experiments
Probably the most important issue not discussed so far in
this review is the question of whether the reality of the
quantum state can be established experimentally. When
it comes to experiments in the foundations of quantum
theory, tests of Bell’s Theorem are somewhat of a gold
standard. Violation of a Bell inequality rules out a wide
class of local realistic theories independently of the de-
tails of quantum theory. Consequently, the experimenter
does not have to assume much about how their experi-
ment is represented within quantum theory. From their
observed statistics they simply get a yes/no answer as to
whether local hidden variable theories are viable, modulo
the known loopholes. In modern parlance, tests of Bell’s
Theorem are device independent [102].
In contrast, a test of the reality of the quantum state
would not be device independent simply because the
“quantum state” is the thing we are testing the reality
of, and that is a theory dependent notion. Consequently,
one has to assume that our quantum theoretical descrip-
tion of the way that our preparation devices work is more
or less accurate, in the sense that they are approximately
preparing the quantum states the theory says they are, in
order to test the existing ψ-ontology results. Therefore,
it is desirable to have a more theory independent notion
of whether a given set of observed statistics imply that
the “probabilistic state”, i.e. some theory-independent
generalization of the quantum state, must be real. It is
not obvious whether this can be done, but if it can then
experimental tests of ψ-ontology results would become
much more interesting.
Of course, one can still perform non device indepen-
dent experimental tests. This amounts to trying to prepare
the states, perform the transformations, and make the mea-
surements involved in a ψ-ontology result and checking
that the quantum predictions are approximately upheld.
Due to experimental error, the agreement will never be
exact, but one can bound the overlap between probability
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measures representing quantum states instead of showing
that it must be exactly zero. For the special case of the
Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem given in Example 7.9,
this has been done using two ions in an ion trap [140].
However, the experimental result only shows that the
overlap in probability measures must be a little smaller
than the quantum probability, and not that it must be close
to zero, and of course, this only applies if one assumes
the PIP.
A better approach to deriving overlap bounds is to test
the results described in §12.2. For finite n, these can
provide overlap bounds for specific sets of states without
auxiliary assumptions. Based on Branciard’s results [55],
a recent experiment with single photons has given a bound
on the ratio of overlap to the quantum probability of
0.690 ± 0.001 for a set of 10 states in a Hilbert space of
dimension 4 [141]. This is still quite far from establishing
the reality of the quantum state, for which one would
want to test many pairs of quantum states with a variety
of different inner products, and to show that the overlap
ratios are consistently close to zero. Recall that, due to
the fact that part of the indistinguishability of quantum
states may be explained by the coarse-grained nature of
measurements in an ontological model, it is difficult to
attach significance to overlap ratios that are significantly
larger than zero. Further theoretical work is required to
derive feasible experiments that can achieve much lower
ratios.
Finally, the original version of the Colbeck–Renner
Theorem, i.e. the one that aimed to rule out ontologi-
cal models with greater predictive power than quantum
theory, has been tested using a quantum optical sys-
tem [142] and there has also been an optical test of the
Patra–Pironio–Massar Theorem on PPM-continuous mod-
els [143].
14.4. Future directions
Assuming that future results drive the final nails into the
coffin of ψ-epistemic explanations within the ontological
models framework, the final question I want to address is
where to go next. One option is to embrace the reality of
the wavefunction by adopting one of the existing realist
interpretations that fit into the ontological models frame-
work, e.g. de Broglie–Bohm theory, spontaneous collapse
theories or modal interpretations. Another is to adopt a
neo-Copenhagen interpretation.
The first option is unappealing because adopting one of
these realist interpretations opens up an explanatory gap.
Namely, given that a ψ-epistemic interpretation would
provide compelling explanations of a whole variety of
quantum phenomena, it is puzzling that the quantum state
should nevertheless be ontic. Of course, the existing no-
go results, such as Bell’s Theorem, also imply explanatory
gaps, e.g. if a theory is explicitly nonlocal then why can
this not be used to send a superluminal signal? For this
reason, those inclined to the ψ-epistemic view are likely
to have rejected these interpretations already on the basis
of these other gaps.
Being neo-Copenhagen is always an option, but the
merits of such an move depend on the degree to which
one believes that realism is desirable. This is not the place
to get into the debate between realism and antirealism
and whether neo-Copenhagen views are compatible with
some weakened notion of realism. Suffice to say that
the viability of these interpretations turns on issues that
are far deeper than the reality of the wavefunction. For
my part, I think that if one denies the existence of an
observer-independent reality then it becomes very dif-
ficult to maintain a clear notion of explanation at all.
Closing explanatory gaps by denying the need for any
explanation at all does not seem that appealing to me.
The only remaining option then is to adopt a realist
interpretation that does not fit in to the ontological models
framework. There are several possibilities, most of them
highly speculative.
• Many-worlds: The many-worlds interpretation [6–8]
is not contained within the ontological models frame-
work because the latter assumes that measurements
yield a single unique outcome. Many-worlds is a
commonplace retreat for realists who want to avoid
introducing nonlocality in the face of Bell’s Theo-
rem. However, the conventional many-worlds inter-
pretation is not a retreat for ψ-epistemicists because
it is based on the idea that the quantum state is a
literal description of reality. Nevertheless, since
ψ-ontology theorems do not apply to theories that
involve many-worlds, it is possible that there is a
viable ψ-epistemic interpretation that involves them.
This is doubtless an unappealing option to both ex-
isting many-worlds advocates and ψ-epistemicists.
For many-worlds advocates, the reason to take mul-
tiple worlds seriously is because they are encoded in
the branching structure of the wavefunction. If you
take away the reality of the wavefunction then you
take away their reason for believing in them. Sim-
ilarly, this is the only real reason for taking many
worlds seriously, so someone who does not believe
in the reality of the wavefunction is unlikely to have
found the existence of many-worlds plausible in the
first place. Nevertheless, it is logically possible that
the universe could be described by some structure
that does not imply a unique wavefunction, but does
support the existence of many-worlds.
• Histories approaches: Histories interpretations, such
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as consistent/decoherent histories [144] and Sorkin’s
co-event formalism [145, 146] are based on taking
the space-time picture provided by the path integral
seriously. Consistent histories does not fit into the
ontological models framework as it decrees that not
all sets of histories can be assigned a probability and
there may not be a unique description of the universe
in terms of a single history. Griffiths argues that the
consistent histories interpretation is appropriately ψ-
epistemic [147]. In contrast, the co-event formalism
is based on a modified logic and probability theory.
I explained my doubts about realist interpretations
of exotic probability theories in §7.7.4 and, in any
case, Wallden [39] provides evidence that a result
analogous to the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph Theorem
may hold in the coevent formalism.
• Retrocausality: In the ontological models frame-
work, it is assumed that the probability measure
representing a quantum state is independent of the
choice of future measurement setting. If this were
not the case then the ψ-epistemic interpretation of
quantum phenomena could be maintained by having
the measures corresponding to antidistinguishable
states have no overlap when the antidistinguishing
measurement is made, but nonzero overlap when
other measurements are made. One way that de-
pendence on the measurement setting may occur is
if there is a direct causal influence, traveling back-
wards in time, from the measurement to the prepa-
ration. Several authors have argued that there are
independent reasons for adopting a retrocausal ap-
proach to quantum theory [148–150], not least be-
cause it might allow an appropriately local resolu-
tion to the dilemma posed by Bell’s Theorem. The
transactional interpretation [151, 152] is explicitly
retrocausal and the two-state vector formalism [153]
can be read in a retrocausal way. However, both of
these theories posit an ontic wavefunction. If we
are to maintain ψ-epistemic explanations then we
instead need to look for retrocausal ontological mod-
els that posit a deeper reality underlying quantum
theory that does not include the quantum state.
• Relationalism: The ontological models framework
assumes that systems have their own intrinsic prop-
erties, encompassed by the ontological state λ. Re-
lationalism posits that systems do not have intrin-
sic properties, but only properties relative to other
systems. The usual analogy is with the concept of
position. One cannot talk about the position of a par-
ticle without setting down some coordinate system,
and this implicitly means that we are measuring
position with respect to some other physical sys-
tem that provides a reference frame. There is an
obvious commonality with Everett’s relative state
approach [6], except that we want a theory of this
type that is ψ-epistemic. Rovelli’s relational quan-
tum mechanics [22] is a theory of this type in which
the wavefunction is supposed to be epistemic, but he
defines relational properties in terms of the global
wavefunction so it is not clear how they are supposed
to be determined if the wavefunction is not real.
In conclusion, I think we should try to find a way
of understanding quantum theory that closes as many
of the explanatory gaps opened by no-go theorems as
possible. This is because an interpretation that merely
accommodates the known facts about quantum theory,
rather than explaining them, is unlikely to yield principles
that can reliably guide us towards future physical theories.
Since ψ-ontology implies many of the existing no-go
theorems, the gap opened by ψ-ontology results should
be taken at least as seriously as the others. This means that
we should investigate the speculative roads less travelled
described above, in addition to others that we have not
thought of yet. The chances that any one of them will
bear fruit may be slim, but the rewards if they do will be
worth the effort.
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Appendix
A. The ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction
and objective chance
In this appendix, the question of whether a distinction
equivalent to the Bayesian distinction between ontic and
epistemic states can be made in theories that involve ob-
jective chance is addressed.
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Firstly, note that whether or not this issue is relevant to
the reality of the wavefunction depends on exactly which
probabilities are deemed to be objective chances. Most
advocates of objective chance support hybrid theories
of probability in which there are epistemic probabilities
in addition to objective chances. Objective chances are
invoked to explain lawlike probabilistic regularities, as
they occur in our theories of physics for example, but
epistemic probabilities, usually cashed out in Bayesian
or frequentist terms, also exist in order to make contact
with statistics. In the ontological models framework for a
PM fragment, probabilities enter into the description in
two places. Firstly, quantum states correspond to proba-
bility measures over the ontic state space and, secondly,
measurements correspond to conditional probability dis-
tributions over their outcomes. A fairly natural position
would be to assert that the probability measures corre-
sponding to states are epistemic, whereas the conditional
probabilities associated to measurements are objective.
The former represent our uncertainty about the true ontic
state, whereas the latter represent our uncertainty about
the response of the measurement device. On a conven-
tional view, it is the response of the measurement device
that represents a “genuinely stochastic” event in quantum
theory, so it would make sense to only place the objective
chances here where they seem to be most needed.
Regardless of whether you agree with this account, the
main point is that the introduction of objective chances
into quantum theory only presents a problem for the on-
tic/epistemic distinction if the probability measures repre-
senting states are deemed to be objective chances. This is
because the definition of ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic models
is given entirely in terms of the overlaps of these prob-
ability measures and does not involve the measurement
device probabilities at all. Therefore, if you are happy
to put objective chances only in the measuring device,
then the introduction of such chances does not present
any new problem for the ontic/epistemic distinction. It is
only if you think that the probability measures represent-
ing states are objective chances that the distinction needs
to be reexamined. Therefore, I assume that this is what
is meant by introducing objective chances into quantum
theory in the remainder of this appendix.
As in the frequency theory, we are interested in whether
objective chances can be viewed as intrinsic properties
of individual systems, or whether they must be defined
with reference to the wider world beyond the individual
system, e.g. in terms of an ensemble of similar systems
or the conditions prevailing in the environment of the
system. An intrinsic property of a system is something
like the charge of an electron or the hidden variable state
of a quantum system, if the latter are presumed to ex-
ist. In a realist approach to physics, these correspond
to ontological features of the system and they cannot be
changed just by changing our description of the world in
which the system is embedded. Changing them requires
an intervention in the system itself.
Deciding whether or not objective chances are intrin-
sic properties is difficult because there is no universally
agreed upon theory of objective chance. Fortunately, the
question only depends on a couple of broad features of
the theory.
Firstly, some authors posit that objective chance is
compatible with determinism so that, for example, the
probabilities involved in classical statistical mechanics
can be viewed as objective chances. Others think that
objective chances only make sense if there is a genuine
stochasticity in nature, with quantum theory providing
the prime example of a theory that involves such genuine
chance. It should be clear that objective chance cannot
be intrinsic in any theory that is compatible with deter-
minism. This is because, in a deterministic theory, the
intrinsic properties of an isolated system determine its
future uniquely, so they could only ever give rise to objec-
tive chances of 0 or 1. Therefore, to make such a theory
work, one has to refer either to an ensemble of systems, as
in the frequency theory, or to the conditions surrounding
the system. As an example of the latter, one can imagine a
specification of the way in which a coin should be tossed
such as “a strong flip between thumb and forefinger” that
is specific enough to license the assignment of a fixed
objective chance, but vague enough that it does not deter-
mine the outcome of the toss uniquely. Of course, it is
questionable whether such a notion makes sense, but the
point is that, if one does take this view, then probabilities
are not intrinsic properties of systems. Either they refer
to ensembles or they refer to the conditions of interaction
between a system and its environment, and specifying
these in different levels of detail would lead to different
probability assignments, just as in the frequency case.
However, many philosophers of objective chance, in-
cluding Popper [154] and Lewis [155], take the view
that objective chances only make sense in a genuinely
stochastic universe. In this case, one can require that the
objective chances of an experimental outcome are only
the same if the intrinsic properties of the system before
the experiment are identical in all relevant details. The
prime example of this would be to say that the objective
chances of obtaining a given outcome in a quantum mea-
surement on two different systems are the same iff the
systems are described by the same quantum state |ψ〉 prior
to the experiment. This presents more of a problem for
the distinction we are trying to make, since ostensibly the
state |ψ〉 only refers to the system itself.
However, it should be noted that the quantum state
example rests on questionable assumptions about the in-
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terpretation of quantum theory. It assumes that |ψ〉 can
be regarded as an intrinsic property of the system and,
further, that |ψ〉 is a complete description of the system.
In an operationalist approach, the assertion that |ψ〉 is an
intrinsic property of a system is denied. Instead, it is a
description of those facts about the device that prepared
the system that are relevant for predicting future mea-
surement outcomes. In other words, it is a condensed
description of a set of knob settings, meter readings, etc.
that refer to a piece of experimental apparatus external
to the system. These are not intrinsic properties of the
system, so the relevant distinction is maintained.
Of course, both Popper and Lewis intend a more realist
interpretation of quantum theory. However, even if quan-
tum states are intrinsic properties of quantum systems,
they need not be complete. For example, in de Broglie–
Bohm theory one also needs to specify the positions of
particles. The theory is deterministic when both the quan-
tum state and particle positions are specified, so we are
back in the position of having to define objective chances
in a deterministic theory, in which case they are not in-
trinsic. In de Broglie–Bohm theory, the statement that a
system is described by a state |ψ〉 really means that it is
part of an ensemble of systems described by the quantum
state |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ . . . and in which the particle positions
are distributed according to |ψ(x)|2. Since there is free-
dom to look at subensembles where the positions are not
distributed according to |ψ(x)|2, and these would allow
prediction with greater accuracy than quantum theory,
systems described by the same quantum state do not have
the same intrinsic properties in all relevant detail.
Nevertheless, although quantum theory is a prime moti-
vation for objective chances, theories of objective chance
are usually independent of the details of physics. Thus,
we can ignore the quantum motivation and just look at
the theories of chance actually proposed to determine
whether chances are intrinsic. In this regard, an impor-
tant distinction is whether or not a theory of chance is
Humean. Roughly speaking, a Humean theory is one in
which the chances are defined in terms of the facts on
the ground, i.e. facts about the universe that could form
part of our experience of it (see [156] for a more precise
definition). This means that objective chances cannot be
defined in terms of things like |ψ〉, which do not form
part of our experience. Lewis [155] was a proponent of
Humean theories of chance and his favoured best sys-
tem theory is really just a modification of frequentism.
More specifically, he thought that chances were specified
via a tradeoff between accurately capturing the relative
frequencies and simplicity. Thus, if a large number of
coin flips is performed several different times, and on
each occasion the relative frequency of heads obtained
was close to, but not exactly, 1/2, varying in a seemingly
random way, Lewis would say that this licenses assigning
an objective chance of 1/2 to the coin flips. This differs
from the frequency theory in that it does not demand
that probabilities are exactly the relative frequencies in
some real or hypothetical, finite or infinite, sequence of
experiments. Of course, defining an objective tradeoff
between predictability and simplicity is difficult, but for
present purposes all that matters is that again objective
chances are not intrinsic properties of systems, but are
instead defined with respect to an ensemble. Likewise, I
think that any Humean theory of chance makes chance a
non-intrinsic property because chances would have to be
defined in terms of observable facts, and I do not see how
this could be done without referring to ensembles or to
the surroundings of the system.
Therefore, the only chance theories that really pose
a problem for the distinction we are trying to make are
those that are non-Humean, i.e. they posit that chances do
not supervene on facts that could form part of our experi-
ence. Of these, the most prominent is Popper’s propensity
theory [154]. Propensities are dispositional properties, i.e.
a system has a disposition to produce a certain outcome
in an experiment. Propensity theories are broadly classi-
fied as either long-run propensity theories or single-case
propensity theories. In a long-run theory, a propensity
is read as a disposition to produce a certain relative fre-
quency of outcomes in the long run. Since this refers to
an ensemble, again there is no problem distinguishing this
type of property from intrinsic properties of individual
systems. On the other hand, single case propensities are
read as a disposition to produce a certain outcome in a
single experiment. These are much more problematic for
the distinction we are trying to make, as they do not refer
to entities other than the individual system. Thus, in a
single case propensity theory, it may not be possible to
make a clean distinction that is analogous to the Bayesian
distinction between ontic and epistemic states.
Before concluding, note that many philosophers take a
more laissez faire approach to objective chances. Whilst
they believe that objective chances exist, they do not
commit to a specific theory and are instead content to
specify some rules that they must obey, such as Lewis’
principal principle [155]. This is a perfectly reasonable
attitude to take, but it is unreasonable to expect that the
question of whether chances are intrinsic properties can
be settled at this level of generality. Some further features
of objective chance would need to be specified, such as
whether or not they ought to be Humean.
In summary, most theories of objective chance seem to
admit a distinction equivalent to the Bayesian distinction
between ontic and epistemic states in that chances refer
to non intrinsic facts about a system. The problematic
theories are single-case, such as the single-case propen-
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sity theory. However, it seems a bit of a stretch to adopt
this theory in order to avoid investigating the question of
whether quantum states are ontic or epistemic, particu-
larly since the interpretation of quantum theory is a prime
motivation for introducing objective chances in the first
place.
B. The Kochen–Specker model
This appendix proves that the Kochen–Specker model
of Example 4.6 reproduces the quantum predictions and
is maximally ψ-epistemic. Recall that, in the Kochen–
Specker model, the quantum state
[
ψ
]
is represented by a
unique probability measure
µ(Ω) =
∫
Ω
p(~λ) sinϑdϑdϕ, (281)
over the Bloch sphere, where the density p is given by
p(~λ) =
1
pi
H
(
~ψ · ~λ
)
~ψ · ~λ, (282)
and H is the Heaviside step function. The condi-
tional probability distribution for a measurement M ={[
φ
]
,
[
φ⊥
]}
is given by
Pr(φ|M, ~λ) = H(~φ · ~λ) (283)
Pr(φ⊥|M, ~λ) = 1 − Pr(φ|M, ~λ). (284)
To prove that this reproduces the quantum predictions,
we need to show that, for any pair of states
[
ψ
]
and
[
φ
]
,∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) = Tr ([φ] [ψ]) . (285)
The corresponding equation for
[
φ⊥
]
will then be auto-
matically satisfied because∫
Λ
Pr(φ⊥|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) = 1 −
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ). (286)
To prove Eq. (285), it is convenient to choose a param-
eterization of the Bloch sphere such that both ~ψ and ~φ lie
on the equator. We can further choose ~ψ to point along
the x axis so that ~ψ = (1, 0, 0) and ~φ = (cosϕφ, sinϕφ, 0)
for some angle −pi < ϕφ ≤ pi. Using Eq. (28), this means
that the right hand side of Eq. (285) is
Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
= |〈φ|ψ〉|2 = 1
2
(
1 + cos(ϕφ)
)
. (287)
Now, expanding the left hand side of Eq. (285) gives∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ)
=
1
pi
∫
Λ
H(~φ · ~λ)H
(
~ψ · ~λ
)
~ψ · ~λ sinϑdϑdϕ. (288)
Since ~λ = (sinϑ cosϕ, sinϑ sinϕ, cosϑ), we have
~ψ · ~λ = sinϑ cosϕ (289)
~φ · ~λ = sinϑ cosϕ cosϕφ + sinϑ sinϕ sinϕφ (290)
= sinϑ cos
(
ϕ − ϕφ
)
. (291)
Due to he Heaviside step functions, we only need to
integrate over the region where both of these are positive.
This is the intersection of −pi2 < ϕ < pi2 and −pi2 + ϕφ <
ϕ < pi2 + ϕφ. When ϕφ is positive this is the interval−pi2 + ϕφ < ϕ < pi2 and when ϕφ is negative this is the
interval −pi2 < ϑ < pi2 + ϕφ. Consider first the case where
ϕφ is positive. Then Eq. (288) reduces to∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) =
∫ pi
0
sin2 ϑdϑ
∫ pi
2
− pi2 +ϕφ
cosϕdϕ
(292)
=
1
2
[
sinϕ
] pi
2
− pi2 +ϕφ (293)
=
1
2
(
1 + sin
(
pi
2
− ϕφ
))
(294)
=
1
2
(
1 + cosϕφ
)
, (295)
as required. The case where ϕφ is negative gives the same
result because sin is an odd function.
To prove that the model is maximally ψ-epistemic, let
ν be the probability measure associated with
[
φ
]
, i.e.
ν(Ω) =
∫
Ω
q(~λ) sinϑdϑdϕ, (296)
where
q(~λ) =
1
pi
H
(
~φ · ~λ
)
~φ · ~λ. (297)
We then need to show that∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) =
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ), (298)
for any Ω such that ν(Ω) = 1. Assume that ϕφ is positive
(the negative case follows the same logic). Let,
Ωψ =
{
~λ ∈ Λ
∣∣∣∣∣0 < ϑ < pi,−pi2 < ϕ < pi2
}
(299)
Ωφ =
{
~λ ∈ Λ
∣∣∣∣∣0 < ϑ < pi,−pi2 + ϕφ < ϕ < pi2 + ϕφ
}
.
(300)
Note that, for any measurable set Ω∫
Ω
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) =
∫
Ω∩Ωψ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ), (301)
because p(~λ) is zero outside Ωψ. Note also that Ωφ is
a measure one set according to ν because q(~λ) is zero
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outside this set. However, in proving that the model
reproduces the quantum predictions, we showed that∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) =
∫
Ωψ∩Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) (302)
= Tr
([
φ
] [
ψ
])
, (303)
and hence∫
Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) =
∫
Ωψ∩Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) (304)
=
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ), (305)
so we have the required property for the special case of
the set Ωφ.
Now let Ω be any other set that is of measure one
according to ν. We can write Ω as the union of two
disjoint sets via
Ω =
(
Ω ∩Ωφ
)
∪
(
Ω\Ωφ
)
. (306)
The set Ω\Ωφ is of measure zero according to ν because
q(~λ) is zero outside Ωφ. This means that Ω ∩ Ωφ is of
measure one. Further, Pr(φ|M, ~λ) is also zero outside Ωφ
so ∫
Ω\Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) = 0. (307)
Therefore, we only need to show that∫
Ω∩Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) =
∫
Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ). (308)
To see this, note that µ and ν are absolutely continuous
with respect to one another on Ωψ∩Ωφ. Since, Ω∩Ωφ is of
measure one according to ν, Ωφ\
(
Ω ∩Ωφ
)
is of measure
zero according to ν and hence, by absolute continuity,
Ωψ ∩
(
Ωφ\
(
Ω ∩Ωφ
))
is of measure zero according to
both ν and µ. Thus,∫
Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ)
=
∫
Ωψ∩Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) (309)
=
∫
Ωψ∩Ωφ∩Ω
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ)
+
∫
Ωψ∩(Ωφ\(Ω∩Ωφ))
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) (310)
=
∫
Ωψ∩Ωφ∩Ω
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ) + 0 (311)
=
∫
Ω∩Ωφ
Pr(φ|M, ~λ)dµ(~λ), (312)
as required.
C. Kochen–Specker contextuality
Kochen–Specker contextuality is not directly related to
ψ-ontology, but many of the consequences of ψ-ontology
can alternatively be derived from it.
The notion of contextuality first arose in Kochen and
Specker’s attempt to prove a no-go theorem for hidden
variable theories [76]. Kochen and Specker’s definition
of contextuality only deals with projective measurements,
but this has since been generalized and given a more
operational spin by Spekkens [67], and we follow his
approach here. The basic idea is that, if two things are
operationally equivalent in quantum theory, i.e. if they
always give rise to the exact same observable probabil-
ities, then they should be represented the same way in
an ontological model. Applied to measurements, this is
formally defined as follows.
Definition C.1. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of it.
Θ is measurement noncontextual if, for each M ∈ M,
ΞM consists of a single unique conditional probability
distribution, and, whenever there exists M,M′ ∈ M and
a POVM element E such that E ∈ M and E ∈ M′, then,
for all λ,
Pr(E|M, λ) = Pr(E|M′, λ). (313)
Otherwise, Θ is measurement contextual.
If a measurement M contains the POVM element E,
then, for a system prepared in the state ρ, the outcome
E always occurs with probability Tr (Eρ), regardless of
how the measurement is implemented. Additionally, if
another measurement M′ also contains E then the out-
come E still has the same quantum probability Tr (Eρ) in
the measurement M′ as it did in M. Since there is nothing
in the quantum predictions that distinguishes E occur-
ring in these different contexts, a noncontextual model
should represent them all in the same way. Note that,
since ΞM is a singleton for every M ∈ M in a noncon-
textual model, we can unambiguously refer to a unique
conditional probability distribution Pr(E|M, λ) associated
to each measurement.
The classic example of the same measurement operator
occurring in more than one POVM is to take two orthonor-
mal bases,
{∣∣∣φ j〉}d−1j=0 and {∣∣∣∣φ′j〉}d−1j=0 , such that |φ0〉 = ∣∣∣φ′0〉.
Such a pair can be constructed from a unitary U that
leaves |φ0〉 invariant via
∣∣∣∣φ′j〉 = U ∣∣∣φ j〉. Then, the two
measurements M =
{[
φ j
]}d−1
j=0
and M′ =
{[
φ′j
]}d−1
j=0
share
the common projector
[
φ0
]
. This can only happen nontriv-
ially if d ≥ 3, since if d = 2 and U |φ0〉 = |φ0〉 then U |φ1〉
can only differ from |φ1〉 by a global phase. For non pro-
jective POVMs, nontrivial examples can be constructed
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for d = 2 as well (see [67] for details), but we are only
concerned with the traditional Kochen–Specker notion
of contextuality here, which only applies to projective
measurements.
Note that, given a POVM M = {E0, E1, E2}, we can
construct another POVM N = {E0, E1 + E2} by coarse-
graining the second and third outcomes. One way of
implementing N is to perform the measurement M, but
only record whether or not the zeroth outcome occurred,
i.e. lump outcomes 1 and 2 together into a single outcome.
Because of this, it is natural to assume that the conditional
probability distribution representing N satisfies
Pr(E0|N, λ) = Pr(E0|M, λ), (314)
since the coarse-graining is just a classical post-
processing of the outcome of the measurement that hap-
pens after the measurement is made. If this holds then
measurement contextuality implies that the conditional
probability distribution representing a measurement de-
pends on more than just which POVM is measured. In
addition to this, different methods of implementing the
exact same POVM must also sometimes be represented
by different conditional probability distributions.
To see this, consider again the two measurements M ={[
φ j
]}d−1
j=0
and M′ =
{[
φ′j
]}d−1
j=0
with d = 3 and suppose that
Pr (φ0|M, λ) , Pr (φ0∣∣∣M′, λ) . (315)
Then, since E⊥ =
[
φ1
]
+
[
φ2
]
=
[
φ′1
]
+
[
φ′2
]
, we have
two ways of implementing the coarse-grained measure-
ment N =
{[
φ0
]
, E⊥
}
, either by measuring M and then
coarse-graining over
[
φ1
]
and
[
φ2
]
or by measuring M′
and coarse-graining over
[
φ′1
]
and
[
φ′2
]
. Both of these
procedures correspond to the same POVM, but the
[
φ0
]
outcome is represented by Pr (φ0|M, λ) in the first case
and Pr (φ0|M′, λ) in the second. Since these are not equal,
the same POVM is represented by two different condi-
tional probability distributions, depending on how the
measurement is implemented. It is for this reason that,
generally, a measurement M has to be represented by a
set ΞM of conditional probability distributions rather than
just a single one.
Definition C.2. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
whereM consists of projective measurements. An onto-
logical model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) of F is Kochen–Specker
(KS) noncontextual if it is both:
• Outcome deterministic: for all M ∈ M, E ∈ M, λ ∈
Λ, every Pr ∈ ΞM satisfies
Pr(E|M, λ) ∈ {0, 1}. (316)
• Measurement noncontextual.
Otherwise the model is KS contextual.
In other words, KS noncontextuality only applies
to projective measurements and is the combination of
Spekkens’ notion of measurement noncontextuality with
outcome determinism, i.e. the idea that the ontic state
should determine the outcome of a projective measure-
ment with certainty. The Kochen–Specker Theorem [76],
and other proofs of KS contextuality [157–164], show that
it is impossible to construct a KS noncontextual model
for all projective measurements in Hilbert spaces of di-
mension ≥ 3.
Note that a model may be KS contextual either by
being measurement contextual or by being nondeter-
ministic. It can of course be both, but either one on
its own is sufficient to reproduce the quantum predic-
tions. The Beltrametti–Bugajski model is an exam-
ple of a model that is nondeterministic, but measure-
ment noncontextual because the conditional probabilities
Pr(E|M, [λ]) = Tr (E [λ]) just mimic the quantum prob-
abilities, which only depend on E, and not on which M
containing E is measured nor on how M is implemented.
On the other hand, the Bell model is deterministic, but
measurement contextual because the way in which the
unit interval is divided up depends on all of the basis
projectors in the measurement and their ordering.
Unlike ψ-ontology, KS contextuality does not obvi-
ously imply excess baggage, but many of the other im-
plications of ψ-ontology are implied by KS contextuality.
Therefore, one might wonder whether ψ-ontology implies
KS contextuality. This is not the case, as the Bell model
in two dimensions is ψ-ontic but can be converted into a
KS noncontextual model by reordering the way in which
the unit interval is divided, e.g. by making the first inter-
val always correspond to the measurement outcome in the
northern hemisphere of the Bloch sphere. Similarly, there
are ψ-epistemic models that are KS contextual, such as
the ABCL model described in §7.5, so ψ-ontology and KS
contextuality are inequivalent constraints on ontological
models.
The following characterization of KS noncontextual
models will be useful in what follows.
Definition C.3. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
and let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of it. For
every M ∈ M, E ∈ M, Pr ∈ ΞM, let
Λ(E,M,Pr) = {λ ∈ Λ|Pr(E|M, λ) = 1} , (317)
and let
Λ(E,M) = ∩Pr∈ΞM Λ(E,M,Pr). (318)
The cosupport ΛE of a POVM element E is then
ΛE = ∩{M∈M|E∈M}Λ(E,M). (319)
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In other words, the cosupport of E is the set of on-
tic states that always return the outcome E whenever a
POVM that contains it is measured, for all possible meth-
ods of implementing the measurement.
Theorem C.4. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment,
whereM consists of projective measurements. If an onto-
logical model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) of F is KS noncontextual
then, for all M ∈ M, E ∈ M, ρ ∈ P, every µ ∈ ∆ρ satisfies∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = µ(ΛE). (320)
Proof. If Θ is KS noncontextual then there is only
one conditional probability distribution Pr ∈ ΞM and
Pr(E|M, λ) is independent of which measurement con-
taining E is performed, so, for any M containing E,
ΛE = Λ(E,M,Pr) = {λ ∈ Λ|Pr(E|M, λ) = 1}. Furthermore,
Pr(E|M, λ) is either equal to 0 or 1 everywhere, so we
only need integrate over those λ for which it is equal to 1.
This gives∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) =
∫
ΛE
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) (321)
=
∫
ΛE
dµ(λ) (322)
= µ(ΛE), (323)
as required. 
The converse to this theorem does not hold, i.e. if
Eq. (320) always holds then the model may still be KS
contextual. This is because there may be subsets of the
ontic state space that are of measure zero according to
all the probability measures that occur in the model. The
values of the conditional probability distributions on these
sets are not constrained by Eq. (320). However, a partial
converse can be obtained by excising some of the mea-
sure zero sets from the ontic state space. Since they are of
measure zero, their removal does not substantively affect
the structure of the model.
Definition C.5. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM frag-
ment. An ontological model Θ˜ = (Λ˜, Σ˜, ∆˜, Ξ˜) of F is
a measure zero revision of another ontological model
Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) of F if
• The ontic state space Λ˜ differs from Λ only by the
removal of a measure zero set. Formally, Λ˜ ∈ Σ and
for all ρ ∈ P and µ ∈ ∆ρ, µ(Λ˜) = 1. Further, Σ˜ is the
sub-σ-algebra of Σ containing all Ω ∈ Σ such that
Ω ⊆ Λ˜.
• The probability measures of Θ˜ are the restrictions of
the probability measures of Θ to (Λ˜, Σ˜). Formally,
for all ρ ∈ P, there is a surjective mapping f : ∆ρ →
∆˜ρ defined by
f [µ](Ω) = µ(Ω), (324)
for all Ω ∈ Σ˜.
• The conditional probability distributions of Θ˜ are
the restrictions of the conditional probability distri-
butions of Θ to Λ˜. Formally, for all M ∈ M, there is
a surjective mapping g : ΞM → Ξ˜M defined by,
g[Pr](E|M, λ) = Pr(E|M, λ), (325)
for all E ∈ M, λ ∈ Λ˜.
Performing a measure zero revision does not represent
a substantive change in the following sense. Imagine you
are passively observing an experimenter who is perform-
ing a sequence of prepare-and-measure experiments in
the fragment F. Suppose that, in addition to observing
the choices of preparation and measurement that the ex-
perimenter makes and the measurement outcomes she
obtains, you also get to see the exact ontic state λ in every
run of the experiment. You write down a long list of
data consisting of the preparation performed, the ontic
state, the choice of measurement, and the measurement
outcome in each run of the experiment. This data would
allow you to distinguish between an ontological model
Θ and a measure zero revision of it Θ˜ only if an ontic
state in Λ\Λ˜ happens to be occupied in at least one run
of the experiment, since this can only happen in Θ and
the probabilistic predictions made by the two models are
otherwise exactly the same. However, the probability
of this happening is zero because the set of ontic states
removed has zero probability according to all the proba-
bility measures in the theory. To all intents and purposes
then, the two models tell the same story about reality.
A partial converse to Theorem C.4 can be obtained as
follows.
Theorem C.6. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
whereM is at most countable and consists of projective
measurements. Let Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological
model of F. If, for all M ∈ M, E ∈ M, Pr ∈ ΞM, ρ ∈ P,
every µ ∈ ∆ρ satisfies∫
Λ
Pr(E|M, λ)dµ(λ) = µ(ΛE), (326)
then there exists a measure zero revision of Θ that is KS
noncontextual.
Proof. The measure zero revision Θ˜ = (Λ˜, Σ˜, ∆˜, Ξ˜) is
constructed as follows. First, let M = {E j} ∈ M and note
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that, for all ρ ∈ P and Pr ∈ ΞM, every µ ∈ ∆ρ satisfies
1 = µ(Λ) =
∫
Λ
dµ(λ) (327)
=
∫
Λ
∑
j
Pr(E j|M, λ)dµ(λ) (328)
=
∑
j
∫
Λ
Pr(E j|M, λ)dµ(λ) (329)
=
∑
j
µ(ΛE j), (330)
where the second line follows from
∑
j Pr(E j|M, λ) = 1
and the fourth from Eq. (326).
The sets ΛE j are disjoint because ΛE j ⊆ Λ(E j,M,Pr)
for every M that contains E and every Pr ∈ ΞM,
and if Pr(E j|M, λ) = 1 then it must be the case that
Pr(Ek|M, λ) = 0 for all k , j in order to satisfy∑
j Pr(E j|M, λ) = 1. Therefore, ΛM = ∪ jΛE j is a set
of measure one according to µ. Now set Λ˜ = ∩M∈MΛM.
This is also measure one according to µ, since it is the
intersection of an at most countable number of measure
one sets. The probability measures in the revision are
then obtained by restriction to Λ˜.
For any measurement M = {E j} ∈ M and Pr ∈ ΞM,
conditional probability distributions P˜r(E j|M, λ) obtained
by restriction of Pr(E j|M, λ) to Λ˜ are equal to 1 on ΛE j
and are zero elsewhere on Λ˜. The latter follows because
Λ˜ ⊆ ∪ jΛE j and we already saw that Pr(E j|M, λ) is equal
to zero on ΛEk for k , j. Thus, the model is outcome
deterministic. Further, it is measurement noncontextual
because ΛE j does not depend on the measurement context.
Thus, the model is KS noncontextual. 
In §5, we showed that ψ-ontic models cannot be maxi-
mally ψ-epistemic and that this implies preparation con-
textuality. KS contextuality can be used in place of ψ-
ontology to derive these results, in the following sense.
If we restrict attention to models of measurements in
complete orthonormal bases such that each measurement
outcome occurs in an at most countable set of contexts,
a maximally ψ-epistemic model has a measure zero re-
vision that is KS noncontextual. This means that the
Kochen–Specker theorem, which shows that KS noncon-
textual models that reproduce the quantum predictions are
impossible, can be used in place of ψ-ontology to derive
these results.
Theorem C.7. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
whereM consists of measurements in complete orthonor-
mal bases and, for each rank-one projector
[
φ
]
, the set
of M ∈ M that contains [φ] is at most countable. Let
Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) be an ontological model of F that re-
produces the quantum predictions and is such that, for
each M ∈ M, ΞM is at most countable. If Θ is maximally
ψ-epistemic then, for all pure states
[
ψ
]
,
[
φ
] ∈ P, every
µ ∈ ∆ψ satisfies
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dµ(λ) = µ(Λφ), (331)
for every M ∈ M that contains [φ] and every Pr ∈ ΞM,
and where Λφ is the cosupport of
[
φ
]
.
Proof. Let ν ∈ ∆φ and consider an M ∈ M that contains[
φ
]
. Then, in order to reproduce the quantum predictions,
for every Pr ∈ ΞM we must have
∫
Λ
Pr(φ|M, λ)dν(λ) = Tr ([φ] [φ]) = 1. (332)
In order for this to be true, there must be a set Ω ∈ Σ such
that ν(Ω) = 1 and Pr(φ|M, λ) is equal to one on Ω. Any
such set satisfies Ω ⊆ Λ(φ,M,Pr) and so Λ(φ,M,Pr) is also a
set of measure one according to ν. Since this applies to
any Pr ∈ ΞM, Λ(φ,M) = ∩Pr∈ΞM Λ(φ,M,Pr) is also a set of
measure one according to ν because it is the intersection
of an at most countable set of measure one sets. Finally,
Λφ = ∩{M∈M|[φ]∈M}Λ(φ,M) is a measure one according to
ν, since it too is the intersection of an at most countable
collection of measure one sets. Since Pr(φ|M, λ) is equal
to 1 on Λφ, we have
∫
Λφ
Pr(φ|Mλ)dµ(λ) =
∫
Λφ
dµ(λ) = µ(Λφ). (333)
Thus, Eq. (331) is a special case of Eq. (52), so it must
hold for a maximally ψ-epistemic model. 
Corollary C.8. Let F = 〈H,P,M〉 be a PM fragment
in which M is at most countable and consists of mea-
surements in complete orthonormal bases. Suppose that,
for all M ∈ M, [φ] ∈ M, it is also the case that[
φ
] ∈ P. Then, any maximally ψ-epistemic ontologi-
cal model Θ = (Λ,Σ,∆,Ξ) of F in which ΞM is at most
countable for each M ∈ M has a measure one revision
that is KS noncontextual.
The proof just consists of combining Theorem C.7 with
Theorem C.6.
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